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ABSTRACT 
"JACK OF ALL TRADES:" THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ARMORED CAVALRY IN 
VIETNAM 
Robert Manson Peters 
August, 2005 
This thesis is a chronological historical examination of armored cavalry doctrine 
and execution during the Vietnam War, with a focus on comparison of the armored 
cavalry's doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force with the 
reality of execution on the ground. In Vietnam, a metamorphosis occurred between these 
doctrinal missions and actual execution due to a series of factors, such as the nature of 
area warfare and a relative lack of doctrinal preparedness, the latter largely due to the 
doctrinal flux of the early 1960s, myths about warfare in Vietnam, and institutional 
resistance. The metamorphosis also occurred because it had to, and could, because of the 
many positive attributes of the cavalry, and because a series of other new enablers 
supplanted and masked the loss of cavalry in performing their doctrinal missions. The 
enablers ranged from new reconnaissance concepts and units, to the rise of technologies 
and increased surveillance abilities. Despite all the changes in execution from doctrine 
due to the demands of an extremely complex and multi-faceted war, cavalry and armor 
doctrine returned to its conventional focus following the war, while most of the adapted 
doctrine was relegated to peripheral manuals. 
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In accordance with Webster's dictionary, doctrine has several meanings, all 
interrelated and applicable in the military sense. The definitions represent the entire 
range of Army operations from the smallest unit levels up to national level policy. First, 
doctrine is "something taught." Second, it is "a principle or body of principles presented 
by a specific field, system, or organization for acceptance or belief." In the case of the 
cavalry, it is part of the proponent of armor and cavalry, a branch of the combat arms. 
Doctrine according to this second definition also serves as a common language with the 
other combat arms, infantry and artillery. Third, doctrine can be a "rule or principle of 
law, especially when established by precedent," which are universally applicable 
concepts such as mass, speed, agility, tempo, surprise, etc, which can be used in the 
application of more specific doctrine. Fourthly, it can be a "statement of government 
policy, especially in foreign affairs." This is where doctrine connects military activities 
with government policy objectives. I 
Doctrine is at times prescriptive, outlining specific actions to take; at other times 
it is a general guideline, not to be followed all the time to the letter, but to be adjusted on 
the ground as needed, dependent on the factors of METT - mission accomplishment, 
enemy factors, friendly troops capability, and the dictates of the terrain. So, while it can 
1 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988), S.Y. "doctrine." 
be specific, doctrine is also set of guidelines within which to operate. To add to this, 
doctrine can, and must change if determined that something entirely different or some 
variation of doctrine works better. If an army cannot adapt when necessary, it will fail. 
Doctrinally, the history of the mission of the cavalry is lively and varied. From 
the earliest times, cavalry (mounted warfare) contributed in many different ways to the 
conduct of warfare, including providing greater speed, mass, and shock affect. Cavalry 
has always been characterized by speed, but yet aspects of the cavalry have been 
emphasized differently at different times. For example, shock affect was used by the 
cuirassiers of Napoleon, while shock effect was not used by cavalry during the U.S. Civil 
War in the same sense. 
Perhaps cavalry's greatest and most significant doctrinal role, however, has been 
reconnaissance. The ability to conduct reconnaissance was greatly improved by the 
mobility of the horse, using it to transport the soldier in order to find the enemy more 
quickly. The cavalry used its speed and mobility to gain and maintain contact with the 
enemy, preferably with stealth, in order to gain intelligence for and protect the remainder 
of maneuver forces. Typically the cavalry gained and maintained contact with the enemy 
in order to allow the rest of the friendly maneuver forces to destroy the enemy at a critical 
point on the battlefield. Cavalry also confirmed or denied the disposition of enemy 
elements for planning purposes for friendly missions, and countered enemy 
reconnaissance. 
Reconnaissance was the primary mission of cavalry leading into World War II, 
but by the end of the war, U.S. cavalry came to be associated with a more robust set of 
2 
"trinity" doctrinal missions: reconnaissance, security, and economy of force. 2 The ability 
and requirement doctrinally to conduct these missions set the cavalry apart from pure 
tank forces. The goal of security is to keep the main force from being under observation 
by the enemy, and to keep them safe from surprise. Security missions consisted of 
screening, guarding, or covering the main body of forces from enemy reconnaissance and 
enemy main forces, with each mission representing increasing levels of protection. 
Economy of force is both a principle of war and an operation, and consists of offensive or 
defensive missions that direct cavalry forces to find the enemy, and then conduct an array 
of military operations once contact is made. The principle of economy of force is to 
occupy as many of the enemy's forces as possible with a smaller, armed and mobile force 
specially trained and equipped for the task (such as the cavalry), thus allowing and 
facilitating the bulk of friendly force maneuver units' ability to achieve their objectives, 
which mayor may not be the destruction of that particular enemy force. Thus, by the end 
of World War II, regarding reconnaissance, it was an accepted concept that cavalry 
needed to have the means to fight for information; stealth, while worthwhile, was not 
always practical or achievable. However, by the end of World War II, the cavalry was 
associated with all three "trinity" missions rather than just reconnaissance. 
Cavalry doctrine of the mid-1960's, leading up to the introduction of ground 
forces in South Vietnam, still centered on the "trinity." Cavalry doctrine was primarily 
based, as was the larger Army doctrine, on a conventional conflict such as World War II, 
or a future Cold War conflict with Warsaw Pact forces on a European battlefield, even 
though President Kennedy's policy of "Flexible Response" of the early 1960's sought to 
2 The term "trinity", for the doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force was first 
observed in the monograph by Major 1. Bryan Mullins, "The Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry." 
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prepare the Army to fight low-intensity conflicts such as insurgencies. Conventional 
conflict was linear warfare with front lines whieh demarcated friendly from enemy, and 
was based on the threat model of Warsaw Pact forces of the Cold War. The reality of the 
situation in Vietnam, however, necessitated fighting differently, and thus challenged 
cavalry doctrine, causing in-country changes and adjustments, some of which found their 
way into doctrine after the fact. 
In general, doctrine did not reflect, or predict the ultimate type of conflict that 
U.S. forces faced in Vietnam. Doctrine lagged mainly because it did not anticipate the 
nature of the war in Vietnam and what it would require of an Army with largely 
conventional doctrine, although there were some warning signs. Further, there were 
several large myths about the Vietnam War which arguably retarded doctrinal 
preparation, including the idea that fighting guerillas was infantryman's work and that the 
jungle was no place for armor. The prior defeat of the French in Vietnam created 
wariness of meeting the same demise. In short, the myths helped delay doctrinal efforts 
to prepare for what lay ahead. By the end of the Vietnam War, however, if not sooner, 
the myths were dispelled, and armored cavalry more than proved themselves. The 
resulting experiences were enough collectively to cause the Army to coin a new doctrinal 
term for their collective operations in Vietnam: stability operations. 
In the Vietnam War, the armored cavalry that participated varied: divisional 
cavalry squadrons, an armored cavalry regiment, air cavalry troops and squadrons, and 
separate cavalry troops. This study looks at the doctrine and execution of the division 
cavalry squadrons and one armored cavalry regiment. The division cavalry squadron is 
by doctrine the reconnaissance, security, and economy of force asset for the division - the 
4 
"eyes and ears." On the eve of Vietnam, their organization consisted of three ground 
cavalry troops and an air cavalry troop. The three cavalry platoons that made up the 
ground troops were integrated, combined arms platoons composed of a tank section, a 
scout section, a mounted rifle squad, and a support squad that provided mortar support. 
This organization was an extremely effective and potent combined arms team. The 
armored cavalry regiment was by doctrine responsible for the same trinity of missions. It 
was a "stand alone" asset that could be used as part of army groups, armies, or COrpS.3 
The regiment consisted mainly of three ground squadrons of three cavalry troops and one 
tank troop each, plus one air cavalry troop for the entire regiment. Additionally, every 
squadron in the regiment, plus the division cavalry squadrons had their own howitzer 
battery artillery, which gave them a lot of additional firepower under their own control. 
There were other separate cavalry troops that served in Vietnam, but they are not part of 
the scope of this study.4 
The U.S. Army's challenge in Vietnam was new because the war brought together 
levels of complexity previously not seen. The war stands out for this reason. It was an 
atypical war - so much so that to this day there is disagreement as to what type of war it 
was - a conventional war, an unconventional war, a counterinsurgent war, a 
revolutionary war, a war against colonialism, a war won by politicians and lost by 
generals or vice versa, a war of winning the "hearts and minds" of the people, a waf of 
South Vietnamese leadership, or a blend of any of these. In fact, this confusion over 
terminology is in itself instructive.5 In the end, perhaps the best definition is that the U.S. 
3 FM 17-95, Armored Cavalry Regiment 1960, 7. 
~ The First Cavalry Division was not truly cavalry in the sense of conducting trinity missions; rather, they 
were an airmobile division with primarily maneuver missions. 
5 Major Robert A. Doughty, 'The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976." 
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faced a largely insurgent, guerilla-style enemy that could strike anywhere at any time by 
using the jungle terrain to his advantage, resulting in a non-linear and omni-directional 
battlefield, which created area warfare - a war with no front lines. Area warfare resulted 
from this combination of the challenging terrain, and an enemy that largely refused to 
face U.S. conventional forces, except on his terms. 
At the same time, the war in Vietnam created a three-fold challenge for doctrine 
and execution. At the top of spectrum there was still a conventional enemy threat-
mainly the North Vietnamese regular units that fought in South Vietnam. In the middle 
were the various Viet Cong units, from small guerrilla groups of 3-4 individuals, to 
battalion and regimental-sized units. At the other end was pacification -- the civil-
military aspect of the war that emphasized providing assistance and security to the people 
of South Vietnam, along with empowering the South Vietnamese Army and government. 
All of these aspects of the war made it a major change for an Army that within the 
previous ten years had been postured first to fight a nuclear war on the plains of Europe, 
and then a conventional war. 
As a result of the challenges of fighting primarily an insurgent enemy in an area 
war in Vietnam, the doctrinal, conventional trinity missions of the cavalry changed in 
terms of execution, intent, and even meaning. The changes represented a metamorphosis 
between doctrinal missions and what was actually executed, but they also reflected 
attempts to better address the situation in Vietnam. Proof of the de facto metamorphosis 
of the trinity is found in new missions and mission terminology; comparison of execution 
with trinity doctrine; the need to conduct and the results of studies on the conduct of 
armored cavalry's operations in Vietnam, and in the flurry of new doctrine that appeared 
(Ft. Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 41. 
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in the late 1960' s. Further evidence is also found in the fact that execution led doctrine, 
and in the proliferation of armor doctrinal tasks. 
In light of all of the unique aspects of the war, doctrinal questions still exist. Most 
military leaders from that era qualified their commentary with the typical statement to the 
effect that while modified, cavalry doctrine was "still valid." However, if it is safe to say 
that doctrine's mission is preparing U.S. soldiers for the next conflict, then in the case of 
the cavalry, with regard to Vietnam the mission failed. What actually happened was that 
execution led and doctrine followed. Execution relied on basic combat skills already 
developed by the units. In the process., by heaping new missions on the plate of the 
cavalry, the trinity missions were largely supplanted, but yet the doctrine that was 
outlined in response to the new missions was too cursory. Vietnam was not the first time, 
however, that cavalry entered a conflict expecting to perform certain missions and exited 
with something different. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
THE ROAD TO VIETNAM 
U.S. Cavalry previously experienced a doctrinal metamorphosis in the heat of 
conflict. Immediately prior to World W'ar II, the role of cavalry was to serve as light, 
reconnaissance oriented forces. During the course of the war, cavalry units became 
progressively better armed and equipped, and as a result they were increasingly able to 
function in a combat role, freeing up heavier combat maneuver units to concentrate 
elsewhere. The end result was that they saw fewer and fewer reconnaissance missions, 
and by the end of the war the cavalry had evolved into a trinity role with expanded 
emphasis on economy of force and security missions.6 
An example of this is how in 1943, the concept of a cavalry group was created, 
which consisted of two cavalry reconnaissance squadrons and other attachments, and 
which typically operated in support of a COrpS.7 They took advantage of their mobility 
and firepower to cover vast expanses of terrain, with minimal forces. A reconnaissance 
platoon of nine vehicles had the same firepower as dismounted infantry company, but far 
better mobility and communications.s At the end of the war a study of cavalry group 
missions revealed the shift in expectations of their use from reconnaissance to other 
areas: 3% on reconnaissance, 33% defending terrain, 29% special operations (acting as 
6 Major J. Bryan Mullins, "Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry," (M.M.S. Monograph, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 34. 
7 Major 1. Bryan Mullins, "Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry," 36. 
8 Major J. Bryan Mullins, "Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry," 37. 
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a mobile reserve, providing for security and control of rear areas), 10% in the attack, and 
25% providing security. Another example is the Cavalry Recon Squadrons, which 
belonged to divisions. They performed reconnaissance missions 13% of the time.9 These 
percentages, among others, and the evolution of mechanized cavalry during the war, were 
used to justify the growing emphasis on the full trinity of operations (as opposed to 
primarily reconnaissance). The emphasis continued after the war. Clearly, the doctrine 
at the beginning of the war was not in synch with the actual missions conducted. 
Reconnaissance, still the point of emphasis at the time of the Normandy invasion, was 
reduced over the course of the campaign in France and Germany - a significant 
difference between the doctrine, and actual execution. At the end of the war, surveys and 
studies were conducted on Mechanizedl Cavalry operations. Out of these came the 
conclusions that combat was necessary in order to conduct reconnaissance, and that 
cavalry units were seen as "multi-functional units that could do just about anything with 
the right mix of attachments."IO 
Thus, though cavalry in both World War II and Vietnam experienced differences between 
doctrine and execution, the execution in World War II became the new cavalry doctrine 
at the end of the war. In Vietnam, this was not the case. 
Toward Vietnam and Flexible Response 
The history of world events, politics, and resultant military strategy went through 
many changes during the intervening 20 years between WW II and the war in Vietnam. 
In the aftermath of WW II, the Cold War began - a war of words and tensions, based on 
9 Major J. Bryan Mullins, "Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry," 36. 
10 General Board Report, "Mechanized Cavalry Units," File R 320.2/6, Study Number 49, 1945. Armor 
School Library, Ft. Knox, KY, 9. 
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the concept of mutually assured destruction. As a function of this new weaponry, politics 
and military strategy changed, and as they did, so too did military doctrine. 
While the world managed to avoid the ultimate clash of nuclear arms, through 
mutual deterrence, the trade-off was a rash of other classifications of warfare that sprang 
up. Most were not new to the history of warfare, but what was new was an attempt to 
study and label them. Among them were partisan warfare, guerilla warfare, irregular 
warfare, revolutionary warfare, and unconventional warfare. Most of these types had 
occurred before, repeatedly, throughout history. 
In 1961, the Kennedy administration brought with it reforms in the military that 
would affect the conduct of the war in more ways than one. With an increasingly 
belligerent Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the helm, Kennedy came in believing 
that the world was a critical juncture, and that the survival of the U.S. depended on its 
ability to "defend "free" institutions" without necessarily using the nuclear option. With 
this in mind, he moved to expand options for the containment of Communism. II 
Realizing that the military needed to be able to meet threats in emerging 
countries, seen as the next battlegrounds in the fight against Communism, he adopted the 
policy of "Flexible Response," replacing the "massive retaliation" policy of Eisenhower. 
The essence of "Flexible Response" was to better prepare the military to fight without 
nuclear weapons. 12To do this a more flexible organizational structure was needed, one 
that could respond to the "entire spectrum" of possible conflicts because the Pentomic 
Division of the 1950's was oriented to nuclear war and lacked a flexible command and 
11 George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1986), 73-74. 
12 Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States 
of America. (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1984), 536. 
10 
control structure. Out of this came the Reorganization Objectives Army Division 
(ROAD). 13 
The ROAD divisions were a big shift from the Pentomic Division system of the 
1950s, which was created with the nuclear battlefield in mind. In a ROAD division 
infantry and armored divisions were markedly different structures. To increase flexibility 
the new ROAD Divisions all shared a common base of three brigade headquarters, a 
cavalry squadron, division artillery, division support command, engineer battalion, and 
eventually an air defense battalion. The Brigade Headquarters were to take control of 
tailored brigades, put together for any particular situation. While sharing a common base, 
there were four types of divisions: infantry divisions, with 8 infantry and 2 tank 
battalions; airborne infantry, with 8 airborne infantry battalions and one of assault guns; 
armored, with 6 tank and 5 mechanized infantry battalions, and newly created 
mechanized infantry divisions with 7 mechanized and 3 tank battalions. Other notable 
changes brought about by ROAD were that armored infantry shifted from armor 
proponency to infantry, and took the term mechanized infantry. 14 Even more 
significantly, as part of ROAD, the hellcopter came of age. Introduced during the Korean 
War, the helicopter found valuable use as part of the ROAD with the creation of air 
cavalry units and other units such as the airmobile infantry of the First Cavalry 
Division. 15 It was the ROAD divisions that served in Vietnam. 16 
13 Cpt. Jonathan House, Towards Combined Arms Waifare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine, and 
Organization in the 20th Century. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, Undated), 158. 
14 W. Blair Haworth, Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the 
Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army. (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1999), 29. 
IS Helicopters were formed into units with their own battlefield missions and doctrine. Prior to Vietnam, an 
air cavalry troop was added to each division's armored cavalry squadron, the armored cavalry regiment, 
and an air cavalry squadron was added to the airmobile division and infantry divisions. Additionally, there 
were some separate air cavalry troops. During Vietnam, some of these air cavalry troops became part of an 
11 
Adjusting to and anticipating the effects of "Flexible Response" was not easy. 
Adjustments of doctrine and organizations to perceived threats and challenges throughout 
the world, while arguably inevitable and necessary, were not without negative 
repercussions on the force. According to James Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia, part 
of the problem in the years prior to Vietnam, was "zig-zagging" doctrine, so called 
doctrine "du Jour." They believed that the Army entered Vietnam while in the middle of 
reorganizing from the nuclear war Pentomic Division configuration to fight a 
conventional-style war on the plains of Europe or elsewhere - not in a place like 
Vietnam. 17 
One problem appeared to have been that although President Kennedy recognized 
the rise of counterinsurgency warfare, the primary methods for fighting it were infantry-
centric. A sign of this was the "reinvigoration" of the Special Forces branch, specifically 
designed to address guerilla warfare-style fighting. The prevailing notion was that if the 
u.S. got involved in a limited war versus insurgents, it would be an infantryman's war. 
While not an incorrect notion, attempts to visualize mechanized forces participation in 
counterinsurgent warfare were lacking. W. Blair Haworth said about the Army in 1962 
that it relied on "conventional wisdom" regarding the use of armor in unconventional 
warfare, and that with doctrinal manuals focused on the conventional fight in Europe, 
independent aviation brigade, for use as a Corps asset. Additionally, the new Flexible Response doctrine 
drove the development and creation in 1965 of the I st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). 
16 Another significant occurrence in 1962 was the adoption of that year's version of 
FM 100-5, simply titled Field Service Regulations, but in practice this field manual was the army's 
doctrinal cornerstone, from which, in theory, all other detailed doctrinal statements would derive. The 
1962 edition set an important strategic tone, ironically just prior to major involvement in Vietnam, by 
dropping the concept of "wars of limited objective," which had come about after the Korean War, and 
instead introduced the concept of limited means, which essentially codified our reluctance to use nuclear 
weapons. Strategy ultimately would have an effect on the doctrine and conduct of the war at the 
operational and tactical levels. 
17 James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After 
Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond. (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1993), 73. 
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there was little of use for fighting in jungles or in confronting guerillas, except in the 
"context of rear-area security." 18As a rcsult of the infantry-centric approach in the early 
1960' s, armored cavalry units were not well prepared doctrinally for what lay ahead, and 
what lay ahead was daunting. Perhaps the conversion to the ROAD structures was seen 
as sufficient, enough change at one time. Indeed, the ROAD structures moved the Army 
far toward better preparing it for the complexities of Vietnam, and the flexibility that 
would be needed there. 
The Origins of the Vietnam War 
The origins of the complex Vietnam War and roots of the insurgency began long 
before the involvement of the U.S. In the wake of World War II, the French, weakened 
by two World Wars, were trying to reassert their colonial hold over Indochina - present-
day Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. While France's hold was weakened, Vietnamese 
nationalism had strengthened during the struggle against Japan. Perhaps the most 
prominent guerrilla leader in that struggle had been Communist-trained Ho Chi Minh. 
He proclaimed his country's independence and established the Democratic Government 
of Vietnam (DRV) in August, 1945. 19 As the French sought to reestablish their control, 
they clashed with the Vietnamese, led by Ho. The armed conflict began in 1946, and 
ended ignominiously for the French in 1954 after the disaster at the battle of Dien Bien 
The French control was deteriorating around the same time the U.S. was signing 
the armistice that halted the Korean War, a year earlier in 1953. In light of both events, 
18 h Hawort , Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way, 30. 
19 James M. Morris, America's Armed Forces: A History. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996), 
327. 
20 John M. Carroll and Collin F. Baxter, eds., The American Military Tradition, From Colonial Times to 
the Present. (Wilmington, DE : Scholarly Resources, Inc.), 205. 
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and the Communist victory over the Nationalists in China in 1949, the U.S. determined 
that Indochina was part of the frontier in the Cold War. Accordingly, the U.S. provided 
monetary aid and a handful of U.S. military advisors to support the French prior to 1954. 
In fact, by 1954, the U.S. was paying for 78% of all French War costS. 21 
Despite U.S. support, France withdrew from Vietnam in 1954 after their defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu, and the Geneva Peace accords divided Vietnam into two parts, north and 
south, with the understanding that in 1956 they would be reunited. In the meantime, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) set up a government in the north, so-named and 
headed by Ho, while a U.S.-backed government was established in the south. As part of 
the accords, reunification was to occur in 1956, and elections were supposed to be part of 
it. However, newly elected South Vietnamese President Diem, with American backing, 
blocked them.22 This reflected concerns that a country-wide election with the more 
populous and Communist North Vietnamese would not be legitimate or desirable. By 
1959 fighting again broke out with Communist guerrillas known as the Viet Cong, who 
used terrorist tactics and other small-scale actions against the South Vietnamese 
')3 
government. -. 
The VC's roots came from the Communist Viet Minh, who fought against the 
French. Many of the cadres of the Viet Minh were left behind in the south in 1954 when 
the Vietnam was partitioned, and they established the organization that became known as 
the Viet Cong (VC) - a political and paramilitary organization. The VC initially pursued 
a policy of subversion, spying, and terror, which later escalated into guerrilla warfare. By 
1960, the VC were employing battalion-sized units, and by 1964, formations of North 
21 Caroll and Baxter, The American Military Tradition, 204. 
22 Herring, America's Longest War, 54. 
23 Carroll and Baxter, The American Military Tradition, 205. 
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Vietnamese forces were in the South. At that time they were getting ready to make their 
final push to destabilize and bring about governmental change in South Vietnam.24 
In retrospect, it appears that there was a pattern of escalation on the part of the 
enemy. From the time France left Vietnam until around 1960, the guerrillas used tactics 
of small unit terror strikes, assassinations and other acts of destabilization. Around 1960, 
battalion-sized attacks by the VC began, and in the space of one year the attacks were 
rising in frequency, with multi-battalion attacks appearing in 1961. The South 
Vietnamese struggled mightily to turn back the tide, raising the numbers of their armed 
forces, as well as concentrating on other aspects of fighting the insurgency such as 
pacification - the business of securing and bettering the lives of citizens in the 
countryside. However, with the assassination of President Diem in 1963, the resultant 
turmoil in the South Vietnamese government erased most of their progress. By 1964, VC 
battalions were growing into regiments, and regiments were budding into divisions. The 
war was careening toward a final "mobile" phase of open warfare, an overt military grab 
for power. By 1965, the crisis had deepened. The first units of North Vietnamese 
Regulars were in the south, and were threatening to cut the country in half, and it became 
apparent that South Vietnam could not hold off the Communists for much longer. By the 
spring, with the South Vietnamese hemorrhaging men and ground to the enemy, the stage 
was set for U.S. intervention with ground troops. 25 
The 1962 CI Study 
In the early 1960' s, there were those who strove to read the tea leaves and plan for 
the counterinsurgent warfare threat posed by the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese 
24 Lieutenant General Bernard Rogers, Vietnam Studies: Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point. 
(Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 1974), 2. 
25 Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 5. 
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supporters. While the Army at large grappled with understanding, defining and preparing 
for a counterinsurgency, not to mention the transition to the ROAD, all as part of the 
concept of "Flexible Response," some members of the armor community did as well. 
Perhaps the most striking harbinger of what was to come in Vietnam for the 
armor/cavalry community came in the form of special study, produced by the U.S. Army 
Armor Combat Developments Agency at Fort Knox, released in 1962. The study was 
prophetically entitled 'The Role of Armored Cavalry in Counterinsurgency Operations." 
Its stated purpose was to examine operational and organizational concepts for armor and 
cavalry units in counterinsurgency operations in order to determine how the 
armor/cavalry school and force might best prepare. The study was initiated at the request 
of the by the Assistant Commandant of the Armor School at the time, as an "in house" 
project, but it grew enough to warrant sending it out ultimately all over the Army.26 
The study began by making some overarching observations. It stated that an 
insurgent-style war with an enemy that appears and disappears demanded "a reappraisal 
of our organizations and tactical doctrines to insure our ability to assist established 
friendly governments against this new form of Communist threat." It also stated that 
"comprehensive national counterinsurgency plans are required to integrate and coordinate 
the use of all military and non-military means." It further recommended organizationally 
that "armored cavalry organizations be recognized as capable of employment in 
counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia and similar areas. ,,27 
26 U.S. Army Armor Center Combat Developments Agency Study, "The Role of Armored Cavalry in 
Counterinsurgent Operations, 1962, Armor School Library, Ft. Knox, Transmittal Memo. 
27 USAARCDA Study, 2 and Abstract. Organizationally, among its recommendations that were eventually 
adopted were the replacement of the aviation company of the armored cavalry regiment with a modified air 
cavalry troop, and the addition of an air cavalry troop to each Divisional Cavalry squadron, which also 
eventually happened, with incalculable positive affect. It recommended equipping squadrons with armored 
personnel carriers, such as the T 114 and the M 113 in lieu of '4 ton trucks as soon as possible, equipping 
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Getting more specific, the study makes uncannily accurate predictions and astute 
recommendations. It recommended that the doctrine and techniques contained in it be 
adopted for a modified cavalry organization, and that the modified organization be tested 
in the U.S. It elaborated on counterinsurgency, stating that "counterinsurgency warfare is 
an attempt at pacification," and that the basic military problem is "to maintain or restore 
internal security so that other elements of the counterinsurgency program can 
operate.,,28Purther, the study mentioned that military activities of friendly forces would 
consist of three phases: isolation, destruction, and reconstruction. Isolation was 
important because the study states that it is important to cut off the guerrilla from his 
source of support - the people. It mentions that reconstruction is usually carried out at 
the same time as the first two phases. It also mentions many of the points that eventually 
appeared in the 1973 version of the Division Cavalry manual eleven years later, including 
harassing insurgents to prevent regrouping, learning the terrain, mounting small scale 
operations to search for and attack insurgent bases, reacting promptly to attacks, and 
understanding the importance of the offense.29 
The study was an accurate predictor of how the trinity missions might be 
conducted in insurgent operation, and the predictions showed major modifications in the 
trinity. It predicted the cavalry's role in conducting security missions such as route and 
lines of communication security, convoy escort missions, and security of fixed sites. It 
predicted that route security and convoy escort would probably be the "primary tasks." 
Regarding reconnaissance, recommendations are sparse but accurate. It stated that "air 
them with protective cupolas and adding machine gun armament to them. All of this eventually happened. 
except that T 114 was found to unfit for duty and was fully replaced by the M 113. 
28 USAARCDA Study. 2. 
29 USAARCDA Study. 3. 
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and armored cavalry elements can conduct reconnaissance of "selected areas" and route 
reconnaissance. 3o The term "selected areas" was eerily similar to the term eventually 
adopted eleven years later in the 1973 manual, where the terms of zone or area 
reconnaissance or reconnaissance in force were replaced with the definition of "specific" 
reconnaissance. 31 There was no mention of economy of force. 
The most specific recommendations acknowledged the need for a change away 
from conventional tactics and doctrine, to doctrine that recognized a different enemy in 
different terrain. It acknowledged that in an insurgency, the primary focus was not on the 
terrain but rather on the enemy. The study further mentioned the advantages that 
armored cavalry forces would provide because of their protection, flexibility, and ability 
to offset any enemy armor, and that that ability to conduct convoy escorts would be 
useful. The study recommended that "current tactics and techniques of armored cavalry 
operations require considerable expansion for counterinsurgency operations," and 
identified the need for supplementary training for it. 32 
The study concluded with several informative annexes. The annexes were "The 
Potential Enemy," followed by "Friendly Forces," "Terrain Analysis," and "Tactics and 
Techniques of Counterinsurgency Operations." This last annex was particularly 
noteworthy, since it was taken almost verbatim and plugged into the 1965 Division 
Squadron Manual as the portion dealing with Counterinsurgency Operations! With 
regard to this last annex, the main difference was that the 1962 study stated that the 
conventional trinity tasks of the cavalry "do not necessarily" apply in counterinsurgency 
operations, whereas the 1965 Division Cavalry manual stated that the doctrine of armored 
30 USAARCDA Study,S. 
31 FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron 1973,8-4. 
32 USAARCDA Study, 8. 
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cavalry in "conventional offensive and defensive operations" applied to 
. .." countennsurgency sItuatIOns. --
The study missed the mark in some areas. It recommended the M114 armored 
personnel carrier (APC) to take the place of the light tanks in cavalry platoons, but the 
M 114 ultimately did not work out in Vietnam because its shape caused it to get stuck 
more easily when crossing through canals and similar terrain. Ultimately the Ml14 was 
replaced by the more mobile M 113 APC, while tanks proved themselves functional and 
worthwhile in Vietnam. 34 It stated, not entirely incorrectly, that "armored cavalry is 
marginally effective in performing encirclements and pursuits," but it touts the ability to 
conduct raids, ambushes, and counterattacks, but by the 1973 Division Cavalry manual, 
only the raid and ambush were still mentioned specifically as part of stability 
operations.35 It also undersold the notion of armored cross-country mobility. The study's 
authors attempted to get better knowledge of mobility in Vietnam by discussing various 
jungle areas in South America, but the trafficability map they produced of Vietnam and 
Indochina still showed most of the region as "impassable.,,36This issue of mobility, one of 
the most potent of the "anti-armor" advocates, would have to wait on actual experience 
and the results of later Army studies that would dissipate the myths surrounding it. The 
study proposed that to achieve better mobility than the insurgents, the armored cavalry 
33 USAARCDA Study, 195, E-I O. Further, it states that "tactically, armored cavalry must not become 
bogged down in attempting conventional operations against a usually elusive enemy, but must take 
advantage of superior flexibility and mobility, particularly air mobility." 
34 USAARCDA Study, G-2. Part of the issue with dispensing with tanks in the cavalry platoons is due to 
thc fact that the enemy was not anticipated to have tanks or anti-tank capability. It was thought that 
retaining the tank companies of the armored cavalry regiment would be enough in that event. 
35 FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1973, 15-5. 
36 USAARCDA Study, Tab A to Appendix 3. 
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"must be able to leave the ground and move through the air with much it its force.,,37 
While it is not exactly clear what lift assets would be able to transport that many armored 
vehicles through the air, it is true that air lift assets did eventually playa critical role in 
logistical resupply. 
The Counterinsurgent Study was thoughtful, and presaged many of the issues that 
surrounded the introduction of armored combat units to Vietnam, and continued to dog 
their execution in country. It predicted armored vehicles role in a combat environment 
such as Vietnam. It predicted the trinity tasks being conducted differently, especially 
with regard to security. It predicted area warfare, a defining characteristic of the war, by 
stating that "armored cavalry must expand its activities beyond conventional tactics and 
doctrine devised for different terrain and a different enemy. Such doctrine is designed 
generally to control ground; this enemy has little interest in the ground except as 
concealment for his activities.,,38 It also strove to fight for armor's place at the 
counterinsurgent table, while acknowledging that the infantry would be the "primary 
indigenous" counterinsurgency force?9The study's commentary on armor and cavalry's 
role in a counterinsurgent environment ret1ected a perception that their use in that type of 
environment was not widely, or seriously considered. 
Eerily prophetic though the Counterinsurgency Study was, its doctrinal 
recommendations were not heeded with the exception of its recommendations for 
organizational adjustments. Why recommendations were not acted on in terms of 
37 USAARCDA Study, 4. It may be that this thought was related to the fact that the CI Study stated a 
desire for the use of a light tank, with the possibility of air transportability, hence better mobility. With the 
M48A3, the main tank of the Divisional Cavalry, this was not possible. Later, in 1969, with introduction of 
the Sheridan tank, this idea may have been closer to reality. 
38 USAARCDA Study, 6. 
39 USAARCDA Study, 1-3. This is seen at the end of the report where the responses to the study from the 
Infantry Combat Development Agency are published, along with the responses from the Armor Combat 
Development Agency to them. 
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recognizing armored cavalry's potential contribution in the counterinsurgent fight and 
planning for it is a matter of question because lack of circulation was not the problem. In 
addition to the Fort Knox chain of command, it was staffed through the Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Group at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was 
directed to the attention of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments 
Command located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, while copies were furnished to other 
proponent schoois.4o 
The Influence of Mythologies of Armored Combat in the Jungle 
As the Counterinsurgent Study evidently felt compelled to point out, the use of 
mounted, armored units such as the cavalry were not truly considered part of the 
counterinsurgent strategy. In fact, their ultimate use in Vietnam was far from pre-
ordained, but rather seemed to happen by accident, despite such warning signs as the 
1962 study. Part of the reasons for a lack of serious institutional consideration and hence 
planning for their use stemmed from many sources, but a particularly large source were 
myths that existed about armored use in such environments. 
One of the largest of these myths was the nature of the terrain. Ever since the 
World War II, prevalent assumptions about the use of armored/mechanized units were 
based on armor studies from the battles and campaigns of Europe and North Africa. In 
contrast, the experience in Korea and the Pacific during Word War II suggested that tanks 
and mechanized forces were of limited use in the mountains and jungle.41 In Korea, 
experience showed that tanks tended to be more road-bound because of channeling, 
40 The Infantry School in particular provided pages of feedback, and it is extremely interesting to read. The 
report also includes USAARCDA's responses to their feedback. The infantry school"s overwhelming tone 
was that counterinsurgency was an infantryman's war. P. 1-16, USAARCDA, CI Study. 
41 General Don Starry, Mounted Combat In Vietnam. (Washington, D.C. : Department of the Army, 1978), 
6. 
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restrictive terrain, while in the Pacific theater, tanks were ultimately denied true mobility 
by the size of the islands that they fought on. 
What many did not seem to realize was that the terrain in Vietnam was actually 
much more suitable for armored and mechanized forces than initially believed. However, 
it took in-depth in-country studies to point this out, after ground forces arrived. The 
principal of these studies as they pertained to mounted combat was one entitled "The 
Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam," also 
known as the MACOV study, released in 1967. It was conducted to find out whether a 
pattern of mechanized and armor combat was emerging. By that time, U.S. ground forces 
had been involved in combat in Vietnam for two years. 
The study conducted terrain assessments of each of the four Corps 
Tactical Zones, starting with CTZ I in the north bordering North Vietnam, running II, III, 
and IV to the south respectively, with the IV CTZ being south of Saigon, primarily the 
Mekong Delta region. It revealed that terrain in Vietnam was quite passable by armor 
and mechanized units. This study by CTZ was important, because each CTZ had 
defining terrain and weather characteristics. I CTZ, the northernmost zone, had 
population that lived mainly along a narrow strip of coastal land where rice growing was 
possible. It bordered North Vietnam, with a type of Demilitarized Zone. II CTZ was 
very broad, long, and included a wide range of differing terrain, from the heavily 
populated littoral belt, to a middle composed of a rugged belt of mountains that covered 
64% of the zone, to the heavily forested highlands in the west, which bordered Cambodia 
and Laos. III CTZ was the most heavily populated, contained Saigon, and was the 
political center of South Vietnam. Its terrain ranged from dense mangroves and swamps 
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to piedmont terrain. In it were included infamous areas known to many U.S. soldiers, 
such as the Iron Triangle, and War Zones C and D. IV CTZ was primarily an ARVN 
area of operations, and was flat, rice paddy terrain primarily, and included the Mekong 
River delta.42 
The MACOV study went further. It identified four primary types of terrain within 
Vietnam: coastal lowlands, highlands, plateau, and piedmont. This variability of terrain, 
taken together with the seasonal weather patterns, determined the ability of armored / 
mechanized units to conduct operations in Vietnam, with emphasis on thickness of 
vegetation, ruggedness of terrain, and mud during the wet season. In fact, the study 
found that tanks could move with organic support in 63% of the country in the dry 
season, and 43% during the wet season. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) were found 
to be able to move in 69% of the country year-round.43 There also significant finding with 
regard to the weather. Weather patterns affected different parts of Vietnam differently, 
during different times of the year. This ultimately allowed for armored and mechanized 
usage during all parts of the year, albeit in different CTZ's. 
Another large factor that contributed to the reluctance to use mounted warfare on 
Vietnamese terrain came, and not unfairly so, from the ignominious end of the French. 
The French had used armor in Vietnam, but there were several factors involved with their 
use that caused them to have the problems that they did. One was that they did not have 
much armor to begin with, and the little that they did have was used in piecemeal fashion 
The French had 452 tanks and tank destroyers and 1,985 scout cars scattered over 
228,627 square miles; by contrast, later U.S. forces employed more than that over 
42 U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV) Study, United States 
Army, Vietnam (USARV), March 1967, iii. 
43 MACOV Study, 48. 
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territory one-third as large.44A large part of the problem was that the vehicles were World 
War II vintage, lacked parts and adequate transmissions for true cross-country mobility, 
and were hard to resupply -- the helicopter just beginning to enter the picture. U.S. forces 
came to rely heavily on the helicopter for all forms of resupply. In retrospect, this may 
have been the single biggest innovation and enabler for armored forces in Vietnam, and it 
was one that the French could not call upon. 
Furthermore, there were stories of how the French armor was beaten badly, even 
when deployed with some numbers. One particular incident stood out in the readings of 
the U.S., described by author Bernard Fall in his landmark book on the French experience 
in Vietnam - Street Without Joy. In it he recounted the debacle of a French mobile 
striking force, called Groupement Mobile 100. Composed of various vehicles, half-
tracks, and tanks, it was put to the test right after it was created. 45Though it was called 
"one of the best and heaviest units of its type" the group was essentially destroyed by a 
series of ambushes by the Viet Minh, and the story is a chilling account. There is little 
wonder that it influenced thinking that Vietnam was no place for armored vehicles! 
Then there was the idea that fighting guerillas was an infantryman's war. 
Counterguerilla operations came to prominence as part of President Kennedy's "Flexible 
Response," and as doctrine and the Army as an institution grappled with how best to 
articulate it in the midst of Army-wide reorganization, the tendency may have been to fall 
back on what was familiar - the use of infantry. After all, guerilla warfare is described in 
the 1951 FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, as "one of the oldest methods of 
44 Starry, Mounted Combat. 3. 
4S Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, (Mechanicsburg, PA : Stackpole, 1964), 241. 
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waging war.,,46Prior to 1965 the U.S. Army had published many manuals on guerrilla 
warfare, which emphasized fighting gueriJJas as primarily a matter for infantry. The 
1951 manual stated that "infantry normally is the principal arm employed in active 
counterguerilla operations. Available supporting arms and services are used in 
accordance with the situation." 47Thus, it appeared that the Army was simply continuing 
a trend that had been around for a long time, albeit with a few new wrinkles such as the 
Special Forces. 
The armor community did not do itself any favors in envisioning its place at the 
counterinsurgency table, outside of some professional discussion in forums such as 
Armor magazine by advisors and others with experience there, and a few farsighted 
individuals and studies, such as the 1962 Counterinsurgent Study. By and large, there 
was institutional resistance to the idea. According to retired General Don Starry, author 
of the capstone work on mounted combat in Vietnam, most armor soldiers did not give 
the conflict in Vietnam much thought, being preoccupied with the potential conventional 
scenario in Europe. Higher ranking armor officers generally dismissed discussion of war 
in Vietnam as a matter best left to the infantry, and in the Armor Officer Advanced 
Course of 1964-65, Vietnam was not formally discussed! This was largely the way of 
thinking leading up to the war. 48 
The Counterinsurgent War 
Not only did armor, cavalry, and the Army at large subscribe to these myths, but 
they wrestled with the very definition of a counterinsurgency in the years prior to the war, 
and how best to fight it. This was a dilemma shared by historians, military officers, 
46 FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces 1951, III. 
47 FM 31-20, 1951,74. 
48 Starry, Mounted Combat. 51. 
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politicians, and civil servants before, during, and after the war.49 Some, such as Colonel 
Harry Summers Jr., felt that the war was a conventional war as evidenced by the fact that 
the final end of war came with the defeat of South Vietnamese army by conventional 
means. The war officially ended when the North Vietnamese rode into Saigon on their 
tanks. He believed that the Viet Cong were used as a "smokescreen" by the North 
Vietnamese, hiding their true conventional aspirations for South Vietnam under the cloak 
and guise of revolutionary war. This lead to misguided attempts to analyze the nature of 
the war, resulting in labeling it a counterinsurgency, when in fact it was a conventional 
fight - the wolf in sheepskin. His view was that the large-scale destruction of the Viet 
Cong- led cadres who surfaced en masse during the Tet attacks of 1968 and suffered 
horrendous losses as a result was what the North Vietnamese wanted, ultimately.50He 
also felt that the war, correspondingly, could have been won with conventional means. 
The U.S. failed to win with conventional means because the U.S. was handcuffed by its 
strategic policy, one of containment rather than victory over a Communist Power.5l 
In an article written in 1972, another supporter for the conventional approach, 
LTC Zeb Bradford, presents additional arguments for the conventional approach to 
insurgencies. He believed that political power could not ultimately be attained by an 
enemy that could not grasp the reins of power with conventional means - that final 
victory for the Communists ultimately depended on mobile warfare. In the case of 
Vietnam, this ultimately happened. Doctrinally, he felt that the Army should concentrate 
49 There are two schools of thought, according to Donald Hamilton, on page seven in his book The Art of 
Insurgency. One is called the conventional school, and the other is the insurgency school. In his book, he 
reaches conclusions that are at odds with the conventional school. 
50 Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1982), 60. 
51 Summers, On Strategy, 55. 
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its efforts in devising a "near-conventional" doctrine, not take a guerrilla-on-guerrilla 
approach. To do the latter would sacrifice the U.S. 's great technological advantages 
needlessly. He states that "near-conventional doctrine" with some overlapping 
conventional uses would be more useful, and brings up the point that guerrilla forces 
would not be put into a foreign country early enough anyway to counter an insurgency. 
Rather, if a situation got too bad, then "fire-brigade" units would be called in. In this 
. h l' S'J vIew, e was a rea 1St.· -
Others felt that the enemy in Vietnam was an insurgency, and therefore our war 
against an insurgency was a counterinsurgency. There were many differing opinions as 
to what constitutes an insurgency, with leading theorists of the day positing their theories. 
An example of a theory is one by David Glagula in his 1964 book Counterinsurgency 
Warfare. In it he stated that insurgencies were revolutionary and had the following steps: 
1) creation of a party; 2) a united front; 3) guerrilla warfare; 4) movement warfare; 5) 
annihilation campaign.53 He initially emphasized the civil aspects of a war to defeat an 
insurgency by stating that "conventional operations by themselves have at best no more 
effect than a fly swatter.,,54 However, he did feel that an insurgency could be defeated, 
not by fighting an insurgency with his own type of warfare, but by gaining the support of 
the population and by obtaining active participation by at least a minority of them. He 
described finding "a favorable minority, to organize it in order to mobilize the population 
against the insurgent minority." Ultimate victory is obtained with destruction of the 
52 LTC Zeb Bradford, "U.S. Tactics in Vietnam," Military Review (February 1972): 75. 
53 David Glagula, Counterinsurgency Waljare. (New York: Praeger, 1964), 44 to 57. He also outlined 
another type of insurgency, called the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern, which he calls a "shortcut" for the 
insurgent. It consists of blind terrorist acts, and selective terrorist acts, with the goal of the insurgents to 
shortcut the process of gaining the support of the population. This appears to be similar to methods being 
conducted in Iraq. 
54 Glagula, Counterinsurgency Waljare, 73. 
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insurgent forces and his political organization in a given area, but also, Glagula 
emphasized, the "permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population. ,,55 
Glagula addressed tactics also. He stated that a force needs a great deal of 
infantry with high mobility, and he mentions the need for armored cavalry. He 
emphasized the need for prior training in and orientation to the concept of 
counterinsurgent warfare. He also mentioned prophetically that while destruction of the 
guerrilla is "highly desireable," it must not become an end in itself because the guerrilla 
nature is similar to a hydra: it will always grow more heads.56 
Glagula also presaged area operations, with a joint civil-military emphasis on a 
counterinsurgency, by outlining steps for operations against insurgents. The first step 
was destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces, followed by the second step, 
deployment of the static unit (augmented with mobile reserves until the area was calm 
enough to not require them). Step three was to maintain contact with and control of the 
population, while step four was destruction of the insurgent political organization. The 
fifth and sixth steps were political: local elections and testing the local leaders, 
respectively. The seventh step was organizing a party, and the last step was winning over 
or suppressing the last guerillas, and he even recommended using massive forces to 
accomplish this, for a variety of reasons. 57 
Perhaps the best definition of an insurgency is provided in the work by Donald 
Hamilton. After discussing the many possible definitions for the term, he stated that 
"insurgency is a political-military conflict waged against a specific faction(s), 
implementing irregular military actions in support of a unified political outcome, short of 
55 Glagula, Counterinsurgency Waifare, 77. 
56 Glagula, Counterinsurgency Waifare, 107. 
57 Glagula, Counterinsurgency Waifare, 107 to 133. 
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revolution or civil war." The definition was then further discussed. He felt that 
insurgencies in and of themselves were not revolutionary events, but that insurgencies 
could ignite revolutions, or, as a type of war, could be part of a larger conventional 
conflict or a revolution. 58From a broader perspective, Hamilton argued that the U.S. 
needed to have a formal doctrine that addressed insurgencies, rather than 
counterinsurgency theories. His belief was that the theories on insurgency produced after 
1945 were never more than "marginally effective" in their conventional and 
unconventional approaches to guerilla operations. He believed that counter-guerrilla 
operations were integrated into mainstream doctrine without a complete understanding 
the true definition of an insurgency. 59 
Still others felt that the war in Vietnam was a revolutionary war - a three-phased 
war whose roots were based on the works of Mao, which was the definition that the 
Army adopted. The 1973 Division Cavalry Manual, as an example, took formal doctrinal 
position on it and defined it. In the chapter on stability operations, it stated that an 
insurgency had three phases, and that "the distinguishing feature of stability operations is 
the nature of the enemy." It said that a communist-led insurgency had three stages: 1) is 
the latent or incipient insurgency; 2) is organized guerilla warfare, and 3) is a war of 
movement. The first two phases were primarily characterized by small-unit actions, 
mainly of raids and ambushes. By Phase III, it became a war of movement between the 
insurgents and their enemy, meaning that the insurgents had reached enough strength to 
58 Donald Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of 
Strategy in Southeast Asia. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 21. 
59 Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency, 7. 
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be confident enough to stand and fight, and even mount mobile warfare against their 
enemies. 60 
Yet another influential camp believed in fighting guerillas with guerillas, 
including the late and distinguished Colonel David Hackworth. 61 He stated that "to 
defeat the guerilla, we must become guerillas. Every insurgent tactic must be copied and 
employed against the insurgent." The famous author Bernard Fall saw things the same 
way. He felt that "the patiently trained jungle fighter" will stay in the jungle and "out-
stay" the enemy if need be; that the answer was not with mass-produced soldiers geared 
for a conventional war like the Korean War.62 
In any event, the true nature and understanding of an insurgency were perhaps not 
fully grasped by anyone in the U.S. - not the military, the policy-makers in Washington, 
nor academia. While there were theories and ideas as evidenced by the work of David 
Glagula and others, there did not seem to be agreement as to which theory of insurgency 
was the correct one. In the end, the revolutionary model of insurgency was adopted, as 
finally reflected in the 1973 Division Cavalry Manual's chapter on stability operations. 
Regardless of the debate over the nature, composition, and motivations of an 
insurgency, the enemy was multi-layered. It was. composed of Viet Cong guerrillas and 
North Vietnamese regulars. The largest enemy units were main force units - the 
battalions, regiments, or divisions of NVA or VC, said by some to be interchangeable. 
The main force units were well armed and equipped, and lived and operated largely 
60 FM 17-36, 1973, 15-1. 
61 There still is much disagreement on the topic as to why the U.S. lost of the war, or how it could have 
been fought better. Options ranged from sealing off the borders of the country to allow the pacification to 
take place inside more effeclively, to starting pacification earlier, to denying border sanctuaries earlier, to 
invading North Vietnam, and on and on, or any combination of these. Others feel that the war was mainly 
lost by the South Vietnamese. 
62 Ltc. Bradford, "U.S. Tactics in Vietnam," 66. 
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separate from the population by moving from jungle base to jungle base. Their tactics 
were to attack at a time and place of their choosing, inflict as much damage as possible, 
then break contact and withdraw back into the jungle to live to fight another day. A 1967 
After Action Report stated that "although they are masters of guerrilla warfare, main 
force units pose their principal threat to American units in more conventional, large-scale 
combat between two regularly organized and equipped military forces.,,63 
Another layer was the local guerrillas. The VC guerillas generally lived among 
the people, in hamlets and villages, and in nearby base camps. Their main missions were 
to harass units by implementing small-unit ambushes, emplacing mines, and booby traps. 
At the same time, when operating in small squad and platoon-sized units, they were 
capable of threatening a U.S. platoon-sized unit, or "doing serious damage" to a 
company. In other roles, guerrillas acted as guards and armed enablers for any local Viet 
Cong political infrastructure, and scouts for main force units. In general, because of their 
familiarity with a particular area, they acted as the "eyes and ears" for both the main 
units, gathering intelligence for their cause.64 
Still another layer was the provincial battalions, considered the "elite" of local 
guerillas. Organizationally, they belonged between the main forces and the local 
guerillas. Their armament and combat power was similar to the combat power of the 
equivalent North Vietnamese unit, but a main difference, which was a big advantage, was 
that the provincial battalions had good knowledge of the area they operated in since the 
63 Operations Report Lesson Learned CORLL) 6-67, "Observations of a BDE Commander," S2D4B2, #3, 
Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 5. Colonel Berry, whose observations are 
contained in the report, was an Infantry Colonel, and passed on his observations from commanding 1 st 
BDE, 1 ID from June 1966 to February 1967. He states that his unit fought two kinds of Viet Cong forces: 
main forces and local guerrilla units, but occasionally encountered VC provincial battalions (which 
combine the characteristics of main force battalions and local guerrillas), and North Vietnamese Army 
regiments. He makes the point that his unit had to be prepared to meet any of these. 
64 ORLL 6-67, 6. 
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members came from the area in which they operated. This made them very lethal -
posing a "double threat" - a weighty, conventional-style ability, coupled with knowledge 
and ability to conduct guerillas operations.65 
To counter the layers of the enemy, there was a layered structure for the South 
Vietnamese forces, which consisted of four branches: regular forces, militia forces, 
paramilitary forces, and self-defense forces. The Army of Vietnam (ARVN) were the 
regular forces, made largely in the image of the U.S. Army. The militia forces consisted 
of the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). The RF usually operated in a 
central location at company strength and operated within their region. The PF were 
usually platoon size forces and operated closer to their home villages. They operated 
under civil authorities against VC infrastructure, or joined ARVN forces on larger 
operations. The paramilitaries consisted of police units that the U.S. trained, and the 
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CrDG) that operated mainly with Special Forces out 
of base camps along the landward border of Vietnam. A last layer was the People's Self-
Defense Force - composed of many civilians young and old, infirm or otherwise on 
notice to take up arms should the need arise. By 1969, they were estimated to be one 
million strong.66 
65 ORLL 6-67, 7. 
66 LTG Frank Mildren, "In Charge - All the Way," Army (October 1969): 99. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARMORED CAVALRY EXECUTION IN VIETNAM 
The deployment of U.S. ground troops to Vietnam in 1965 added another, 
powerful layer. The deployment occurred only after U.S. leadership determined that the 
South Vietnamese could not hold off both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese on 
their own. The plans for U.S. forces' initial missions were defensive in nature, and were 
purposely limited to three basic missions: security, enclave, and later, "search and 
destroy." The first two of these missions did not plan for the use of armor. The security 
mission was for the airfields from which bomber missions against North Vietnam were 
launched. This mission grew to the second, an enclave mission, whereby more ground 
was procured in order to protect larger areas than just airfields. In the summer of 1965 
the situation literally expanded further when permission was granted for U.S. forces to go 
after the enemy anywhere necessary. Once General Westmoreland, commander of the 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), received permission to use troops 
anywhere in the country, he personally began to determine which and what types of units 
to deploy to Vietnam. Even at this juncture of widening U.S. involvement, armored units 
were still not seriously considered because of lingering misconceptions.67 
The circumstances under which armored vehicles were deployed to Vietnam were 
illustrative of the debate surrounding their practicality in Vietnam, which included the 
67 Starry, Mounted Combat, 55. 
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myths about their use as well as considerations of doctrine. In 1965 the first troops to 
Vietnam were Marines and the 173rd Airborne Brigade - units that required less 
logistical support, were quicker to deploy, and sent a message that a stay in Vietnam was 
not to be long in duration.68 With these ground troops to Vietnam came armored vehicles 
- by accident. When Marines were deployed in 1965, the MACV planners who 
requested them did not realize that the Marine battalion landing team had its own tanks. 
When the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam learned of their deployment, he was surprised 
and less than pleased, and referred to these heavy vehicles as "not appropriate for 
counterinsurgency operations.,,69Upon hearing that the heavy vehicles had landed, even 
General Westmoreland was "piqued.,,7o A further illustration involving the 1 st Infantry 
Division was best recounted by retired General Don Starry in his book, Mounted Combat 
In Vietnam, perhaps the definitive work on all mounted forces involvement in Vietnam. 
When the division was designated for deployment to Vietnam, it was told not to bring 
either tank battalion, among other equipment. The decisions for this were made by the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, who overruled a request to bring at 
least one tank battalion. General Johnson's reasons for rejecting the use of armor are 
illuminating. He referred to the deterrent factor of anti-tank mine use as demonstrated 
by the Korean War, and the fact that there would be "an absence of major combat 
formations in prepared positions." He referred to some of the experiences of the South 
Vietnamese in their fights against the enemy, saying that he had seen little evidence that 
68 Starry, Mounted Combat, 54-55. General Starry wrote Mounted Combat in Vietnam based on the 
results of a study while he was stationed at Fort Knox, as the Commanding General. This work is the 
official history of mounted units in Vietnam, including armor, and mechanized infantry. Previously, he 
commanded the 11 th ACR in Vietnam. The papers he used to write his book are in the Armor in Vietnam 
Collection in the Patton Museum, Fort Knox, KY. 
69 Starry, Mounted Combat, 55. 
70 Andrew Krepinovich, The Army and Vietnam. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
141. 
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they had been requesting their tanks. Further, he said that tanks would slow down the 
movement of other troops, and would also send the wrong message. Tanks, according to 
him, would establish an atmosphere of "conventional combat" reminiscent of the 
French.71 However, in the end, he allowed 1-4 Cav, the divisional cavalry squadron of 
the 1 sl Infantry Division (lID) and the first deployed to Vietnam in October, 1965, to 
bring its M48A3 tanks for test purposes, and pending the results of this test, he was 
prepared to allow the division to deploy one of iits tank battalions to Vietnam. When 
General Westmoreland got word of General Johnson's decisions with regard to the use 
of armor with the deployment of the 1st ID, he stated that "except for a few coastal areas, 
most notably in the I Corps area, Vietnam is no place for either tank or mechanized 
infantry units."nIn the end, the cavalry squadron deployed with the division with 
modified M 113' s armored personnel carriers, and their 27 M48A3 tanks. 
Deploying was only the first in a series of hurdles imposed on the cavalry. Once 
in country, the squadron was parceled out, with each of the three ground troops going 
with one of the 3 brigades of the 1 st ill to different locations. This practice was known as 
detachment. It was not until six months later that the squadron operated together as a 
whole. Additionally, General Westmoreland still saw no use for the tanks so all of their 
M48A3 tanks were withdrawn and impounded in a motor pool until the commanding 
general of the division and the cavalry squadron commander could convince 
Westmoreland to release them. As if that was not enough, the Air Cavalry Troop which 
belonged to the cavalry squadron was parceled out in pieces to whoever needed their 
71 Starry, Mounted Combat, 56. 
72 Starry, Mounted Combat, 56. 
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services and it was not until other air cavalry troops were observed operating together 
efficiently that 1-4's air cavalry troop was able to end this practice.73 
The actions of the Army's leaders show the state of mind among the senior 
leadership of the U.S. Army at that time regarding the use of armored forces in Vietnam. 
They were clearly convinced of the disutility of mounted forces for the conflict in 
Vietnam, for a variety of reasons. Many were related to the mythology of Vietnam which 
collectively resulted in a belief that mounted forces either could not, or would not 
perform well there, whether because of the nature of fighting an insurgent enemy, or 
because of the difficult, non-armor friendly jungle terrain. Others may have still been 
holding out hope that the ARVN would not need the help of conventional U.S. forces; 
that augmentation with advisors and Special Forces would suffice. It was also possible 
the planners hoped that incremental deployments of conventional forces might deter the 
enemy from further attacks without the U.S. ever having to deploy additional mounted 
forces. It is still further possible that an institutional infantry-centric mindset delayed 
visualizing, and thus planning and preparing for armored forces deployment in a 
counterinsurgent environment, and as a result, armored forces were not trained 
adequately for it. This knowledge may have caused further hesitancy among the 
planners. Another may have been lack of desire to stay in Vietnam very long because of 
political considerations, and understandably, sending armor and mounted forces would 
have conveyed politically undesirable connotations of permanence. One can clearly see 
through the gradual escalation in the missions and deployments of U.S. troops to Vietnam 
that it was hoping that with each increment, it might be enough. 
73 Starry, Mounted Combat, 58. 
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As Starry further mentioned there were other considerations with regard to the 
generals' mindset. One was that tank/armored units required a much larger logistical 
infrastructure for their support than did dismounted infantry, and at the outset of the 
Vietnam this was undesirable in the minds of the planners. Additionally, the increase in 
logistical overhead would in turn require more assets to secure them, which was also 
undesirable.74 It appeared that the early planning phases for troop deployments to 
Vietnam were weighted toward a rapid and uncomplicated deployment - getting there 
first with the most. It also appeared that from the outset, the deployment of ground 
troops in general to Vietnam was done without a long-term plan or vision, given that one 
can clearly see a mission escalation from security, to enclave, to "search and destroy," as 
well as an escalation in troops and equipment. Another reason for confusion in 
deployment lay in the "tug-o-war" between deploying for counterinsurgency, or a mid-
intensity, conventional-style war.75 The latter won. 
Early in Vietnam, ground cavalry units underwent steep learning curves, partly 
because of a lack of preparation and training prior to arriving in Vietnam. As was 
mentioned earlier, for various reasons it was never part of the long term plan to employ 
armored cavalry units to Vietnam, and this affected training and preparation. As an 
example of this, when 1-4 cavalry deployed to Vietnam, they had had only two weeks of 
unit training prior to departure. This was due in large part to the fact that the squadron, 
not expecting to deploy, had sent many of it most experienced people to a different 
74 Starry, Mounted Combat, 56. 
75 Krepinovich, The Army and Vietnam, 151. 
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brigade in the 1 sl Infantry Division that was deploying. Hence, they were depleted of 
experienced personnel. 76 
Despite their unplanned deployment and relative lack of preparedness, armor and 
cavalry began proving their worth in the jungle and the doubters began to change their 
minds. General William DePuy, an early naysayer of armored cavalry's worth in 
Vietnam, became an advocate.77 When he took over 1 sl Infantry Division, he regularly 
used armor and cavalry to locate the enemy. The commanding general of the 251h 
Infantry Division, which deployed after the 1 slID, insisted on deploying with his armor. 
Meanwhile, others quietly went about finding uses for armored cavalry. In April 1966, 
Colonel Harold Moore, a battalion commander in the 1 sl Cavalry Division in the famed Ia 
Drang Valley fight, and later the commander of the 3rd Brigade, 1 sl Cavalry Division 
(Airmobile), formed Task Force Spur in order to move an artillery unit through 20 
kilometers of nothing but solid jungle. The unit was escorted by Troop C, 3-4 Cavalry, in 
conjunction with air cavalry providing reconnaissance. The tanks led the way, providing 
security and literally crushing a path through previously unexplored jungle.78 
Early Cavalry Operations 
Cavalry quickly began to become a multi-purpose unit, not just focused on trinity 
missions. From the period of September, 1965, to 30 May, 1966, they performed a litany 
of missions. The main missions were route security, convoy security, "search and 
destroy" operations (with infantry battalions), and blocking positions. It was also found 
that they were best employed to clear paths through the jungle, and serve as a rapid 
76 Starry, Mounted Combat, 57. 
77 After the war, General DePuy perhaps became best known for being the first commander of the U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the driving force behind the first major post-war 
doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations, which came out in 1976. 
78 Starry, Mounted Combat, 65-66. 
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reaction force. It was also clear early on cavalry troops were sometimes detached for 
service with infantry battalions. They were particularly useful in this method. The 
cavalry vehicles flattened paths through the jungle vegetation and helped detonate mines, 
both for the following infantry, and then lead the way through any enemy base camp 
found, imparting shock effect, and setting up blocking positions on the far side. Other 
positive contributions were that their vehicles were more readily visible from the air, 
making it easier for airborne leadership to assist with command and control, and land 
navigation. Early on the cavalry became a hot commodity.79 
One of the first fights involving cavalry was at the village of Ap Bau Bang, in 
November 1965. Troop A of 1-4 Cavalry was part of a task force composed of infantry, 
whose mission had been to secure safe passage for a South Vietnamese Regiment and an 
artillery battery. Encamped the night after ensuring safe passage along the route, the U.S. 
forces were attacked by Viet Cong assaults. Six hours later, the battle was over. Though 
the cavalry had suffered casualties, the perimeter of the defense had held; they had beaten 
off the enemy attack. This fight was one of the first demonstrations of the effects of 
cavalry's firepower on the enemy. 80 
In June and July of 1966, events heated up when the lSI ID moved north into an 
area known as War Zone C, a big VC sanctuary area northwest of Saigon that bordered 
Cambodia. The move into War Zone C was to accomplish several tasks, including 
opening Highway 13, which ran north/south, and to conduct "search and destroy" 
79 Armored Cavalry Operations in Vietnam Memo, 7 June 1966, S2D3, #87, 2-4. 
80 Starry, Mounted Combat, 63. The cavalry's actions at Ap Bau Bang also illustrated a change from 
defensive doctrine. Normal doctrinal deployment in the defense called for dispersion in order to prevent 
making a large target for the enemy. However, in Vietnam, because of the enemy's relative inability to 
threaten U.S. forces with air or large caliber artillery, and the fact that they were dispersed all throughout an 
area, U.S. forces set up night defensive positions with tight perimeters that gave 360-degree protection. 
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missions against elements of the 91h Vietcong Division. For their part, 1-4 Cavalry 
conducted "search and destroy missions," reconnaissance in force missions, and convoy 
escort and security. These missions became perhaps the most familiar of missions 
conducted by cavalry and other maneuver units during the war, and were major variations 
of the trinity missions of reconnaissance and security. By the end of the series of 
operations in September, the 1 sl ID had engaged in five major engagements, driving the 
9th VC Division back to sanctuaries in Cambodia after they suffered 850 killed. 1-4 
Cavalry played a major role in the lSI ID's success in three of the five engagements, and 
. f' d 1 f . 81 tactics were re me as a resu t 0 expenences. 
While looking for the enemy and during the process of securing Highway 13, the 
first engagement occurred, the Battle of Bench Mark 69. While moving on the highway 
on June 8, Troop A, 1-4 Cavalry encountered an enemy ambush and fought it off, killing 
over 100 of the enemy. They were able to inflict high casualties because of the combined 
firepower of the tanks, ACAVs, artillery, and air strikes.82 Out of the ambush came 
improved techniques, including using supporting fires from artillery and air to keep the 
enemy pinned in the area after the ambush, not allowing him room to maneuver or 
escape. Also, the idea of using airmobile infantry as the reaction force to cut off the 
enemy and help beat off the main attack was refined. s3 
The next engagement was the battle of Srok Dong 1 on 30 June, which took place 
on Highway 13. A deception plan was released to make the enemy think that there would 
only be less than one troop conducting a reconnaissance, when in actuality there were 
81 Starry, Mounted Combat, 66. 
82 Operational Lessons Learned, 1-4 Cavalry, S2D4B2. #5, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patlon Museum, 
Ft. Knox, KY, 1 May - 31 July 1966, Undated, 7. 
83 Starry, Mounted Combat, 67. 
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actually Troops Band C of 1-4 Cavalry with an attached rifle company. They were 
attacked by dug-in Viet Cong while conducting a reconnaissance in force on Highway 13, 
en route to secure engineer equipment.84When Troop B was hit first, Troop C was able to 
maneuver and reinforce, holding off the main attack. Meanwhile, the cavalry, in 
conjunction with artillery, air power, and an airmobile infantry reaction force, beat off the 
attack of the enemy and forced them to withdraw. While withdrawing, the enemy was 
harassed and engaged by these follow-on forces. At the end of the day, the enemy lost 
approximatel y 270 dead, and a number of weapons were captured. 85 
The success of lhese operations encouraged General DePuy to bait the enemy into 
an ambush on 9 July, 1966. The demonstrated firepower, mobility, and protection of the 
cavalry made them an acceptable candidate for bait. The mission was actually classified 
as a reconnaissance in force "to lure forces to ambush/attack the column, enabling the 1 st 
Brigade to destroy VC forces by offensive action.,,86 The Task Force that was to carry it 
out was named DRAGOON, and was composed of Troops Band C, 1-4 Cavalry, and a 
company of infantry. The bait worked, and at the end of the day, 240 of the enemy were 
dead, with minimal U.S. losses. This particular incident was significant in that it 
represented a de facto execution shift from doctrine. Armored forces were now the fixing 
forces while the infantry was the maneuver (encircling) force, contrary to established 
practice, which was usually the other way around. Armored forces' firepower enabled 
them to immediately return devastating fires on the enemy, fixing the enemy in place, 
while their armor aided in their surviving the ambush. Thus, they made good bait. New 
84 Report, "The Campaign Along National Route 13," S2D4B2, #11, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton 
Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 3. 
85 Starry, Mounted Combat, 67. 
86 1-4 Cavalry Report, "Activities of I st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, Jun-Jul 66," S5D2B I, #67, Armor in 
Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, Battle of Minh Thanh Road, 4. 
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doctrine came out of all of this action as well - the herringbone formation, which 1-4 
Cavalry is credited with inventing. The herringbone formation is still part of U.S. armor 
and cavalry doctrine today.87 For their actions during this time period, known at the 
Highway 13 Campaign, 1-4 Cavalry was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, in 
recognition of their contributions and performance. 
Statements by the 1-4 Squadron Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel LeWayne, 
reveal much about the state of cavalry operations in October 1966. He discussed the 
terms "search and clear," and "search and destroy," and says that they are synonymous. 
Both meant that a designated area was searched for enemy, installations, and material, 
and were destroyed when found. 88 These terms characterized the bulk of cavalry 
reconnaissance missions for the duration of the war in Vietnam, and represented a shift in 
execution from the doctrinal trinity mission of reconnaissance. 89 
At that time, the missions of the 1-4 Cavalry that most closely resembled the 
trinity reconnaissance missions were labeled reconnaissance in force missions, "search 
and clear," and "search and destroy" missions. Reconnaissance in force was doctrinal, 
and described in the 1965 Division Cavalry manual as "a limited objective operation by a 
force of sufficient size to discover and test the enemy's dispositions and strengths, or to 
87 Starry, Mounted Combat, 71. The herringbone is a battle drill, a drill that happens instantly when the 
need arises. The herringbone formation is when a column of vehicles that are traveling, usually along a 
road, suddenly stop and every other vehicle pulls off the opposite side of a road, facing outward. In this 
fashion, the road is cleared, and weapons are instantly deployed outwardly, equally on both sides of the 
road, while usually the most protected part of the vehicle (the front) is facing a potential enemy, thus also 
offering a smaller target. Further, other vehicles can still travel along the road. 
88 1-4 Cavalry Unit SOP, October 1966, S2D3B I, #69, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. 
Knox, KY, "Questions for 41h Cavalry," I. 
89 Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL), 151 ID, S2D4B2, #5, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton 
Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, Undated. P. 82. Proof of the preponderance of "search and destroy" missions 
conducted by the division during a 90-day reporting period, which included the campaign along Highway 
13, listed "search and destroy" as the category of mission most overwhelmingly represented in terms of 
friendly casualties. Under that mission category for the period, there were 493 killed in action, and 2392 
wounded in action. The next closest category was defense, with 61 and 406 respectively, followed by 
convoy with 421288, and patrol, 411177. 
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develop other intelligence." However, unlike the other traditional trinity reconnaissance 
missions, such zone, area, and route reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force was not 
discussed again anywhere else in the manual, at any level, platoon, troop, or squadron. It 
was more a broad, encompassing term. 
This what the terms "search and clear" and "search and destroy" became as well, 
in execution - broad, encompassing terms. They were new, broader terms that reflected 
truly new missions for the cavalry. Because they were broad terms, they presumably 
rested on a myriad of sub-tasks. Some were relatively new sub-tasks, such as blocking 
force, sealing force, attachment to infantry, or in the role of breaking the jungle for other 
units. Among these, blocking force was found in a small paragraph in the 1965 doctrinal 
manual, whereas breaking jungle and sealing force missions were not; hence, they were 
new to the cavalry. Other newer sub-tasks included destroying the infrastructure found, 
such as tunnel complexes and bunkers, with either gun fire or with demolitions. Other 
tasks that made up the broader terms such as "search and destroy" were not new, such as 
movement to contact and other basic battle drills such as actions on contact. Ultimately, 
the broad terms such as "search and destroy" rested on a collection of sub-tasks, some 
new and others not, that were a blend of doctrinal and new missions. Terms such as 
"search and destroy" were overarching covers laid over various collections of these sub-
tasks. At the conclusion of the operations in War Zone C, perhaps the best summation of 
cavalry's mission was "finding, fixing, developing the situation, and killing VC," with 
the end goal of maintaining contact as long as possible in order bring to bear more 
firepower and thus kill more of them.9o 
90 1-4 Cavalry Unit SOP, October 1966, S2D3B 1, #69, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. 
Knox, KY, 4. On page 2 of the intelligence portion later, it states that the "Cavalry Squadron as a whole is 
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What this early campaign in the summer of 1966 showed was that versions of 
trinity reconnaissance missions were becoming sub-tasks, used as necessary, under new, 
broader and overarching terminology. An example of this was one of the main doctrinal 
reconnaissance terms used in Vietnam, reconnaissance in force. The 1-4 Standard 
Operating Procedure (SOP) said that reconnaissance in force's primary objective was the 
"detection, engagement, and defeat or capture" of any VC unit encountered. Additional 
information on terrain and trafficability, part of the focus of the trinity reconnaissance 
tasks of zone, area, and route reconnaissance, was accomplished incidentally along the 
way. Later, the SOP reiterated that reconnaissance in force was the term used, to the 
exclusion of limited objective attacks, or raids. The SOP states that "raids, as such, are 
seldom conducted." The minimum size of the unit conducting the reconnaissance in force 
was usually a cavalry troop, augmented by an infantry company that rode on the 
cavalry's vehicles, and supported by engineer mine teams, air cover, and artillery. 91It 
appeared that of all the trinity reconnaissance terms, this one was arguably the most 
accurate in describing what cavalry was doing. 
Reconnaissance in force, the last bastion and "distant cousin" of the trinity 
mission of reconnaissance that arguably applied in Vietnam directly, was defined 
differently in Vietnam. One description of it from the time stated that it was "a typical 
search and destroy mission" that was conducted in three phases: isolation of the enemy, 
mounted sweeps through the area, and lastly the dismounted, detailed search.92 From this 
usually employed in VN as a find, fix, and eliminate force. The Air Cav is utilized by the squadron for 
flank security, route reconnaissance, recon by fire for possible ambush sites, and command and control." 
91 1-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, 3. 
92 Major William B. Blake, "Missions and Techniques of Employment of Ground Armored 
Cavalry Units in Vietnam." (Ft. Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
March 1973), 3. 
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definition, it was evident that reconnaissance in force had moved to reflect a description 
of a "search and destroy" mission - a new mission. This new, real world definition of it, 
when compared with the definition from the Division Cavalry manual of 1965, which is 
very brief - only at the front of the manual, and not at all found in the section on 
Reconnaissance Operations, is illustrative. The manual stated that reconnaissance in 
force was "a limited objective operation by a force of sufficient size to discover and test 
the enemy's dispositions and strengths, or to develop other intelligence.,,93This was 
evidence of a doctrinal term - reconnaissance in force-- shifting in meaning by adopting 
the definition a description of an entirely new mission being conducted in Vietnam - the 
"search and destroy." 
There were two other interesting aspects about reconnaissance in force. One was 
that most reconnaissance in force missions began as meeting engagements. Meeting 
engagements, as defined by a later seminar on the topic, were "the combat action that 
occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy force, 
static or in motion, concerning which it has inadequate intelligence.,,94It appeared that 
once intelligence was gained regarding a suspected enemy location, forces went to that 
location, and a meeting engagement happened either en route, or upon arrival at the 
suspected location. According to a later study, "the typical engagement of the enemy by 
all types of U.S. forces occurs at pointblank range in dense forest.,,95 
Another was the de facto repudiation of one of the traditional, trinity-based 
fundamentals of reconnaissance - to avoid decisive contact with the enemy. In the case 
93 FM 17-36 Division Cavalry 1965, 7. 
94 "Extracts From Report of the Meeting Engagement Seminar." United States Army Vietnam (USARV), 
S2D3B 1, #60, Armor In Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 14 September 1967, 4. 
95 MACOV Study, 55. 
45 
of Vietnam, because of the terrain and the elusive nature of the enemy, it was extremely 
hard to find the enemy in the traditional, conventional sense. The trinity version of 
reconnaissance, based on a conventional setting and a conventional enemy, held that 
scouts could acquire enemy vehicles at distant ranges, and vector fires or other killing 
maneuver forces onto them. In Vietnam, for the most part, the jungle terrain prevented 
this long range acquisition of the enemy and the luxury of staying hidden while doing so. 
Rather, U.S. forces generally found the enemy in many cases when the enemy fired on 
them. This resulted largely from terrain that offered an advantage to the insurgents - the 
ones who lived in the jungle and knew it well. Generally, engagements were initiated at 
the times and places of their choosing, at extremely short ranges, and U.S. forces were 
forced to react to the contact. While the U.S. mounted forces were not road-bound, 
when they did go off the roads it was either to patrol portions of an area of operations, or 
it was in response to intelligence as to enemy locations. Ultimately, the way they found 
the enemy was by running into them, which in itself was not in accordance with one the 
fundamentals of reconnaissance, to avoid decisive engagements. This was in direct 
contrast to "search and destroy," which sought decisive contact. 
Another unique affect that was noted in the 1-4 SOP was the importance of 
maintaining a presence, coupled with saturation patrolling. Saturation patrolling was a 
technique for conducting "search and destroy" missions while also maintaining a 
presence and learning the terrain. Saturation patrolling was reportedly brought to the 1 st 
by its Commander, General DePuy. When conducting it, units would break down into 
sub-units, and search a particular area .. Each sub-unit, in most cases, used a "cloverleaf' 
method, whereby each would circle out and around, each in a different direction, making 
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a shape resembling one of the leaves of a clover, and then all ended up back in the same 
place. The regrouped unit would then shift to another location and repeat the process. 
When contact was made, and the size, strength, and location of the enemy determined, 
artillery and air strikes were called in to help destroy the enemy.96 Saturation patrolling 
was another example of a new term coined to characterize different execution, and 
different intent in Vietnam. Like "search and destroy," it incorporated elements of other 
trinity tasks in the process, such as techniques of conducting area or zone reconnaissance. 
It was similar to "search and destroy" in this aspect. 
Changes to the trinity missions of security were also happening, but differently 
from the changes to reconnaissance. The most common security missions for the cavalry 
at that time and in that area of operations were route clearing / securing, and convoy 
security. Route security missions generally consisted of two phases. The first phase was 
route clearance, performed as a modified route reconnaissance, to make sure that the 
route had no mines, obstacles, or booby traps located on it, while the second phase was 
establishing and maintaining security of the route while in use. The first step of route 
clearance generally consisted of first positioning the troops, and second, clearing the 
road.97The second phase consisted of maintaining security along the route during the 
actual convoy. The second phase generally consisted of three steps: first, securing the 
route against ambush; second, running the convoy, and third, rolling up the forces. 98 The 
security consisted of holding sides of the road with infantry, who employed saturation 
96 lSI ID Division History in Vietnam, S2D4B2 #10, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. 
Knox, KY. Undated, Intelligence, 6. The 1966 1-4 SOP states that the presence of the cavalry most 
interfered with the enemy's capability for mobility, by making the enemy realize that every time he is seen, 
he will be attacked, whether on the ground or from the air in artillery or tactical air. As a result of this 
knowledge, the enemy would go to great lengths to avoid being seen, thus greatly hampering his mobility. 
97 ORLL 6-67, "Observations of a BDE Commander," 29. 
98 ORLL 6-67, 29. 
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patrolling techniques, while the convoys were escorted with armor. Armored cavalry 
troops could also be used in route security by establishing mutually supporting 
. I h ~ strongpomts a ong t e route. 
Armored cavalry's ability to conduct route security was greatly enhanced with 
attachments such as infantry, engineer mine sweeping teams, and demolition teams. 
Route security was usually conducted at troop level (with attachments), with clear 
guidance not to break down the troop below platoon level when conducting a convoy 
escort or when conducting reconnaissance down lateral routes. The SOP also noted that 
route reconnaissance in Vietnam greatly differed from the traditional idea of route 
reconnaissance in Europe because in Vietnam it was a "slow, tedious process," not like 
the school concept of rapid movement and engaging the enemy only when necessary."(OO 
Other new techniques were created. To reduce the vulnerability to ambush during 
a road march, 1-4 developed a technique known as the "compressed L formation," using 
a squadron with a company of infantry. One troop would lead the column, and one 
would be in the trail, and one in reserve. Moving with the trail troop was a company of 
infantry. When the enemy was encountered the lead troop cut down the intervals 
between vehicles and occupied a herringbone position. The infantry company, riding 
with the trail troop, dismounted and attacked up the column on one side of the road while 
the trail troop moved forward to herringbone with the lead troop. The attacking infantry 
moved forward along the road, while the trail cavalry troop "leapfrogged" forward by 
platoon or section in order to stay abreast of the infantry and not fire into them. If 
necessary, the reserve troop was committed, through the infantry, to the flank of the 
99 1-4 Cavalry SOP, 2. 
100 1-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, I. 
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enemy, while an infantry battalion sent airmobile infantry to land at pre-selected landing 
zones to the flanks or rear of the enemy in order to seal them in a killing zone. The final 
statement regarding the description of the compressed L technique is an 
acknowledgement that doctrine had changed in this regard: "Armor has become the 
fixing force by virtue of its staying power and standoff distance. Infantry has become the 
maneuver force by virtue of its airmobility."lol 
Air Cavalry 
The story of the cavalry would not be complete without mention of the air 
cavalry, because ultimately the air cavalry's abilities to conduct trinity cavalry missions 
in Vietnam arguably had an impact on the ground cavalry. The technology of the 
helicopter gave enormous mobility to U.S. forces in Vietnam. The creation of the air 
cavalry troop represented one of the best innovations of the Vietnam War. They were 
created organizationally by the ROAD reorganization of 1962, but the idea for their 
creation had roots in WW II airborne operations and in the limited but productive 
experience with the helicopter in Korea. 102Their doctrinal missions were the trinity, 
similar the ground cavalry. The 1962 definition of their mission was "to extend by aerial 
means the reconnaissance and security capabilities of ground (cavalry) units and to 
engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying actions within its capability of seizing and 
dominating lightly defended areas or terrain." 103 Each Troop generally consisted of three 
platoons - an aeroscout platoon consisting of two sections, whose main job was aerial 
reconnaissance; an aerorifle platoon, whose main job was to conduct reconnaissance and 
101 \-4 Cavalry SOP, 5-6. 
102 Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, Vietnam Series. Airmobility: /96/-/971. (Washington, D.C. : 
Department of the Army, 1973), 4. 
103 Lawrence H. Johnson, III, Winged Sabers: The Air Cavalry in Vietnam. (Harrisburg, PA : Stackpole, 
1990), 15. 
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security missions with a rifle platoon consisting of four aerorifle squads of two fire teams 
each, that would typically fly in to particular locations to confirm or gather information 
on a particular location; and an aeroweapons section that would provide aerial fire 
support, air to ground fires, and provide security for the other scout elements of the troop. 
104 One air cavalry troop was part of each Divisional Cavalry Squadron, and one 
belonged to the Armored Cavalry Regiment. Additionally, there were air cavalry 
squadrons, such as 1-9 Cavalry, the Division Cavalry Squadron of 1 st Cavalry Division 
(Airmobile). 
The air cavalry was critical to cavalry operations in many ways, but probably 
most critical in overcoming the limitations of jungle terrain. No ground movement was 
conducted without air reconnaissance. In the early days with the 1-4 Cavalry, the air 
cavalry was used primarily for flank security, route reconnaissance, recon by fire, and 
command and control. The 1-4 SOP stated that of the three usual types of 
reconnaissance, zone, area, and route, route recon is the most effective, but even that at 
times is limited by the dense jungle, particularly the overhead tree canopy. 
Reconnaissance quality was clearly affected by, above all things, the jungle-type terrain, 
with heavy undergrowth. The dense undergrowth was even to the point, in various areas, 
that ground reconnaissance was "less effective and far more time consuming." The other 
frustrating and tough aspect of conducting reconnaissance was determining friend from 
foe. 105 As a comment on these tough aspects of reconnaissance in Vietnam, feedback in 
the 1-4 SOP stated that the current doctrine "leaned too far toward conventional-type 
warfare with open terrain and a distinguishable enemy." 
104 ST 17-1-2, History and Role of Armor December 1971, 67. 
105 \-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, I. 
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Feedback in the 1-4 SOP on the air cavalry as they related to the trinity, was 
instructive. Feedback revealed that "'basic doctrine and tactics are still the foundation of 
air recon; however, in guerilla warfare all tactics must modify (using) Lessons Learned, 
and now tactics are being forwarded to the U.S. daily and those should be compiled to 
form a basic guerilla warfare text."lo6Additionally, the portion on air cavalry made little 
mention, proportionally, of conventional security missions such as guard, screen, or 
cover, or of economy of force. The only security mention referred to preempting enemy 
attack by firing on them first with air, as well as conducting flank security. Regarding 
economy of force for the air cavalry and the ground squadron, the notes stated matter-of-
factly that economy of force missions such as offense, defense, or retrograde, "do not 
apply while offensive tactics are limited to find, fix, and eliminate the enemy."lo7Thus, 
even the air cavalry found their trinity missions modified greatly by the peculiar demands 
of Vietnam, particularly the terrain and vegetation. 
Early Conclusions 
After about six months in combat, 1-4 Cavalry developed solid conclusions about 
the nature of their operations. The most frequent missions performed were security 
missions. They were performed mostly in the form of route security and convoy escort, 
and were not the trinity missions of screen, guard and cover. Route reconnaissance was a 
part of the overall route security mission, interweaving reconnaissance aspects with 
security. A lot of the emphasis on route security came from General Westmoreland's 
directive calling for opening the roads, making them safe, and using them. Another 
Division Cavalry Squadron, 1-10 Cavalry of the 4th rD, conducted route security missions 
106 1-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, 2, 
107 1-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, 3, 
51 
for the majority of the time they were in Vietnam in II CTZ. During the first three 
months of 1967, they secured the passage of almost 8,000 vehicles across their CTZ 
without incident. A technique they used was to establish strongpoints along the route 
from which they could react, and if they did not have enough forces to do this, they 
would escort the convoys directly. The enemy caught on to the use of strongpoints, 
however, so as soon as 4th ID gained the services of another cavalry squadron, 1-10 
changed their route security technique to consist of offensive patrolling missions within 
several kilometers of the main highway, which proved very effective. IDS Security 
missions were thus very different from the trinity versions of security. They became 
literal security missions, versus the trinity versions which emphasized protecting a main 
body of forces from attack or observation at a distance, oriented on front lines. 
Reconnaissance was a necessary mission and was conducted with regularity, 
except that it was either called reconnaissance in force, "search and destroy," or "search 
and clear," all with the overarching mission of finding the enemy, fixing them, and 
destroying them. "Search and clear" missions were slightly different in intent, in that 
they were more terrain oriented and longer in duration than the reconnaissance in force. 
Their purpose was to clear all enemy out of the area, and secure the area against their 
return. 109Reconnaissance in force, a doctrinal term most closely related to "search and 
destroy," centered on finding the enemy, fixing him, and destroying him. 
Reconnaissance in force helped counteract the nature of the enemy, and the nature of the 
terrain, which made it possible for the enemy to find excellent concealment and maintain 
the initiative by being able to launch attacks on U.S. forces largely at the time and place 
108 Starry, Mounted Combat, 107. 
109 Blake, "Missions and Techniques of Employment," III. 
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of their choosing. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct reconnaissance loaded for bear, 
which is what the reconnaissance in force was. Overall, what was significant was that 
new mission terminology, such as "search and destroy" and "search and clear" reflected 
new missions, both of which reflected overarching intent. In the case of "search and 
destroy," the intent was to find the enemy and his installations, and kill and destroy them, 
and to operate within those guidelines. For "search and clear," it was to rid the area of 
the enemy, and maintain a presence to disallow his return. 
Besides these new overarching mission terms, one other trinity reconnaissance 
mission, route reconnaissance, was probably the one conducted most often in accordance 
with the original doctrinal intent, with exceptions, particularly that the pace was a lot 
slower and that engagement of the enemy was expected, if not sought, rather than 
engaging "only when necessary."IIOThe more traditional reconnaissance missions of the 
cavalry - zone and area - were seldom conducted in accordance with their original 
doctrinal intent, largely because they were terrain based, and stealth was hard with the 
close engagement ranges and the enemy's potential to be anywhere. 
Economy of force operations changed as well. In Vietnam, purely offensive and 
defensive missions were simply not done in the traditional sense. Defensive missions 
became security missions, night defensive position perimeters, or base and installation 
defense, whereby units protected themselves and others. When the enemy did possess 
the initiative and enough advantages to blatantly attack U.S. forces or installations, 
seldom was the weight of their forces enough to cause U.S. troops to have the need to 
defend for long, let alone conduct retrograde actions. Offensive missions overtook and 
arguably subsumed the reconnaissance missions. In fact, it is arguable that that was 
110 1-4 Cavalry SOP, Intelligence, I. 
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where reconnaissance in the trinity sense really changed: reconnaissance, in Vietnam, 
became fused with offensive-type operations such as the "search and destroy." 
Doctrinally, economy of force missions were predicated on the notion that cavalry 
forces engaged the main portion of the enemy for the reason of buying time for the rest of 
the maneuver forces to achieve decisive effects elsewhere, but this was not regularly the 
case in Vietnam. The decisive point on the ground generally was wherever one found the 
enemy. However, as the war went on, operations were described in Vietnam as a 
country-wide economy of force, meaning that forces, particularly cavalry, conducted 
wide-ranging operations in portions of Vietnam, in order to free up infantry to operate in 
areas where mounted forces could not go. 
Besides the experiences of 1-4 Cavalry during the summer of 1966, the early 
experiences of another cavalry unit, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), were 
instructive. The first and only U.S. ACR to serve in Vietnam arrived in September, 1966. 
The "Blackhorse" regiment, like the rest of mounted, armored forces, almost did not 
make it to Vietnam. It was originally requested in December of 1965 for the purposes of 
maintaining route security, no doubt based on the positive impact that the cavalry already 
in Vietnam was having. After wrangling between higher headquarters in Vietnam and 
the Department of the Army about what types of vehicles to substitute in an effort to 
make the force lighter, a structure was finally agreed upon to replace the tanks in the 
cavalry troops with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. When modified, these vehicles 
became known as the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs). The regiment was 
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composed of three ground squadrons, consisting of three cavalry troops and a pure tank 
. h d Th . I d' . 1 III company III eac squa ron. e regiment a so possesse Its own mr cava ry troop. 
1965 - 1966 Doctrine 
One the eve of mounted forces deployment to Vietnam, armored cavalry doctrine 
was still focused on the Cold War fight in Europe. As an example, a field manual such as 
the October 1965 version of FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units, 
followed basic patterns of Cold War convention. It stated the cavalry mission in the form 
of the trinity: armored and air cavalry units' missions were to "perform reconnaissance 
and to provide security for the unit to which assigned or attached, and to engage in 
offensive, defensive, and delaying action as an economy of force unit." It further 
described operations for a cavalry platoon in terms of reconnaissance, offensive, security, 
defensive, and delaying/retrograde operations. 112 
At the same time, the manual did acknowledge the conflict in Vietnam. At the 
squadron level, a chapter entitled "Special Operations" included 8 pages, under the sub-
heading of "Counterinsurgency Operations." In it, the five types of offensive actions 
relating to "counterguerrilla" operations are listed as encirclement, raid, pursuit, ambush, 
and counterattack. 113 These came straight from the 1962 Counterinsurgency Study 
almost verbatim, as did most of the rest of the 8-page section, so in that sense, the CI 
Study was heeded. I 14 
III Starry, Mounted Combat, 72-73. 
112 FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units October 1965, 5. 
113 U.S. Army Armor Center Combat Developments Agency Study, "The Role of Armored Cavalry in 
Counterinsurgent Operations, 1962, Armor School Library, Ft. Knox, 7. In this, the Counterinsurgency 
study contradicts itself, and consequently the 1965 manual. The CI study states that "armored cavalry is 
marginal in encirclements and pursuits." 
114 USAARCDA Study, "The Role of Armored Cavalry in Counterinsurgent Operations," 1962, E-3. 
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The other remarkable aspect of this chapter was with regard to the missions that 
the manual lays out for armored cavalry against guerilla forces. They were: installation 
and community security; establishment of roadblocks; search and seizure of area; security 
of surface lines of communication, apprehension of insurgent forces, and area 
surveillance." It was remarkable that these varying missions were not put into trinity 
categories. At the beginning of all cavalry manuals, the missions were stated in the form 
of the trinity, but in this case, there are six seemingly new missions in an obscure portion 
of an obscure chapter, not grouped according to the trinity. There was a list and little 
else, but it was a glimpse of what was to come. 115 
The next wave of armored cavalry/armor doctrine came out in 1966. In two of the 
manuals that came out that year, there were some additions to doctrine that reflected 
cavalry execution in Vietnam. FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment, came out in 
May 1966, and FM 17-1, Armor Operations came out in October of that year. Regarding 
the former, it came out perhaps not early enough to reflect as many lessons learned from 
Vietnam, particularly those learned by 1-4 Cavalry during the summer of 1966; nor had 
the 11 th ACR yet arrived in country.116However, there were signs that the manual was 
beginning to recognize events in Vietnam. 
115 FM 17-36, 1965, 196. 
116 A line from the ACR manual of 1960, was that the armored cavalry can operate as "a light armor task 
force, without reinforcement, in security and light combat missions." There is clearly still a trinity role, and 
is set in a conventional environment, but the emphasis is on "light." By the 1966 manual, which is the next 
update, the reference to "light" is gone. The trinity is still alive and well with the 1960 manual. As 
envisioned in a Cold War, European setting, it may been envisioned that an ACR and other cavalry units 
would be able to acquire, reconnaissance-wise, the enemy out at long ranges and at least have the option of 
remaining stealthy, and more of an option of avoiding contact and decisive engagement. By 1966, with the 
realities of Vietnam, this emphasis is gone, a token reflection of reality. The reconnaissance fundamentals 
one of which is to avoid decisive engagement with the enemy, were curiously not found in the 1960 
manual. 
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The 1966 ACR manual added a chapter on counterinsurgency, which stated that 
the cavalry may need to perform "internal security operations" such as securing key 
installations, operating mobile and static checkpoints, controlling civil disturbances, 
securing routes of communications, convoy escort, and other "constabulary-type 
missions," patrolling for presence and psychological effect, and operating along the 
border to "interdict, deny, or keep under surveillance," and to "prevent the use of an 
adjacent country as a sanctuary.,,117The chapter qualified border control operations by 
saying they would be conducted where the terrain allowed. 1l8 In this list there were 
clearly some new missions, moving beyond the trinity. Some of the same missions 
appeared in the Armor manual that came out later that year. Missions in a 
counterinsurgency environment that the regiment was "particularly suited" to accomplish 
were the following: search and seizure of areas; harassing and elimination of insurgent 
forces by means such as saturation patrolling - mounted and dismounted - on terrain 
where the mobility of the cavalry can be exploited; and area surveillance. General types 
of offensive actions are listed as the encirclement, raid, pursuit, ambush, and 
counterattack, with the encirclement being the "most effective of all operations." 1 19 
The other manual for armor and cavalry, FM 17-1, Armor Operations, came out in 
October, 1966. Though not explicitly a cavalry manual, it was doctrinally and 
117 This was an example of tactical doctrine not in synchronization with national policy and strategy, since 
the cavalry and other forces were prevented from following their own doctrine in the sense that they could 
not "prevent the used of an adjacent country as a sanctuary" through direct ground action. 
118 FM \7-95 The Armored Cavalry Regiment 1966, 125. 
119 FM 17-95, 1966, 126. There were some anomalies in the trend of execution leading doctrine, however. 
In this instance, the new ACR manual came out in May 1966, and the II th ACR arrived in country in 
September, 1966. Theoretically, the 11th ACR had time to digest this new doctrine, but in most cases most 
of the officers and leadership were not in school in time to have received this doctrine in a classroom 
setting. Thus, the only training they might have had that would reflect this doctrine was at the unit level, 
prior to departure. The bottom line is that their earliest execution in Vietnam does not reflect digestion of 
newer doctrinal terminology. Rather, with the exception of the overarching mission "search and destroy," 
most all the other tasks and missions were described in trinity terms, such as area and route reconnaissance, 
and area security. 
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institutionally linked to the cavalry manuals, because cavalry officers were trained under 
the armor curriculum, and given additional training regarding the trinity missions. 120 The 
manual did a good job of trying to categorize operations in an insurgency environment, 
giving an overarching term to the operations in Vietnam, "Internal Defense Operations." 
The manual further put actions to be conducted in an insurgent environment into two 
categories: strike operations, and clear, hold, and consolidation operations. The manual 
stated that strike operations were called by other names, such as "search and clear," and 
"search and destroy," "and others," and that they were primarily tactical operations. 121 It 
stated that the purpose of strike operations were to find, fix, and destroy insurgents, but 
that they could be used to harass the enemy as well. The manual went on to say that 
"strike operations are comprised of raids, reconnaissance in force, coordinated attacks, 
relief operations, or combinations of these.,,122This doctrine was an effort to put tactical 
operations into one category (strike operations), and then put all of the rest in another 
category, the clear, hold, and consolidate category. The clear, hold, and consolidate 
category later evolved into simply the "consolidation" category. In the 1966 manual, 
clear, hold, and consolidation, along with strategic hamlet operations and province 
rehabilitation programs and "others" were the "application of all aspects of the Host 
Country national internal development program." The ultimate goal of the program was 
the restoration of "HC governmental control to the population and the area." 123 It 
appeared that the clear, hold, and consolidate category was created to note the other 
important side of the war; essentially all else besides tactical operations. The manual in 
120 Cavalry and armor officers are given the same basic schooling, with officers designated to go to cavalry 
units receiving additional, trinity-related cavalry specific training. 
121 FM 17-1 Armor Operations 1966, 221. 
122 FM 17 -I, 1966, 221. 
123 FM 17-1, 1966, 221. 
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effect acknowledged that strike operations were in reality a "sub-piece" - the first piece 
of ongoing and all-encompassing "consolidation." 
Then the manual marked a big doctrinal change by listing a whole host of 
missions that cavalry and armor could conduct. By doing this, the manual in effect began 
a "homogenization of missions" between maneuver units (armor and infantry units and 
task forces), and armored cavalry units, traditionally and doctrinally associated with 
trinity missions. This do-it-all mentality started with the description of strike operations, 
with such statements as "combinations of these," and "and others." This trend was begun 
earlier in the chapter on Internal Defense Operations, when the manual explicitly stated 
that "where brigade, battalion, and company are discussed in this section, it is equally 
applicable to the armored cavalry regiment, squadron, and troop unless otherwise 
specified.,,]24While the doctrine contained in this chapter was simply following execution 
in Vietnam, this statement was a de facto doctrinal endorsement of armored cavalry's use 
in virtually any mission, including and beyond the trinity. They were becoming victims 
of their own success, from pariah status to jack of all trades. The doors were now 
opening wide. 
The manual takes advantage of this, adding a dizzying array of missions and 
combat operations for armored forces in the "Internal Defense Operations" section. In 
the process of adding new missions and combat operations, the list got almost too long, 
and conveyed the impression that just about every mission or every contingency, in every 
circumstance, was listed. The chapter stated that within the two types of operations, 
strike, and clear, hold, and consolidate, there were six operation modes or activities: 
tactical operations against insurgent tactical forces, military civic action, internal security 
124 FM 17-1, 1966, 219. 
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operations, advisory assistance, psychological operations, and intelligence operations. It 
then listed 11 specific tactical missions that fell into the six modes or activities that armor 
(and armored cavalry) units could accomplish: 1) search and seizure of areas; 2) search 
and clearance of areas; 3) reaction force (reserve); 4) installation and community 
security; 5) security of surface lines of communication; 6) reconnaissance; 7) 
surveillance; 8) apprehension of insurgent force members; 9) harrassing and elimination 
of insurgent tactical forces; 10) convoy escort; and 11) border control. l25To add to the 
plate, the chapter went further. The chapter described a list of ground armor unit combat 
operations, listing over twenty different combat operations. This was a sign that armored 
cavalry and regular maneuver units had multiple overlapping missions, and was further 
evidence of mission homogenization. Armor maneuver units were now doctrinally 
expected to conduct trinity-type missions, while armored cavalry was expected to 
conduct maneuver missions beyond the trinity. 
The contents of the "Internal Defense Operations" section was the ultimate 
doctrinal reflection of execution based on experience in Vietnam, and it showed that 
armored cavalry's mission expectations had indeed moved far beyond the trinity. The list 
of combat operations began with area organization, which laid out very well the nature of 
area operations - the method whereby a higher unit headquarters would parcel out 
responsibility for territory to the subordinate units, and they in tum would parcel out their 
territory to their subordinate units. It further listed mobile combat bases, static security 
posts, movement to contact, encirclement, attack and pursuit, search and clear, 
counterattack, ambush, counterambush, blocking position, raids, offense in cities and 
built-up area, security force in cities and villages, security of routes of communication, 
125 FM \7-\, \966, 22\-222. 
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convoy escort, reconnaissance and surveillance, inland water crossing, border control 
operations, psychological operations, and combat service support. I 26Whilc this list was 
specific and comprehensive, it left the door open even wider. The manual stated as a 
preface to the list that "the operations, tactics, and techniques discussed may be employed 
in varying degrees by armor units in both strike, and clear, hold and consolidation 
operations." l27It appeared that this list was an attempt to codify doctrinally that fact that 
units in Vietnam were, to a large extent, conducting whatever the mission dictated of 
them. They were doing it all. 
The exponential increase in missions and operations for armor and armored 
cavalry in a counterinsurgent environment was a possible indicator as to why the armored 
cavalry missions were expanding well beyond the trinity: because they could. There 
were repeated statements about armored cavalry in the manual, to the effect that because 
of their mobility, flexibility, combined arms organization, firepower, communications, 
and protection, armored cavalry units were well-suited for a counterinsurgent 
environment. This in tum may have been related to a reliance on technology, particularly 
firepower, to win a war where the terrain and the enemy frustrated a large part of 
conventional tactics and doctrine. There was also foreshadowing of another reason as to 
why this may have been possible, and that was that air cavalry, among others, was 
picking up the trinity role in lieu of ground cavalry. The chapter stated later that "air 
cavalry or other observation aircraft are the primary means for reconnaissance prior to an 
operation.,,128It further said that the physical risks of ground reconnaissance must be 
126 FM 17-1, 1966,223-242. 
127 FM 17-1, 1966, 223. To add confusion, however, the list of combat operations is not reconciled with 
the previously listed II specific tactical missions. 
128 FM 17-1, 1966, 224. 
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weighed against the level of detail needed, and that in most cases, aerial observation 
"must suffice."l29 
One last note on the 1966 17-1 Armor Operations manual was that it was one of 
the few manuals to actually list "search and destroy" (as one of the over twenty combat 
operations), and to discuss it. It stated that "search and destroy" fell under the banner of 
strike operations. It described strike operations as "variously called search and clear, 
search and destroy, and others, are primarily tactical operations."noWhen specifically 
describing "search and destroy," as one of the combat operations, it stated that it 
"combines the movement to contact with attack and search techniques to cover an 
assigned zone in which all insurgent forces must be captured or destroyed by offensive 
action."l3l Clearly, even in this definition there was ambiguity. No one term, or indeed 
no one combination of terms could define "search and destroy." "Search and destroy" 
defied doctrinal description, which lead one to believe that it was a broad term and rested 
largely on intent for interpretation as opposed to specifics or one set of ways to conduct 
it. 
Meanwhile, around the same time this doctrine was published, cavalry operations 
continued. One of the 11 th ACR's first operations in Vietnam was Operation HICKORY, 
7-15 October, 1966. The operation involved the 3rd Squadron of the 11th ACR. The 
overall mission was "search and destroy," as well as a security mission for engineers who 
were to check to make sure the area was safe. However, after action documents used the 
terms area and route reconnaissance, and area security, using more of the traditional 
trinity doctrinal terms in describing tasks to subordinate units. Perhaps this was a sign 
129 FM 17-1, 1966, 225. 
130 FM 17-95 The Armored Cavalry Regiment 1966, 221. 
131 FM 17-95, 1966, 235. 
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that all the newer doctrinal terminology was not yet part of their mission terminology, 
meaning that they had not yet digested the new ACR manual. Or, as is more likely the 
case, since the unit had just arrived in country, they probably used doctrinal terms with 
which they were more familiar - missions expressed in trinity terms. 132 
The regiment did not have to wait long for indoctrination into warfare, Vietnam-
style. Soon the II th ACR participated in Operation ATLANTA, which ran from 20 
October 1966 into December of 1966. The overarching mission of A TLANT A was to 
clear and secure lines of communication near Saigon, while securing their new base 
camp. Another overarching task was to conduct a "search and clear" mission. 133From 
A TLANT A the regiment made many discoveries. One was that at certain times they had 
all three squadrons conducting different missions; at no time were all squadrons operating 
together. 134 At one point, 1 st Squadron was called away from A TLANT A to participate in 
Operation ATTLEBORO, a separate and unexpected operation. Another was that most 
of their missions were "search and destroy"/ "search and clear" operations, and various 
types of security such as base security and convoy security operations. They conducted 
cordon and search operations, in which squadrons sealed off areas and then drove the 
enemy out the area with combined mounted and dismounted operations. 135Additionally, 
they discovered that within squadrons, subordinate units wound up conducting separate 
132 Combined After Action Report (CAAR), Operation HICKORY II th ACR, S3D I B I , 26 October 1966, 
5-14. With the unit newly arrived in country, the mission was probably a true area reconnaissance in the 
trinity sense, to get familiar with the surrounding terrain, and to provide initial security in these areas. Also 
of note, there is no mention of any of the 5 offensive actions of the new ACR manual in describing their 
actions in Operation HICKORY. Plus the term "search and destroy" is not found in the May 1966 ACR 
manual. It might be possible that they used this term as part of word of mouth, or just used the term that 
best described what they were doing on the ground. 
m Combined After Action Report (CAAR), Operation ATLANTA, S3DIBI, Undated, I. 
13~ CAAR, Operation ATLANTA, I. 
135 Starry, Mounted Combat, 74. 
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missions. 136 There was also a mix of mounted and dismounted operations. In sum, their 
missions were complex, varied, and simultaneous, and were either not trinity based, or 
were major variations of the trinity missions. 
Additionally, during ATLANTA the regiment fought its first battle - the Battle of 
Suoi Cat. During this battle, while conducting route security, units of the regiment 
fought off enemy ambushes. The procedures used became the adopted standard in 
Vietnam-wide. 137 The procedures included having the ambushed element use its 
firepower to protect itself and the escorted vehicles, and then get them out of the killing 
zone. Once they were clear of the killing zone, the cavalry vehicles would return to the 
fight, while reinforcements came in from other ground cavalry elements, artillery, and 
close air support. I 380verall, the experience of ATLANTA provided a taste of what was to 
come - multiple, varying, and simultaneous missions were the order of the day, and were 
very different from the conventional, trinity missions. 
The Large Operations 
1-4 Cavalry did not have much time to breathe after their missions during the 
summer. Up until the fall of 1966, they operated mainly with their parent division, the 1 sl 
ill, otherwise known as the Big Red One. Soon, 1 sl ill became embroiled in Operation 
ATTLEBORO, one of the first large-scale multiple-unit operations in Vietnam by U.S. 
136 CAAR, Operation ATLANTA, 6. 
137 Starry, Mounted Combat, 75,78. 
138 Starry, Mounted Combat, 74-75. Curiously enough, while the most effective methods were being 
honed in Vietnam, as only experience can do in many cases, there are comments after HICKORY that give 
clues to idea that not all lessons learned were being passed around. The comment after HICKORY, prior to 
ATLANTA, is to "strive for infantry and armored cavalry combined arms operations." While there is 
nothing wrong with point this out, it is interesting to note that 1-4 Cavalry found themselves using 
airmobile infantry in a reaction role, in much the same way, about six months earlier. It begs the question 
about how effectively lessons learned were passed around - how quickly, and in what form, or if at all. He 
states that "in many cases a quick reacting IN force such as a heliborne company could have accounted for 
considerable VC casualties." 
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forces. Most of the fight took place in November of 1966, with the same 9th VC Division 
that the 1 st ID sent reeling into the safety of Cambodia to lick its wounds a few months 
earlier. Newly recharged and refitted from their time in those sanctuaries, the VC re-
emerged in force. The resulting fighting grew from one U.S. light infantry brigade 
involved to over 22,000 U.S. troops, composed of the 1 st ID, elements of the 4th ID, the 
25th ID, and the 11 th ACR. As an example of how the 11th ACR was used during 
ATTLEBORO, 1 st Squadron of the 11 th ACR participated first under operational control 
of the I st Infantry Division and later the command of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, while 
2nd Squadron provided base security, and 3rd Squadron continued on a separate 
operation. 139 
ATTLEBORO was not a fight that the U.S. had planned; rather, it grew in the 
response to discovery of enemy forces and supply caches. By the time it was over, 2,130 
enemy were dead, with 155 friendly dead. The enemy also lost vast quantities of supplies 
captured and bases destroyed. The operation made a positive early statement about the 
value and power of the U.S forces fighting role in an unconventional warfare 
environment, particularly mounted forces. 14°Perhaps a downside may be that the 
cavalry's early performance perpetuated a belief that all was well with doctrine; that 
conventional doctrine could work in a counterinsurgent environment, and therefore did 
not require much scrutiny as to validity or modification. 
In early 1967 came Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, both of 
which were planned and initiated by the U.S., as opposed to being a reaction to the 
139 Combined After Action Report (CAAR), 11 th ACR, Operation ATTLEBORO, S3D 1 B 1,08 December 
1966, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 8. 
140 Lieutenant-General Bernard William Rogers, Cedar Falls - Junction City: A Turning Point. 
(Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 1974), 12. 
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enemy. The purpose of Operation CEDAR FALLS was to destroy enemy forces and 
infrastructure within an area known as the Iron Triangle, only 25 kilometers northwest of 
Saigon, as well as to relocate civilians living within the Triangle. It was conducted in 
January, 1967, while Operation JUNCTION CITY ran from 22 February to 14 May, 
1967. Both were significant because they were the largest operations of U.S. forces to 
date, but also because some of the missions that 1-4 Cavalry and the 11 th ACR conducted 
as part of these operations were closest to their traditional, conventional trinity missions. 
CEDAR FALLS was essentially a large scale "hammer and anvil" type operation, 
and was the largest combined operation in Vietnam to date. It involved the 1 st ID, 25th 
ID, 173rd BDE, 196th IN BDE, 11 th ACR, and ARVN units, with the 11 th ACR and 173rd 
under operational control of the 1 st ID. The concept of the operation was to position 
forces at one end as the "anvil," and then the enemy was driven into them by another 
element, the "hammer." The 1 st ID was the driving force - the "hammer," leading the 
"search and destroy" mission into the contested area. In addition, their tasks were tunnel 
and base camp destruction, and jungle clearing. It was a typical "search and destroy" 
operation of Vietnam, except on a much larger scale. The two squadrons of the 11 th ACR 
participated mainly as the thrusting force from the south into the Iron Triangle, searching 
and destroying as they went, linking up with infantry units that had been airlifted into 
landing zones ahead of them and other infantry units that conducted "search and destroy" 
operations moving south. 141 This was another example of maneuver units and cavalry 
units conducting the same missions. While both the cavalry and other maneuver units 
conducted some missions peculiar to their specialties (cavalry screening, infantry landing 
141 After Action Report, Operation CEDAR FALLS, S2D4B I, #7, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton 
Museum. Ft. Knox, KY. March 13, 1967, 4-5. 
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by helicopter) both the 11th ACR units and infantry units were largely conducting the 
same overarching mission: "search and destroy." 
1-4 cavalry initially blocked and screened to the east, protecting the flank of the 
rest of the U.S. forces. These missions resembled the trinity security missions, 142 Later 
the squadron was relieved of this mission and picked up a blocking mission in a new 
location, working under the control of the 11 th ACR. Toward the end of the operation, 1-
4 Cavalry, joined by two infantry companies, conducted jungle clearing operations, 
tunnel destruction, and security operations. 143Thus, they conducted a wide range of 
operations. Operation CEDAR FALLS ended at the end of January, 1967, with much 
enemy destroyed, infrastructure razed, and jungle cleared. General DePuy, the 
commanding General of 1 st ID, felt that the operation was a decisive turning point in the 
III CTZ, in favor of the U.S. and the South Vietnamese. 1 44Colonel William W. Cobb, 
commander of the 11 th ACR, felt that the regiment demonstrated its capabilities in 
conducting its missions of "search and destroy," screening, blocking, and security 
., 145 mlsslOns .. 
Operation JUNCTION CITY ran from February to May, 1967. It was even larger 
than Operation CEDAR FALLS. The overall mission was "search and destroy" in order 
to eliminate the headquarters structure of the enemy thought to be in the area, known as 
the Central Officer of South Vietnam (COSVN). It took place in War Zone C, the 
approximately 80 x 50 kilometer area bounded by Highway 13 in the east and Cambodia 
in the west. It was the ground of the earlier operations of the 1 st ID and 1-4 Cavalry the 
142 Rogers, Cedar Falls - Junction City. 25. 
143 After Action Report, Operation CEDAR FALLS, S2D4B I, #7, March 13, 1967, 5-8. 
144 Rogers, Cedar Falls - Junction City. 78. 
145 Starry, Mounted Combat, 95. 
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previous summer, and a place that was still considered to be an enemy stronghold, partly 
because it had been one for the previous twenty years. For the operation, 2 U.S. 
Divisions participated in addition to South Vietnamese troops. 146 
Similar to Operation CEDAR FALLS, the concept of the operation was like a 
hammer and anvil operation, except that for this operation, blocking forces would set up 
in a giant horseshoe shape with other forces attacking into the mouth of the horseshoe. 
This was to be the first part, JUNCTION CITY I. The 1 SI ID was to be part of the 
horseshoe, forming its northern and eastern lengths. By the end of the operation, Viet 
Cong sanctuaries had been eliminated by destruction of their forces (each of the four 
enemy regiments of the 91h VC Division, mauled earlier by 1 SlID) and their installations, 
while U.S. facilities were built in their place. 147 
The missions of 1-4 Cavalry during Operation JUNCTION CITY I demonstrated 
how they had made a jump from doctrinal trinity missions, to becoming a "jack of all 
trades" in execution in Vietnam. 1-4 initially spearheaded the initial move of 1 sl ID into 
their area of operations, with missions of seizing and securing landing zones for the 
infantry, escorting and securing artillery units, and opening roads. Other missions were 
daily clearing of main supply routes, convoy escort of engineer units into their positions, 
blocking a portion of the supply routed from enemy access, and conducting their own 
search and destroy missions within their own area of operations. 148By leading the 
division into the AO, the unit was performing a mission similar to trinity security 
mission, by acting as an advance guard mission. There were other conventional 
146 Rogers, Cedar Falls - Junction City, 83. 
147 Rogers, Cedar Falls - Junction City, 87. 
148 Combined After Action Report (CAAR), Operation JUNCTION CITY, 1-4 Cavalry, S2D4B I, #10, 19 
April 1967, 2. 
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similarities, such as seizing terrain-based objectives, but in reality, it appeared that the 
majority of the operations were non-trinity security related tasks, plus the ever-present 
requirement for "search and destroy." 
After that, 1-4 Cavalry's mission was to reinforce airborne elements along the 
northern portion of the horseshoe. In order to do this quickly, the squadron raced along 
20 kilometers of uncleared road. The mission was officially termed an attack, in order to 
seize an objective, which they did, and linked up with elements of the 173rd Brigade. The 
mission was risky because of potential for mines, but turned out to be a successful 
mission. It was also a form of the trinity mission of route reconnaissance, since the 
squadron was followed by support elements. 149 
The squadron's missions continued to be a potpourri. For the next part of the 
operation, 23 Febuary to 13 March, the squadron conducted road clearing and security; 
convoy escort, secured bases, conducted "search and destroy" missions, and extensive 
night patrolling. No contact of significance was made by the unit during the course of the 
operation. During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, 18 March to 15 April, they conducted 
perimeter security, road clearing operations, and convoy security, again encountering no 
significant contacts outside rocket propelled grenades and recoilless rifle fire. ISO 
Meanwhile, the 11 th ACR was part of the force attacking up into the mouth of the 
horseshoe. They conducted mainly "search and destroy" operations, plus blocking, 
screening, and security missions. 
By the end of the operation, armored cavalry, in addition to mechanized and 
armored forces, had proved their worth in terms of being able to effectively control large 
149 Starry, Mounted Combat, 95. 
150 Combined After Action Report (CAAR), Operation JUNCTION CITY, S2D4B I, #10, I -4 Cavalry, 26 
April 1967, 3. The rocket propelled grenade was the RPG-2. 
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areas of War Zone c. ISI Indeed, even North Vietnamese defectors commented that the 
loss of their bases and infrastructure [as a result of JUNCTION CITY] forced their 
command to realize that they could not maintain them in such close proximity to Saigon; 
rather, they decided that bases and camps needed to be relocated to the sanctuaries of 
Cambodia. ls2 Additionally, the significance of these successful large-scale operations was 
that it demonstrated their importance and their possibility in a counterinsurgent 
environment. The successful destruction of enemy forces and their sanctuaries, plus the 
subsequent construction of friendly bases, were major accomplishments. The enemy, 
who had been moving toward the Phase III of an insurgency, mobile warfare, now had to 
rethink his plans. The only problem noted at the conclusion of the operation was that 
there were not enough forces to stay in the area, because it was not long after the 
conclusion of the battle that enemy forces began to trickle back in. Further, even during a 
large-scale operation, the enemy could still get away because of jungle vegetation and 
usually intimate knowledge of the terrain; this meant that in many cases, the enemy still 
owned the initiative - that ability to strike and break contact at the times and places of his 
choosing.IS3 
From the point of view of the cavalry, the operations showed their ability to take 
part in large operations, akin to tradition conventional missions. While the cavalry 
performed well, however, these operations may have been in some senses misleading 
from a doctrinal viewpoint. The nature of the war in Vietnam was not conventional- the 
terrain was difficult, the enemy varied, and the front lines were virtually non-existent. 
The operations could only be conducted according to where intelligence showed that the 
151 Starry, Mounted Combat, 102. 
152 www.army.millcmh-pglbooksNietnamJ90-7/chI4.htm. 3. 
153 Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 157-158. 
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enemy was likely to be, and then once found, he could be destroyed. The large scale 
operations of CEDAR FALLS and JUCTION CITY showed how the cavalry could 
modify, on a large scale, the traditional, conventional versions of their trinity missions, 
and simultaneously conduct missions outside the scope of trinity missions, but at the 
same time, it may be that leaders were convinced that the conventional doctrinal blueprint 
could be successfully modified to fit the nature of the war in Vietnam. 
Immediately following JUNCTION CITY was Operation DALLAS, 17-26 May 
1967. I s( ID and the I s( Squadron, 11 th ACR were part of it. The operation was a "search 
and destroy" mission conducted in the western portion of War Zone D, just to the east of 
War Zone C. 1 st Squadron's mission statement was illustrative: "1 st Squadron attacks 
north into sector, seizes, and secures two artillery support bases. Conducts combat 
reconnaissance in assigned areas of operation; destroys VCINV A forces and installations 
in sector." The Squadron was to first secure fire support bases, attacking into enemy 
territory to do so, and attacking because of the unknown enemy situation, expecting 
contact. Further, use of the term "combat reconnaissance" implied a reconnaissance in 
force or any of a myriad of missions, but the most important task in the mission statement 
was that they were to destroy VCINV A forces and installations. As mentioned earlier, 
trinity versions of reconnaissance had become "search and destroy," "search and clear," 
and reconnaissance in force in Vietnam. They were broader terms that challenged 
definition, because just about every enemy or terrain situation was different. What was 
constant, however, was the need to find, fix, and destroy the enemy and his structures. 
The term "combat reconnaissance" was illustrative of the varying usage of terms used to 
describe the Vietnam versions of reconnaissance. 
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The descriptions of all the subordinate missions that the squadron conducted were 
even more illustrative. They showed that the squadron conducted the following troop and 
platoon sized missions during DALLAS: 1 multi-coordinated attack with 3 troops; 24 
troop-sized "search and destroy" missions; 3 landing zone security missions; 3 parachute 
zone security missions; 1 troop size area recon; 1 troop size convoy escort; I troop size 
engineer work party security; 2 troop size route security missions; 2 troop size reaction 
missions; 7 platoon size search and destroy missions; 3 platoon size (composite) engineer 
work party security missions; 7 platoon size night route clearance missions (Thunder 
Runs), all for a total of 51 missions within the squadron. Elements on these missions 
made contact on 8 of the 51 missions, 6 were light contact, and 2 were moderate contacts, 
each lasting about 3 hours. Clearly, the cavalry units conducted many different missions 
simultaneously. This was a clear demonstration of the fact that the missions of the 
cavalry were a long way from conventional, trinity missions. 154 The reality in Vietnam 
was that the cavalry were conducting whatever missions were necessary within the 
bounds of their capabilities, which were considerable. 
During DALLAS, 1-4 Cavalry conducted road clearing and security, convoy 
escort, security of a fire support base, and limited "search and destroy" operations. As 
part of conducting these missions, the squadron was again conducting multiple and 
simultaneous operations. For example, Troop A clear and secured a route; Troop B, with 
a platoon of infantry attached, cleared a route and conducted "search and destroy" 
154 CAAR, Operation DALLAS, II II Cavalry, S3D I B I, #4, 29 March 1968, 1-4. The composite platoons 
were formed by taking tanks from the tank company and re-distributing them to certain troops and cavalry 
platoons. Remember lhallhese platoons had given up their original task organization in order to come to 
Vietnam, replacing the tanks in the Cavalry Troops with M 113s. Also, as one looks at these AAR 
comments, one might notice some groping for terminology. Such terms as "combat reconnaissance" can be 
figured out, but it is not per se doctrinal. It may have been unit Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). 
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missions; Troop C cleared and secured routes and secured engineer work parties; an 
attached infantry company secured the fire support base, and conducted "search and 
destroy" operations. ISS These numbers illustrated both cavalry and maneuver units 
conducting some of the same missions, simultaneously and at multiple levels. In a 
conventional setting, it would not be this way. 
The MACOV Study 
During the same timeframe as CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, the Army 
had officers and analysts in Vietnam seeking answers as to what was actually occurring 
on the ground in Vietnam. As part of the Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in 
Vietnam Study (MACOV), over 100 military officers and civilian analysts were sent to 
Vietnam to gather data to find out during the period of January 1967 to March 1967. 
They were to discern whether particular patterns were developing regarding the use of 
mounted forces, tanks and armored personnel carriers, in Vietnam. Additionally, one the 
goals of the study was to evaluate the tactics, techniques, and operations of U.S. mounted 
forces (armor, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry) in order to determine what 
changes needed to be made, if any, to doctrine and training. 156 
The findings were many and substantial. Perhaps the most eye-opening findings 
related to the terrain. It found that armored vehicles could traverse terrain in Vietnam in 
more areas than previously believed, and during longer periods of the year, because the 
weather patterns were found to be different from other countries, such as Korea. It 
debunked the previous myth that the terrain was largely inhospitable to armored vehicles. 
1:1:1 CAAR, Operation DALLAS, S2D4B2. #11,1-4 Cavalry, 13 June 1967, 1··2. 
156 MACOV Study. Summary. 
73 
In fact, armored vehicles were actually on the ground in Vietnam already, disproving the 
myths. 
With regard to organization and equipment, many of the other findings of the 
report were simply confirmations of what was already occurring on the ground, including 
modifications to the M 113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) by adding protection for 
the track commander, and side weapon mounts for the crew, to form the vaunted 
Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACA V). The study found that ACA Vs were used in a 
tank-like role, which is not surprising given that the Army approved their substitution for 
tanks back in the early days when the deployment of armored cavalry and armored units 
to Vietnam hung in limbo. The 11th ACR used exclusively ACA V s in the cavalry troops 
during its first years in Vietnam, and the Division Cavalry squadrons used them as well. 
The study also examined doctrinal trends and identified a trend of cavalry's 
employment as maneuver units. One trend was that armored units fixed enemy and the 
airmobile infantry maneuvered to encircle the enemy and complete their destruction. 
This was a 180-degree doctrinal flip. Moreover, it discovered that tanks were leading 
APCs through the jungle, contrary to established doctrine. This switch was purely a 
function of the terrain - the heavier tanks, as with Task Force Spur, broke the jungle for 
their smaller brethren, much like icebreaker ships break paths for other ships to 
follow. 157 In another doctrinal flip, the study identified that in many cases, infantry fought 
mounted from their ACA V s rather than dismounting from them prior to reaching the 
enemy. The firepower, protection, and mobility of the vehicles gave the infantry a great 
advantage when closing with the enemy in Vietnam. 
157 Starry, Mounted Comhat, 85. 
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Findings of the MACOV study discussed new procedures, techniques, and 
mission titles created out of necessity by units in Vietnam. Some of the most prevalent 
and effective formations and procedures include the herringbone formation, roadrunner 
and thunder-run missions, and the cloverleaf technique for reconnaissance. They were 
representative of bottom-up contributions from the force - innovative techniques created 
by units on the ground as the most effective way of accomplishing relevant missions. In 
some cases the techniques were new, while others were adaptations of previous 
techniques. The roadrunner and thunder run missions were procedures used for 
establishing and maintaining route security; however, they were in fact forms of route 
reconnaissance, conducted with great variation from the normal, doctrinal version of 
route reconnaissance. The thunder run was a quick road run by armored units, usually at 
night, used to deter mine-laying and also to clear roads by racing down them, firing 
weapons to trigger potential ambushes. Emphasis was on speed. Roadrunner operations 
were similar, but were usually carried out by larger units looking for trouble spotS. 158 
Some of the techniques became doctrinal, and are still used in the U.S. Army today, such 
as the herringbone formation and the cloverleaf method of conducting reconnaissance. 
Of the missions conducted by U.S. mounted forces, the MACOV study found that 
the typical missions were "search and destroy," "clear and secure," and security missions. 
The study then said that these missions "entail the conduct of offensive, defensive, 
reconnaissance, security, or economy of force operations." I 59The study said that these 
158 Starry, Mounted Combat. 71-72. 
159 MACOV Study, 57. The version of the MACOV that this note refers to is the copy of the report that 
was approved for dissemination to the Army. General Starry's book refers to the fact that part of the 
problem with the entire MACOV study was its unwieldiness. In its entirety. it was comprised of 7 thick 
volumes, and had six data supplcments to back it up. It is believed that its restrictive classification at the 
time it came out, coupled with its size, ultimately alTccted it's ability to get out to the force and be read. 
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were the most frequently assigned missions in Vietnam, and most of the time occurred 
simultaneously. It further said that "these missions may be assigned to infantry, tank, 
mechanized infantry, and armored or air cavalry units.,,160This was further confirmation 
of mission homogenization between cavalry and maneuver units - a drift by cavalry to 
maneuver missions beyond the trinity. 
One can conclude from the study several things. One, that overarching, broad 
mission terms such as "search and destroy" could be essentially anything that they 
needed to be. They were, in effect, carte blanche missions, which in turn required carte 
blanche-type organizations such as the cavalry to execute them. Another was that any 
ground unit could conduct maneuver missions. Another was that the component pieces 
of overarching missions such as "search and destroy" were composed of everything else 
that cavalry and maneuver units were supposed to already know how to do. This gave 
the overarching, broader terms some doctrinal legitimacy, to the extent that that was an 
issue for ground commanders. Doctrinal legitimacy was at least pondered by some, 
however, given the need to conduct a study such as the MACOV and examine doctrine as 
part of it. 
By mission title, the MACOV revealed that the cavalry was conducting new 
missions in Vietnam, as evidenced by the need to give them new names such as the 
"search and destroy," and "clear and secure." Underneath the mission titles, however, 
were multiple and various conventional trinity tasks. Reconnaissance missions were 
undoubtedly part of "search and destroy" missions, because much of the "search" 
involved looking for the enemy, either in general or based on some idea of where he is. 
Even today, parts of it are classified as "'limited." which means that it can be read but not published for 
public consumption. 
160 MACOV Study, 57. 
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Furthermore, there were offensive missions involved, such as a hasty attack or movement 
to contact, once contact with the enemy was made. By thcmsclves, these terms were 
doctrinal, but in Vietnam they were not conducted by themselves in that sense; they were 
conducted as part of the larger operations, such as "search and clear" and "search and 
destroy." By the same token, "search and destroy" missions were conducted at platoon 
level as well. 
In addition, under the broad umbrella of the mission terms "search and destroy" 
and "search and clear," there were many other types of missions that were relatively new, 
at least on a large scale, such as installation destruction, tunnel destruction, and jungle 
clearing. In the end, none of these terms by themselves would or could accurately 
convey what a "search and destroy" was. In fact, it seemed that the terms "search and 
destroy," and "search and clear" were terms given because they most clearly articulated 
the intent of the commander. They were overarching terms in many respects because 
they conveyed intent. Intent, coupled with and driven by the nature of the terrain and 
enemy, caused the cavalry to conduct their missions differently, particularly with regard 
to "search and destroy," and "search and clear." However, because "search and destroy," 
and "search and clear" missions were composed of elements of missions that cavalry was 
already trained to do, there was theoretically little cause for alarm. This fact may have 
contributed to a common response by commanders that, despite conducting missions in 
Vietnam differently, conventional cavalry trinity doctrine was "still valid." 
In an environment such as Vietnam, the peculiarity of the situation - the terrain, 
the enemy, and the civil and political aspects all combined - and likely demanded new 
terminology to convey intent. In absence of predictive doctrine for this strange war, 
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conveying intent by giving missions new overarching terms was arguably the best that 
could be done in the short term, because soldiers were already in the middle of fighting. 
It appears that the combination of circumstances in Vietnam created a total environment 
whereby the conventional terms and doctrine did not well apply. For example, the 
conventional trinity missions were based on the cavalry primarily conducting a special set 
of missions, reconnaissance, security, and economy of force, according to their doctrine, 
which nested with the rest of the conventional doctrine. When the conventional setting, 
and for the most part the conventional enemy went away, doctrine described itself in 
terms that largely nu lunger applied as well, though certainly many of the fundamentals 
still applied. Previous, trinity-based conventional doctrine could be fashioned and used, 
which the cavalry was able to do. As if this was not enough, new missions appeared such 
as jungle clearing and tunnel destruction, which in Vietnam could seldom be conducted 
in isolation - only in context of a larger, overarching mission such as a search and 
destroy. Thus, the overarching terms of "search and destroy" served two purposes: to 
convey intent, and to overarch the multiple other sub-omissions inherent in them. It can be 
argued that "search and destroy" was in fact an area reconnaissance, a reconnaissance in 
force, a movement to contact, or others. In reality, it may have been components of all of 
these, and to varying degrees at different times and places, but at the end of the day the 
"search and destroy" and "search and clear" mission titles conveyed to the soldier what 
was to be done, which was ultimately the intent of the higher commander: search, and 
destroy (enemy and enemy installations). 
The MACOV study defined "search and destroy" as operations designed "to 
locate enemy installations, destroy or evacuate supplies and equipment, and to destroy or 
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capture VC forces. Less importance was attached to seizing and holding terrain than to 
finding and finishing the enemy armed forces and political infrastructure." Later in the 
report, it stated that "tactics employed are more in the nature of a reconnaissance in 
force.,,16I The basic scheme of maneuver for "search and destroy" was to use a 
combination of maneuver and blocking forces, augmented with air and artillery fires. 162 
The study further stated that "during a search and destroy operation, armor and 
mechanized infantry units are initially engaged in area reconnaissance and intelligence 
missions; when contact is made with the enemy, they undertake offensive operations as in 
any meeting engagement." Even the MACOV study used multiple terms in an attempt to 
pin down the description of "search and destroy," which showed that anyone attempt to 
pin down "search and destroy" as necessarily anyone or two conventional doctrinal 
missions was not doable, because of its ever changing nature based on the terrain and the 
enemy. Each mission in and of itself, such as the area reconnaissance, or the 
reconnaissance in force, was taken from conventional doctrine; however, Vietnam 
required blending of these two categories of conventional doctrine, and others, in order to 
create a new "flavor," to address the new type of area war in Vietnam. 
The "clear and secure" mission was described as "offensive combat operations 
aimed at driving VC forces out of a designated area and keeping them out." The study 
stated that "clear and secure" missions usually start out as "search and destroy," but were 
ultimately different because they were sustained and emphasis was on seizing key 
population and communication centers. "Clear and secure" implied maintaining more of 
a presence, and was more aligned with such issues as population security and becoming 
161 MACOV Study. 133. 
162 MACOV Study, 58. 
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knowledgeable in particular area. The study mentioned that these missions were 
conducted by U.S. forces, as well as the ARVN and other allied forces. As with "search 
and destroy," "clear and secure" was also an overarching mission term, under the title of 
which any number of traditional conventional tasks might apply. Further evidence of 
trying to come to grips with this term was that it seemed to be used interchangeably with 
the term "search and clear." 
Regarding security missions, the report listed them as convoy, route, base, and 
area security. The description of convoy security is similar to the description of the route 
security mission in the 1-4 Cavalry SOP. The MACOV study described the other 
security missions as "generally longer in duration, and, like clear and secure operations, 
are normally in conjunction with some search and destroy actions." Their purpose is for 
"seizing and holding routes, installations, and facilities." Security operations were 
conducted with the minimal force necessary, and were supported by quick reaction 
reserves, for which purpose armored and mechanized infantry were "particularly well 
suited." 163 
In general, the major change in security from the trinity missions were that in 
Vietnam, the missions were more literally security. In a conventional war, the real threat 
(though not entirely) of the enemy was beyond the front lines, behind which there was 
less of a worry. The conventional, trinity security missions were based on this concept. 
Their purpose is to protect the main body of enemy forces from observation, to provide 
163 MACOV Study. 59. It is also interesting to note here where even with security. the missions are linked 
to the ubiquitous search and destroy. It seems that there the overarching end of most military action in 
Vietnam was the "search and destroy." Find the enemy. then bring force to bear to destroy him. Finding 
the enemy proved the biggest challenge, due to lack of large scale conventional formations the jungle 
terrain. Further, the strategic and political restrictions that prevented the destruction of the enemy's cross-
border sanctuaries did not help. 
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early warning, and to protect the main body physically. In contrast there were no front 
lines in the area war in Vietnam, and as such security had to be everywhere, and became 
literally securing bases, installations, fire bases, transportation routes, and convoys. 4th 
ID's Divisional Cavalry squadron, alternately augmented with another cavalry squadron, 
2-1 Cavalry and a tank battalion, spent the greater part of the war providing route and 
convoy security. This was representative of a huge change from trinity missions. 
Security missions for the cavalry in Vietnam changed in execution and intent from the 
doctrinal trinity security missions. 
Another aspect of the change in security was, if this was the case, what happened 
to relevancy of conventional security tasks such as guard, screen and cover? In the case 
of Vietnam, they appeared to matter less, but were still important. To the extent that they 
were done, a large part of the load was picked up by the air cavalry. They stepped in to 
help fill whatever void existed. This is seen in the example of Task Force Spur's march 
through previously unexplored jungle. For that mission, aerial assets provided the longer 
range reconnaissance, orientation, and hence provided a level of security and early 
warning. This may have helped make the fact that ground cavalry was not conducting 
their traditional trinity missions less noticeable and more palatable. Other factors that 
may have largely help replace the cavalry's traditional job of providing security were a 
result of mission homogenization - that is, that maneuver units found themselves 
conducting more of the trinity missions themselves, just as the cavalry ended up 
conducting more maneuver type missions. An example this mission homogenization was 
the fact that in the early experience of 1-4 Cavalry in 1966, air assets were used to 
conduct screening to the front primarily, while infantry were used to conduct flank and 
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rear security in operations large and small, and were considered to be the best at it. I 64The 
air cavalry conducted flank security as well. 165 
The last category of missions mentioned in the MACOV study was Revolutionary 
Development - the name given to the task of nation-building, with the goal of 
government of South Vietnam being reestablished and extended over the population. At 
the time of the MACOV study in the first half of 1967, the U.S. forces role was to help 
extend this control. The study described a sequence of action, with the U.S. forces being 
involved primarily at the beginning of the process. Typically, military operations would 
be conducted in areas not under the control of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
(RVN), and typically consisted of first conducting a "search and destroy" mission, 
followed by "clear and secure" operations. ARVN forces then assumed control, working 
on developing the local forces and police in the area, and ultimately once this happened., 
they moved on as well. Meanwhile, during the early parts of this process, and even 
throughout, the U.S. forces conducted civic action programs to help the civilian 
population of that particular area with food, medical help, clothing, and other supplies. 
The actions of U.S. units were coordinated with local Vietnamese officials and the U.S. 
advisors in the area to ensure that efforts were synchronized. 166Cavalry at times were 
involved in these operations as well, typically participating in the initial "search and 
destroy" missions, and "search and clear missions," with particular emphasis on helping 
provide security around towns and villages prior to them being searched. 
Perhaps the root of all the observations and the bedrock of adjustments to the 
missions of the cavalry, among others, are due to what the report identified as Area 
164 1-4 Cavalry Unit SOP. II. 
165 1-4 Cavalry Unit SOP, 2. 
166 MACOV Study. 59-60. 
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Operations. Area operations were defined as what conventional warfare was not: a war 
with no front lines because the enemy can be anywhere. Area warfare resulted when 
"armed forces seeking to achieve control of the population of a country are unable to or 
do not desire to conduct military operations in the traditional sense, i.e. by the seizure of 
a succession of terrain objectives while maintaining a continuous front or line of 
demarcation between one's own forces and those of the enemy." The report described the 
U.S.'s role in an area war as "widespread tactical offensive operations by units varying 
from platoon to multi-divisional size," and that other characteristics of area war were the 
presence of logistical bases and unit base camps spread throughout the country, with 
attendant security responsibilities. The study stated that the missions of U.S. forces were 
correspondingly focused on the enemy, and not on terrain, and finished by saying that all 
U.S. operations must be undertaken within the broader context of nation-building -
allowing the RVN government to gain and maintain control over the population. A new 
requirement in support of this last statement is that Rules of Engagement must be 
established (ROE).167 
Area warfare, a term used in the MACOV study seemingly for the first time, 
evolved from the combination of the nature of the terrain and the nature of the enemy. 
The terrain was extremely overgrown, thick, and generally offered great cover and 
concealment to the smaller Viet Cong forces but yet greatly hindered the movement of 
U.S. conventional forces, despite the surprising mobility of U.S. mounted forces beyond 
initial expectations. The nature of the terrain made feasible the choice of the enemy to 
not engage the U.S. in conventional war, with conventional forces, with front lines and 
objectives based on terrain. Rather, they chose to use the terrain to their advantage to 
167 MACOV Study, 57. 
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hide and fight a war on their terms, striking when and where they chose. The enemy also 
used the terrain to get in amongst the people of South Vietnam to try and either coerce or 
win them over, to wear out both U.S. forces, and U.S. public opinion, and ultimately ride 
into Saigon victorious. This also added to the evolution of area warfare, the fact that a 
large part of the war was a war of the people - being where they were, winning them 
over, working on development, providing their security, and differentiating friend from 
foe. 
Area warfare necessitated a largely new type of warfare for U.S. forces, and the 
terrain aspect of it in Vietnam exacerbated the challenge. The immediate tactical 
implications of area warfare were that U.S. forces had to expect contact at any time and 
from any direction; that they must be ready to deploy quickly, and that area warfare 
necessitated fire support from fire bases that had to provide "complete coverage of the 
area of operations." The MACOV study stated that within each of the four CTZ's, the 
enemy and terrain were likely to be different; therefore, forces in each CTZ "must be 
capable of fighting organized NV A and VC units, defeating the guerrilla, developing area 
stability, and securing lines of communication.,,168The differences in the CTZs 
contributed to mission and doctrinal homogenization. Based on being responsible for 
their particular areas, dispersed units had to fend largely for themselves, and be prepared 
to fight the full range of threat, in four different CTZ's. Units become their own cavalry 
and their own maneuver forces, and thus the distinction between and the more distinct 
roles of each began to homogenize. Further, the different and varying enemy types, and 
different terrain characteristics of each CTZ made attempts at doctrinal codification 
harder, defying creation of sets of particular doctrine with rigid boundaries. In a war 
168 MACOV Study. 58. 
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setting that defied boundaries, U.S. execution had to defy them as well. To a large 
degree, execution had to follow and extend beyond certain boundaries as well to meet the 
enemy where he was. To the extent that doctrine followed execution, implementing 
overarching doctrinal terminology such as "search and destroy" was a method of coping, 
but was also a reflection of doctrinal groping. 
The MACOV report ultimately had a big impact, particularly with regard to its 
recommendations on equipment changes and unit organization adjustments. 
Recommended doctrinal changes, however, were less enthusiastically received. With 
regard to the U.S. Army Armor School and the Combat Developments Command Armor 
Agency at Fort Knox, doctrinal changes were not implemented. I 69Perhaps it was the 
caveat found in the report that stated the new types of missions being conducted in 
Vietnam such as "search and destroy" essentially rested on the foundation of other armor 
and cavalry missions. Therefore, there was probably little urgency to change doctrine. 
Perhaps another reason may have been that there was still the conventional Cold War 
threat in Europe, which the majority of the Army not involved in Vietnam was preparing 
to fight, and which was considered the primary threat. 
In any event, it would not have added much to doctrine to codify the new 
missions - "search and destroy," and "clear and search," under an appropriate category. 
After all, they were what was happening in Vietnam. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel 
LeWayne, the 1-4 Commander, in his 1966 SOP: "the cavalry squadron as a whole is 
usually employed in VN (Vietnam) as a find, fix, and eliminate force.,,17oAs it was, some 
of the new concepts were already in the 1966 17-1 Armor Operations manual. The 1966 
169 Starry, Mounted Comhat. 86. 
170 1_4 Cavalry Unit SOP. 2. 
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17-1 already had terms such as the "tank sweep," and mention of the terms "search and 
destroy," and "search and clear," under the banner of the new term "strike operations.,,171 
FM 17-1 did the best job of the armor/cavalry manuals of codifying some of the new 
doctrinal terms, and appeared to be responsive to some of the items outlined earlier that 
year by 1-4 Cavalry in their SOP, such as mentioning "search and clear" and "search and 
destroy" under the new banner of strike operations. The Division cavalry manuals in 
general lagged behind, and though they added a chapter in 1968 called Stability 
Operations, the only new doctrinal tactical term of real significance was "search and 
clear." In general, doctrine lagged, and even if new terms were added, their descriptions 
and depictions were lacking in comparison with the conventional doctrine of the trinity 
mISSIons. 
There were other obstacles to implementation of the findings of the report as well. 
The Army staff still did not agree with Combat Developments Command's endorsement 
of the suggestion for an increased emphasis on the use of armored forces in warfare like 
that in Vietnam. A further compllication was that around the same time the study group 
was getting ready to go to Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara imposed troop 
ceilings on troop deployments to Vietnam. This meant that the troop levels suddenly 
became less than what had already been planned, and made it impossible to send 
additional armored troops to Vietnam without giving up other soldier slots, one for one. 
This made arguments for further troop deployments to Vietnam a parochial issue, pitting 
branches of the Army against each other. 172 
171 FM 17-1 Armor Operations 1966. 176, 221. 
177 C b - Starry, Mounted om at, 90. 
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What the report did do was shed light on the nature of the war in Vietnam; what 
type of war it was, how it was being fought by armor and mechanized forces, and with 
what types of missions. The study was an adjunct to the doctrine and it was a 
codification, a snapshot of reality on the ground, for purposes of dissemination, in an 
attempt to take all that information and circulate it among the force to assist with 
standardization, and solicit professional commentary. The study was a sign that people 
were aware of possible changes in execution from doctrine, and the study was a sign of 
attempts to grapple with solutions. 173The study was also meant to recommend, and 
perhaps even justify certain changes; some were implemented, and some were not. The 
study also vindicated the use of mounted forces in a war theater such as Vietnam - one 
where the fight was an area war, lprimarily against an insurgency, that also involved 
aspects of nation-building. Perhaps if nothing else, the study reiterated what many 
already knew: that Vietnam was a complicated war for many reasons, and because of this 
fact it challenged the use of armor and cavalry's (not to mention the Army's as a whole) 
conventional warfare mindset. 
In June 1967, not long after the MACOV study ended, the 11 th () ACR, consisting 
of the I st and 3rd Squadrons, participated in Operation AKRON. For the operation, they 
were attached to the 9th Infantry Division. The purpose of the mission was to "seek out 
and destroy VCINV A forces, and to conduct jungle clearing operations" along key trails. 
For their part the II th ACR (-) conducted "reconnaissance and search and destroy 
operations to destroy VCINV A forces and installations," and were prepared to conduct 
security for the engineer work forces in their sector. At one point in the operation, the 1 SI 
173 There are also those who believe that the study was simply going through the motions, a study 
commissioned after the fact to justify what was already going on, though it seems that these people were in 
the minority. 
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squadron provided security for the regiment's base camp and conducted road clearing 
operations, all the while maintaining the capability to dispatch a troop-sized reaction 
force and preparing to provide security for the engineer work parties that were clearing 
jungle. I 74Thus, not only were cavalry squadrons conducting various missions, but even 
within the squadrons, there were usually simultaneous and differing missions occurring. 
The missions continued to come fast, furious, and varied for the 11 th ACR. 
Operation SANTA FE was conducted 1 November to 3 December 1967, in order to 
reestablish friendly control of the area along Highway 1 to the east of the 11th ACR's 
base camp, known as Blackhorse base camp. After gaining initial control of the highway, 
the 11 th ACR would then transition into an attempt to surround an area with suspected 
VC locations, working with the 15t Brigade, 9th ID. The mission of the Regiment was 
first to block Highway 1, the main transportation artery in the area, in order to prevent 
enemy elements escape. Then they were to establish and secure a fire support base, and 
then pass the 15t Brigade, 9th ID, through their positions. After this was all complete, the 
mission of the regiment was to "conduct offensive operations to locate and destroy VC 
and NV A forces and installations.,,17S 
Operation QUICKSILVER followed during the month December. Its purpose 
was to secure a particularly important logistical route "for the movement of logistics and 
personnel convoys of the 1015t Airborne Division." In addition to the route security, 
limited "cordon and search" and "reconnaissance in force" missions were conducted by 
the 1 st and 2nd Squadrons of the 11 th ACR. Among some of the tactics used to 
accomplish these overarching missions were outposting, which was stationing small units 
174 Combined After Action Report (CAAR), Operation AKRON, 28 March 1968, S3DIBI, 1,8. 
l75 CAAR, Operation SANTA FE, Undated, S3D 1 B I, I, 4. 
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of forces at locations along the route in positions where they could react to enemy 
attacks. As part of this, ACA V s were outposted every 75-150 meters along the route. 
Additionall y, ambush patrols were conducted, six of which resulted in contact. 176 
During Operation FARGO, 21 December to 21 January 1968, the whole ACR 
worked together for the first time. This was significant, since many conventional 
doctrinal scenarios had the ACR working together as a unit, but in Vietnam the whole 
regiment working together was almost unheard of. For FARGO, the mission was 
primarily a "recon in force" operation, with the secondary mission being road clearing 
and road security. The mission statement of the regiment stated that the regiment was to 
conduct operations in the area "to destroy enemy main force units," and "clear and 
secure" National Highway 13 (the same highway that 1-4 Cavalry fought along during 
the summer of 1966). Additionally, as part of the road clearing, jungle clearing 
operations were conducted, with 950 acres of jungle along the road being cleared, 
"thereby eliminating VC tax collection points and ambush sites.,,177The fact that 11th 
ACR worked together on this operation was timely, because the Tet Offensive would 
erupt at the end of the month. 
Again, the list of the 11 th ACR' s missions from the period of the summer of 1967 
to early 1968 was long and varied, but in the end most of the overarching missions ended 
up in forms of "search and destroy" missions, though in many cases the missions were 
called reconnaissance in force, or "conducting offensive operations." They also 
conducted security missions, mainly the physical security of routes, units, and 
installationsibases. The special abilities of the cavalry - mobility, protection, firepower, 
176 CAAR, Operation QUICKSILVER, Undated, S3DIBI, 1-4. 
177 CAAR, Operation FARGO, II th ACR, S3D 1 B I, 21 June 1968, 1-6. 
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communications, and inherent task organization - ended up making them the primary 
candidates to conduct the spectrum of missions - variations of the trinity and well 
beyond. They were doing whatever they could be used for, and because of their abilities 
and capabilities, that was quite a lis.t. 
As the year progressed into the fall of 1967, there was evidence of the continuing 
effort to better understand the nature of the fighting in Vietnam in terms of assessing 
execution and doctrine. As part of this ongoing effort, a Meeting Engagement Seminar 
was held in Vietnam 14 September 1967. It started off by defining a meeting 
engagement as "the combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely 
deployed for battle, engages an enemy force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages 
an enemy force, static or in motion, concerning which it has inadequate intelligence." 
This description likely described most of the engagements in Vietnam, and indeed the 
report states that "the meeting engagement is of one of the most common type operations 
experienced in South Vietnam."I78The report mentioned the meeting engagement as 
primarily a result of conducting "search and destroy" operations, and because the goal 
was finding the enemy, he was usually positioned on "terrain of his own choosing; hence 
most actions start as meeting engagements or enemy initiated ambushes.,,179The seminar 
prescribed part of the fix for this as maintaining good flank, point and rear security, but 
stated overall that "no new tactic or technique is needed to turn the meeting engagement 
to our advantage. The only thing needed is to adhere to the already valid and tested 
178 "Extracts From Report of the Meeting Engagement Seminar," S2D3B I, #60, 1967, 4. 
179 Meeting Engagement Seminar, 6. 
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principles.,,]80This implied that the seminar was at least partly satisfied that modified, 
conventional doctrine was working adequately. 
What the report does not convey in so many words, however, made a statement 
about the trinity. In properly working trinity doctrine and execution, friendly forces find 
the enemy before the enemy finds him, and friendly forces find the enemy usually 
through reconnaissance. If units end up in a meeting engagement, then it means that 
more than likely, reconnaissance has failed. In this context, the meeting engagement 
seminar made a statement regarding the trinity and operations in Vietnam. It said in so 
many words that troops were relying on running into the enemy to find him, rather than 
finding him first with reconnaissance. This may have been due to the fact that 
reconnaissance in its traditional, conventional trinity sense was unable to be conducted in 
an area war such as Vietnam anywhere near the level of effectiveness that could be 
expected from reconnaissance in conventional operations, despite the best efforts from 
tactics and technology. 
Regarding security, the seminar repOlt found "including aerial observation and 
fixed wing," as being essential to prevent the enemy from gaining the upper-hand in a 
meeting engagement. This was curious, because in conventional trinity doctrine, the job 
of the ground armored cavalry was to provide security ahead of the main body of forces 
and to make contact with the least possible force to enable maneuver room. However, 
there was no mention in the report about a shift in responsibility, if there was one, and if 
so, to whom it shifted. That may be because there was no best answer. The report 
acknowledged that "aerial observers and ground recon will not, in most cases, detect the 
180 Meeting Engagement Seminar, 12. 
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enemy before contact is made.,,181 In this context, perhaps there was an unspoken 
realization that the traditional security missions weren't working according to trinity 
doctrine, and weren't going to work in Vietnam, so troops had to make the most of what 
to do once they found themselves i:n a meeting engagement. Statements here also allude 
to the fact that perhaps aerial assets and cavalry were helping replace ground cavalry in 
filling the trinity void. 
The Doctrinal Flurry - Stability Operations and Counter-Guerrilla Operations 
The MACOV Study, development of unit SOP's such as 1-4 Cavalry's, and 
other professional forums for discussion were reflections of efforts to better understand 
the situation on the ground in Vietnam, and establish new ways of adapting. 
Organizational and equipment changes of consequence were codified in the form of 
Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs). Tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for units were adopted from the ground up, primarily at the company/troop 
level and below. They were adopted wholesale by units as they learned how best to fight 
the enemy and conduct operations in the jungle. At the squadron and division level, 
different commanders sometimes made their imprint by conducting their operations 
certain ways. Some of these tactics and techniques made their way into doctrine, and 
some didn't. 
The situation on the ground made it a different type of war, one for which the 
Army was largely doctrinally unprepared. As a consequence, the Army's optimum 
methods for dealing with what it found in Vietnam, whether organizationally, equipment, 
or doctrinally, was to either study the problem, or update existing doctrine. Evidence of 
an even farther reaching need in the case of Vietnam was in the creation of new doctrine. 
lSI Meeting Engagement Seminar, 14. 
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In a sense, that is exactly what it was - a reactive situation, the Army reacting to what it 
found on the ground. For an Army that always emphasized being on the offensive and 
maintaining the initiative, being in a reactive mode was not optimal, but it was reality and 
the Army made the efforts accordingly. While armor and cavalry made some 
adjustments to their doctrine, it still followed the execution curve, and was still 
overwhelmingly based on conventional conflict. Meanwhile, the Army as a whole 
reacted and wrestled with the need to address the doctrinal challenges associated with the 
war in Vietnam. Evidence of this is seen in the sudden proliferation of additional 
manuals during the late 1960' s, covering a variety of topics. 
The Counterguerilla Manuals 
One of important manuals updated in March, 1967 was FM 31-16, 
Counterguerilla Operations. The ~ocus of this manual, as opposed to others, was mainly 
on how to defeat enemy guerillas. The counterguerrilla manuals were not new however. 
The 1951 manual, Operations Against Guerrillas, was a prescient manual in many ways, 
despite emphasizing infantry as the primary force with which to fight guerrillas, and a 
reliance on using special units trained to fight guerrillas and not regular forces. It 
foresaw the concept of area operations that later proved necessary and effective in 
Vietnam, such as when conducting reconnaissance, the usefulness of units operating in a 
particular area so as to not arouse suspicions of guerillas. 182 In 1961, FM 31-15, 
Operations Against Irregular Forces, the importance of area operations was buttressed 
further. The manual stated with regard to patrolling that "regular combat patrols are 
formed and employed in a conventional manner and for harassing operations in areas of 
182 FM 31-20 Operations Against Guerilla Forces 1951, 83. 
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extensive guerrilla activity.,,183The manual commented that "only when military forces' 
knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the irregular force can it meet the 
guerrillas and the underground on equal terms." 184These statements emphasized the 
possibility of the use of forces with an area focus, which among other benefits, allowed 
them to gain knowledge of the terrain in a particular area. 
The 1951 manual also made prescient statements about the use of conventional 
forces in a counterguerrilla role. It predicted that conventional tactics would have to be . 
modified by the situation on the ground, that attainment of terrain related objectives 
would matter little, and it further listed some the operations that conventional forces 
might conduct, "broadly classified" as the encirclement, attack, and pursuit. The manual 
also mentioned the hammer and anvil concept used so often and effectively in 
Vietnam. 185Jt stated that "security or offensive forces can often use armor effectively," 
and that their very presence is demoralizing to the enemy. 186 
In 1967, the next version of the manual came out. 187There was a substantial 
increase in the size and substance of the manual from the previous version in 1963. The 
manual parallels in many ways the 1967 Stability Operations manual, another especially 
important manual that came out in 1967, in that it elaborated on the enemy, and explained 
the terms internal defense and internal development as the parallel goals of stability 
operations. Like the stability operations manual of that year, the counterguerrilla manual 
mentioned strike operations and consolidation operations. Accordingly, strike operations 
were designed to harass or destroy the guerrilla force, and consolidation operations were 
183 FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces 1961, 34. 
184 FM 31-15,1961, 38. 
185 FM 31-20,1951, 106-114. 
186 FM 31-20,1951, 129-130. 
187 Prior to the 1967 version, there were versions in 1961 and 1963. 
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designed to neutralize the guerrilla force and secure an area. 1 88For countering small 
guerilla forces, the manual emphasized continuous, extensive patrolling (by foot, track or 
wheel vehicle, air, or water), area ambushes, numerous small raids, minimizing reserves, 
minimizing static defenses, maximizing use of civilian police and area coverage, and 
immediate destruction of guerrilla forces. The manual stated that all of these same 
concepts needed to be modified to defeat large guerrilla forces. 1 89What was interesting 
was how prescient this manual was, like the 1951 manual, in predicting, ultimately, what 
types of missions that the armored cavalry would conduct in Vietnam. 
The manual clearly stated that armor and cavalry had a role in fighting guerillas. 
Regarding armor employment, the manual mentions that armor operations would be 
limited by terrain, but to the extent that terrain permits, armor should be used to take 
advantage of the firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect. Further, the 
manual mentioned that armor has a role in other non-combat aspects of stability 
operations due simply to being "an excellent show-of-force weapon." In other stability 
operations related considerations, the manual also reminded tankers to exercise good fire 
control to prevent innocent civilians from being killed or injured. 190Regarding the 
employment of the cavalry, the manual did not devote much to it, having already 
elaborated on armor use, other than "terrain permitting, armored cavalry units are well 
suited for offensive operations against guerrilla forces," but it does mention regarding air 
cavalry that it is "readily adaptable'" to counterguerrilla operations. The manual 
mentioned that "terrain permitting, tanks or carriers may be used effectively in 
counterguerrilla tactical operations to 1) execute offensive strike operations, including 
188 FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations 1967, 49. 
189 FM 31-16,1967, 50. 
190 FM 31-16, CounterguerriIla Operations, (1967), 51. 
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harassment, against well-organized guerrilla forces; 2) conduct reconnaissance and 
surveillance missions; 3) perform reconnaissance in force missions; 4) provide convoy 
escort; 5) provide mobile reserves for destruction missions or movement to blocking 
positions; 6) conduct demonstrations and feints; and 7) assist in defense of base 
complexes and airfields.,,19I It discussed strike operations as well, stating that they were 
sometimes called "search and clear," or "search and destroy" operations. 
In this 1967 manual there was doctrinal linkage between the terms most often 
used to characterize armored cavalry missions during the first few years in Vietnam. 
Strike operations were to "inflict damage on, seize, disrupt, or destroy an objective-
either terrain or hostile guerrilla forces." The manual stated that during strike operations 
other operations were minimized. Thus, it appeared that strike operations were made 
possible by economy of force type missions in other places, and that the strike operations 
represented the new "objectives" on the battlefield: enemy oriented, and based on 
opportunities as they arose. The manual went further saying that "brigade strike 
operations are conducted to harass the guerrilla by all means available to prevent a 
buildup of personnel and logistical resources; destroy the guerrilla force and his base of 
complexes; demonstrate support for the populace in the area." I 92Later, it was mentioned 
regarding strike operations that they emphasized the use of airborne and airmobile forces 
and that once guerilla forces were located and fixed, strike forces maneuvered to capture 
or destroy them. 193 
The manual further mentioned the raid, reconnaissance in force, movement to 
contact, pursuit, encirclement, operations in built-up areas, and reserves as strike 
191 FM 31-16,1967, 52. 
192 FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations 1967, 54. 
193 FM 31-16, 1967, 57-58. 
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operations. Regarding these, the manual made an interesting observation regarding 
reconnaissance. It said that in counter guerilla operations, it was rare to have thorough 
prior reconnaissance and time for methodical evaluation - rather, forces must quickly 
strike targets of opportunity. It described the "usual case" as being when a unit only has 
enough intelligence to "suspect" the enemy was in a particular location, then what usually 
happens is a reconnaissance in force, followed by a coordinated attack or raid. I 94This was 
evidence to suggest that execution was adjusting to the realities on the ground in Vietnam 
- that conventional, trinity reconnaissance, particularly as conducted by ground elements, 
was almost nonexistent. Rather, out of necessity, units such as the cavalry which could, 
conducted the closest missions to reconnaissance that there were: "search and destroy," 
"search and clear," and reconnaissance in force missions, among others. 
Regarding consolidation operations, those operations that took place routinely 
and were occasionally punctuated by strike operations, the manual defined them as those 
actions that "maintain or restore internal security of that area.,,195 The offensive phases of 
them were the strike operations; the rest was the defensive phase. The offensive phase 
might consist of patrolling, area surveillance, ambushes, and other small-unit actions to 
disrupt and gain information. I 96The patrolling operations were to gather intelligence, and 
cover the entire area to be controlled, to set the stage for strike operations. When 
consolidation was in a defensive phase, it involved "holding an area against guerrilla 
attack to permit the civilian security forces and other governmental agencies to conduct 
their internal defense and development programs.,,1970ther defensive tasks enumerated 
194 FM 31_16, 1967,59. 
195 FM 31-16 1967, 67. 
196 FM 31-16,1967, 65. 
197 FM 31-16,1967, 65. 
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focus on deterrence, area denial, reducing the guerrilla's capacity for offensive action, 
and economizing forces in one area so that other forces could be used decisively in 
another. 198This last information alluded to an economy of force role, which the cavalry 
did in Vietnam. 
The contrast between the 1967 counterguerilla manual and the previous version, 
in 1963, was remarkable. The 1967 version clearly reflected execution in Vietnam. The 
1963 version did not have anything on strike or consolidation operations, and only 
devoted two pages to armor and armored cavalry in a counterguerrilla role. However, the 
1963 manual did list twelve missions that armored cavalry could conduct, but none were 
trinity missions, or conventional economy of force attack or defend missions. Security 
appeared in the form of convoy security, lines of communication security, and installation 
/ community security. 199 This confirmed that doctrine made a huge jump in 1967 to 
reflect execution on the ground. Perhaps what was most important about the 
counterguerilla manuals, particularly the 1951 and 1963 manuals, were that they presaged 
not only cavalry's use in a counterguerrilla environment, and also changes from the 
trinity missions. 
Stability Operations 
Another long-lasting doctrinal term was coined in 1967, called "stability 
operations." The 1968 version ofFM 100-5, the Army's overarching operations manual, 
devoted a chapter to it. The chapter stated that the scope of stability operations was to 
"provide general doctrine for U.S. Army participation in U.S. efforts to aid friendly 
nations in preventing and combating insurgency," and stated that "stability operations are 
198FM31-16,1967,66. 
199 FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, (1963), 85. 
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that type of internal defense and internal development operation and assistance provided 
by the Armed Forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which 
responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be 
achieved." It further acknowledged that while some countries and agencies use the term 
"counterinsurgency" for these types of operations, within the U.S. Army use of the terms 
"stability operations," or "internal defense and internal development" are preferred to 
"counterinsurgency." The manual also stated that "assistance in internal defense and 
internal development is a normal function of U.S. Army operations. This function may 
be the sole purpose of Army operations, or it may be conducted in conjunction with any 
other Army roles.,,2ooThis last statement was significant in that the concept of stability 
operations was a "normal function," and could be the only focus of U.S. troops. The 
statement gave stability operations mainstream status. 
FM 31-23, Stability Operations, came out in December, 1967. It was a reflection 
of attempts to better holistically explain and understand an insurgency.201According to 
the manual there were two parts to a national strategy for stability operations. One was 
establishing an internal defense, and the other was internal development. While both 
were important and could fluctuate, the "primary objective of the governments (of Host 
Countries) will be the attainment of internal security, which will permit economic, 
political, and social growth." Under National Strategy, it further went on to say that "in 
the past, the strategy to defeat insurgencies has been viewed mainly, if not entirely, as a 
200 FM 100-5, 1968, 13-1. 
201 This manual, together with FM 3 I -16, CountergueriIla Operations, dated 24 March 1967, superseded the 
previous manual, FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, date 3 I May 196 I. Manuals devoted to 
the topic of guerilla-type warfare were nothing new, but had not moved out of the Special Operations / 
infantry and Marine realm until after 1960. Now, in the wake of Vietnam, these two new manuals both 
came in the same year, the first since 196 I. 
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counterguerilla (fighter on fighter) problem and has been handled largely by military and 
police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of internal development, the 
prevention of subversive insurgency includes measures for internal political, economic, 
and social development." Further, "basically, national strategy of internal defense and 
internal development will be directed toward two main considerations - the insurgent and 
the population." Thus, there was now recognition, codified in doctrine, that a war such as 
that in Vietnam (though not directly mentioned as such) was in reality more than just a 
military effort. Rather, it was a parallel effort. 202 
Regarding the insurgent, it discussed the importance of "elimination or 
neutralization of the insurgent leadership and infrastructure," and emphasized that to 
defeat the insurgent, pressure must be maintained through tactical operations to destroy 
the enemy, his supplies, and his equipment. Fragmenting the enemy forces was also a 
goal, which then put Host Country forces in less danger of being overrun and freed them 
up to cover more area. 203 While the manual still mentioned destruction of the enemy, it 
also emphasized destruction of supplies and equipment, and used other key words such as 
"neutralization," "pressure," and "fragmenting." This was a subtle change, but one more 
reflective of the whole environment, more toward emphasis on a "one war" concept. The 
language leaves the possibility open that the enemy could be defeated by doing more 
things than just seeking his destruction, but yet it did not ignore destruction as a goal 
either. 
According to the manual, an insurgency had three phases, and that it (in the case 
of Vietnam) was based on the revolutionary doctrine of Mao and Lenin. Phase I was the 
202 FM 31-23, Stability Operations 1967, 23. There was even an additional manual created to elaborate 
more on these two efforts - FM 100-20 - Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations. 
203 FM 31-23, Stability Operations 1967, 23-24. 
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Passive Stage, a long, protracted process of establishing infrastructure. Phase II was the 
Active Stage, which extended political control and increased military action in armed 
resistance to government forces. Phase III was the mobile phase - open warfare. The 
countering U.S. strategy was laid out according to the same phases. Phase I puts 
emphasis on internal development; Phase II called for a shift in strategy, to "reorient (the 
employment of military forces) directly against armed insurgents, their underground 
organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power." Phase III 
results when the Host Country government is in immediate danger of military defeat, and 
thus the U.S. or the particular nation needed to be prepared to defeat the threat should it 
get to that level. 204 
It appeared that in the case of Vietnam, U.S. ground forces never had the lUXUry 
of being in Phase I of an insurgency. Rather, it appeared that at the time of U.S. ground 
forces introduction in 1965, the insurgency bordered on Phase III, if not already in Phase 
III. Prior to that, U.S. advisors and the ARVN were involved in Phase II. Once they 
arrived in 1965, U.S. ground forces helped push things back to Phase II, and the conflict 
remained in that stage for the duration. It remained generally in a deadlocked state, with 
the U.S. not able to fully push things back down to Phase I, but the enemy unable to 
reach Phase III as long as U.S. ground forces remained. 
The manual spelled out an interesting chain of doctrine from the highest 
levels, down to the tactical level. At the top were the two parts of a national strategy for 
stability operations: internal defense, and internal development. There were three 
204 FM 31-23 Stability Operations 1967, 26. Regarding Phase II, interestingly, are statements which were 
minimally followed in the Vietnam War. u.s. forces did not prosecute the war against North Vietnam, the 
nation behind the war, to the fullest extent - only in bombings. Additionally, the U.S. did not attack enemy 
sanctuaries either, except through bombings and a brief invasion of Cambodia in 1970. 
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campaigns that could be conducted in support of these two parts. The three types of 
campaigns were the consolidation campaign, and strike campaign, and the remote area 
campaign. The overarching and continuing campaign was the consolidation campaign. It 
could be punctuated by the strike campaigns, and remote area campaigns as necessary. 
Of these three campaigns, the strike and consolidation campaigns also each had below 
them strike and consolidation operations, respectively. At the campaign level for both, 
the strike campaign was conducted to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces, and 
was characterized by offensive tactical operations, while the consolidation campaign was 
essentially everything else as it pertained to civil-military actions, with an emphasis on 
providing a secure, stable environment for the populace in which development can take 
place. It stated that "consolidation campaigns often have been referred to as "clear and 
hold," "strategic hamlet," "pacification," "mral reconstruction," and "revolutionary 
development" operations. This clarification finally consolidated this multitude of terms 
in an overarching category, which if nothing else simplified understanding a doctrinal 
concept, as opposed to several different terms. 
The strike campaign definition was further broken down into an operations sub-
component. Strike operations included encirclement, pursuit, sweep, and coordinated 
attack. 205B Y the time the next version came out in 1972, the strike operations category 
had swelled to include: movement to contact, reconnaissance in force, encirclement, 
pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack. 206 There was also mention in the 1967 
manual of reconnaissance, stating that it was to "locate and test insurgent dispositions, or 
to develop additional intelligence," and was characterized by "continuous, decentralized, 
205 FM 31-23, 1967, 59. 
206 FM 31-23 Stability Operations 1972, 8-12. 
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small unit operations.,,207 Operations for the consolidation campaign included all the other 
civil aspects, such as police, paramilitary, social, psychological, and others. 
Overall, the 1967 stability operations manual was prescient with regard to tactics, 
reflecting a growing emphasis on area-related execution and awareness and a better 
understanding of the total environment in Vietnam. It stated that "in stability operations, 
maximum aggressive use of armor units in suitable areas will deny these areas to the 
insurgents and release larger infantry forces for employment in terrain which is restrictive 
to armor.,,208This was a change in focus from simply destruction, to a denial approach: 
keep them out from the start. It emphasized maximizing the use of forces in aggressive 
patrolling to not let the enemy rest and regroup, and manning of outposts with minimum 
forces. It called these harassing tactics, in an economy of force role. 209The manual 
emphasized the offense, maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy by maintaining 
contact, not committing large forces until enemy forces were found and fixed, and, with 
an eye toward the pacification, it mentioned to not draw straight unit boundary lines; 
rather, they should be drawn based on the local or regional political considerations.210 
Regarding the use of armored cavalry and other mounted forces, the manual was 
very significant, at least in terms of what it contained. Because of inherent capabilities 
such as mobility, flexibility, combined arms, organic air assets, firepower, and staying 
power, it found that armored units were very useful in stability operations. This 
newfound usefulness was newly codified in the concept of stability operations. It took 
armored cavalry's performance in Vietnam to achieve this recognition, a far cry from 
207 PM 31-23 Stability Operations 1967, 59. 
208 PM 31-23,1967, 113-114. 
209 PM 31-23, 1967, 90. 
210 PM 31-23,1967, 26, 90. 
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those that prior to 1965 did not envision a role for annored cavalry or mounted forces in 
Vietnam.2lI 
The impact of these manuals, 1967 FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations and 
FM 31-23, Stability Operations on the cavalry was probably minimal in terms of conduct 
of the war in Vietnam. It was doubtful that many commanders were able to crack open 
the stability operations manual in the middle of the jungle. However, the manuals were 
significant in their attempts to understand and codify the "one war," and in terms of 
demonstrating changes in the trinity. In them, all of the trinity missions for cavalry had 
changed, an example of the doctrine following the reality of execution. Reconnaissance 
was part of strike operations, but yet was continuous and ongoing because the enemy was 
all around. Reconnaissance was redefined under the banner of the strike campaign (and 
as a consequence fused with the offense) as "find, fix, and destroy." This definition was 
the essence of "search and destroy." Further, reconnaissance was "characterized by 
continuous, decentralized, small unit operations.,,212This seemed reflective of General 
Abrams' future "one war" focus, and the resultant change in strategy. Security fell under 
the banner of consolidation operations but was unlike security in the trinity sense; it was 
more literal, because like changes to reconnaissance, the enemy is all around. Again, this 
was a reflection of reality. Economy of force was not enabling the decisive maneuver of 
the rest of the main body of forces in the trinity sense. Economy of force came to mean 
211 Regarding this point, in fairness to the decision-makers, up until ground forces were introduced, it was 
debatable that the conflict would ever get to that point that it required their introduction. The introduction 
of tanks by accident, and the reluctance to send mounted forces there, is proof that their role was not 
envisioned, much less expected. Once it happened, then mounted forces had to react to the situation they 
found on the ground. With advisors in Vietnam helping the South Vietnamese, if that had alone had proved 
sufficient, then so much the better. As it turned out, it was not enough. 
212 FM 31-23, 1967,59. It is true that well before Abrams, as this thesis shows, there were plenty of small 
unit operations, decentralized, ongoing, and simultaneous. However, the big change is that after Abrams 
came aboard, with the exception of the Cambodian invasion in 1971, there not as many large-scale, "big 
battalion" operations similar to CEDAR FALLS, etc. 
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forces that had an area of responsibility a particular area of the countryside, enabling 
other forces to conduct strike operations as opportunities arose. It also appeared that 
missions were not cavalry specific. Because of the nature of the terrain and the enemy, 
which resulted in the need for area-type operations, cavalry units found themselves 
participating in strike operations or consolidation operations. In short, the requirements 
of area warfare broadened their mission spectrum. 
The downside of the manuals was that they were still reactive, putting into 
doctrine what was happening on the ground in Vietnam, after the fact. Further, there 
were not many specifics. While conventional, tactical manuals were full of diagrams and 
pictures, diagrams were minimal in the case of these manuals. Perhaps this was not part 
of the charter of the manuals. Particularly in the case of the stability operations manual, 
the manuals seem to be trying to convey the holistic concept to the reader, leaving the 
tactical specifics to the other, more tactically focused manuals, such as 17-95, the 
armored cavalry manual and 17-36, the division cavalry manual. Indeed, the school of 
thought that felt that the U.S. implemented the wrong strategy in Vietnam by failing to 
understand earlier the importance of the "one war" concept would applaud the efforts to 
better convey context. While this was good, it was debatable as to whether the omission 
of more tactical specifics was on purpose or by accident. The danger might have been 
that, despite all the different manuals, tactical methods tested and tried in Vietnam were 
not getting codified like they should. 
New Missions 
As if the challenges of fighting the civil-military war of stability operations and 
an insurgency were not enough, while adjusting their conventional trinity missions the 
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cavalry also had to figure out other new missions. As with their combat missions, the 
cavalry was not unlike most other combat units in Vietnam in performing these with little 
to no prior training; they took what they knew, adapted it, and did it. Most of these 
missions were new, and required adaptations of conventional cavalry doctrine and the use 
of basic combat skills. Additionally, the cavalry tailored their missions according to the 
situation on the ground. Jungle clearing was done to deny the enemy area to set up bases, 
and to restrict his movement, and to "interdict infiltration routes" in order to help protect 
the populated areas.213 Additionally, the goal was to use the wood to give to the people, 
and to then use the land for agricultural purposes. Jungle clearing was also used to clear 
areas along highways for the purposes of foiling ambushes. 
As part of area warfare in Vietnam, both small and large-scale jungle clearing 
operations became a standard security mission for the cavalry. A large part of the 
mission of Operation CEDAR FALLS was to clear jungle, and build roads into 
previously inaccessible areas. Another jungle clearing operation that involved the entire 
1st ID was Operation PAUL BUNYAN, from 19 July, 1967 to 11 September 1967. 
While the operation did not involve the whole division, it fell under division control. It 
consisted of two phases, and 1-4 Cavalry was involved in the second phase.214While the 
plows cleared, the mounted units provided security for them. By the end of the operation 
the plows had cleared 14,566 acres. This was an example of another security mission 
that the cavalry conducted. Their mobility allowed them to keep up with the plows, and 
213 After Action Report (AAR), Operation PAUL BUNYON, 1 ID, 19 July - September 1967. S2D4B2, 
#2, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 10. 
214 After Action Report, Operation PAUL BUNYON, 1 ID, 19 July - September 1967. S2D4B2, #2, I. 
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their tracks enabled them to move over downed logs, something wheeled vehicles could 
not do?15 As the war progressed, cavalry units honed their techniques. 
There were other new missions as well. An example of one was in the spring of 
1966, elements of the 1-4 Cavalry with other U.S. and ARVN units participated in LAM 
SON II, a "highly specialized pacification operation.,,216Pacification was a term used 
throughout the Vietnam War to mean the battle to win the hearts and minds of the 
Vietnamese people in the countryside. More specifically, it was the term given to all 
efforts focused on the welfare, life improvement, and security of citizens in the 
countryside - outside of missions to seek out and destroy organized enemy forces. 
Pacification focused more on countering the political strength and influence of the Viet 
Cong by winning the loyalty of the people through building infrastructure, offering 
medical and agricultural assistance, and in many cases, simply maintaining a positive and 
visible presence.217 Part of pacification consisted of first identifying areas of VC 
influence, then searching villages for suspected VC, and then transitioning efforts in the 
village toward education of and providing services to the people of the village. Cavalry 
units found themselves taking part in these missions from time to time. Their primary 
role was security, primarily in the first part of these operations, accomplished by sealing 
off a village to prevent exit and entry of vc. Usually for these operations, the actual 
dealing with the inhabitants of a particular village was done by members of the ARVN. 
To help run some of these pacification related missions, the 1st ID created a special 
215 AAR, Operation PAUL BUNYaN, 1 ID, 9. 
216 Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL) 1 May - 31 July 1966, 1 SI Infantry Division, S2D4B2, #5, 
Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 10. Pacification is what became, in official 
doctrine, known as "consolidation operations" in the 1973 Stability Operations Field Manual. 
217 Ray Bonds, ed., The Vietnam War: The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia." (New 
York: Crown, 1983), 106. 
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Pacification Task Force, composed of primarily a u.s. infantry battalion and ARVN 
troops, but augmented occasionally by cavalry troops.218 
LAM SON 67 was an example of a non-conventional operation that demanded 
learning on the move for the cavalry. A cavalry squadron took part along with other 
infantry battalions,. While not all the battalions / squadrons or even their subunits 
conducted this operation simultaneously, it was continuous in duration, demonstrating 
resolve to the task. The operation revealed that u.S. forces recognized the value of 
continual experience in a given area. A developed technique was to search "hardcore" 
VC villages on a continuing basis from month to month, using seal and search 
techniques. This also included repeat seal and search missions to catch VC unaware, 
including sometimes with only one week in between. In the month of March, they were 
able to search 11 villages, with "significant" results. One particular village yielded 291 
detainees, and little over two weeks later it was hit again, yielding 88 detainees, while 
another yielded initially no detainees, but one week later it yielded 4 VC, 24 draft 
dodgers, and 176 detainees. Detainees were interrogated in order to uncover VC or VC 
supporters. LAM SON would continue into April that year?19 
Almost as if mocking adaptation of conventional trinity doctrine to the peculiar 
and multi-faceted environment of Vietnam, events happened to abruptly shift units back 
to their conventional, doctrinal roles. The Tet Offensive was one of these events, 
erupting at the end of January, 1968. For this brief period, the fighting the cavalry 
218 ORLL, May/July 1966, 1 st ID, S2D4B2, #5, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, 
KY, 10. 
219 Monthly Evaluation Report (MER), 1 st ID, MAR 1967, S2D4B2, #6, Armor in Vietnam Collection, 
Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 1. 
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participated in was similar to the conventional warfare for which they were trained, 
attacking to secure objectives from the enemy rather than beating the jungle looking for 
small units of the enemy. The Tet offensive consisted of attacks by Viet Cong and NV A 
soldiers across the length of all of Vietnam, in the form of simultaneous assaults on 
Saigon, 36 of the 43 provincial capitals, and 64 of the district capitals. With the 
exception of Hue where the enemy committed large numbers of regular troops, the rest of 
the assaults were beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy in approximately two 
weeks,z20 
During Tet the cavalry made their presence felt. One example of the cavalry 
racing to the rescue, akin to the old western movies, was the race by 3-4 Cavalry, the 
division cavalry squadron of the 25th Infantry division. One of its troops, Troop C, raced 
down Highway 1, the main artery running north/south, toward Saigon. With their 
squadron commander overhead in a helicopter helping them avoid any ambushes en 
route, the Troop arrived at the Tan San Nhut airfield which was under attack. After 
fighting through one attempt to stop them and losing some vehicles in the process, the 
troop crashed into the rear of Viet Cong units that were on the verge of fighting their way 
onto the airfield. This action broke the back of the enemy, and proved to be the decisive 
action in keeping the enemy from capturing the airfield.221 
Another example of cavalry on the move during Tet was Troop A of 3-5 
Cavalry.222The Troop was ordered from its position where it was conducting security for 
a firebase. Leaving one platoon there; the troop blasted its way through one ambush en 
220 Andrew Krepinovich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 239. 
221 Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. 
(Novato, CA : Presidio, 1985), 230-231. 
222 Interestingly enough, in the book Ringed in Steel, written by an officer who served in the 11th ACR, A 
Troop is from the 11th ACR, not the 3-5 Cavalry. ( 98-99) 
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route, disrupted enemy movement, and upon reaching the air base at Ben Hoa, foiled an 
enemy ambush by attacking it behind. I Once this was done, the remainder of the unit 
entered the airfield, linked up with elements of the 1015t airborne division, and fought 
with them until the last enemy attempts to take the airfield were beaten off.223 
The 11th ACR was also on the move during Tet. They were notified to move on 31 
January while they were in the middle of the jungle of War Zone C. They pulled out, 
linked up the entire regiment, and moved over 100 kilometers in 8 hours to encircle and 
protect a threatened airfield complex at Long Binh - Ben Hoa.224 
In the end the Tet Offensive was a failure. In every case, the VCfNVA attacks 
were beaten off with heavy losses. With the exception of Hue, most NV A troops were 
unable to link up with the VC cadre that had infiltrated the cities because they were 
interdicted with air and ground attacks, and the uprisings of city people that the VC 
envisioned never materialized.2250f the estimated 85,000 to 100,000 attackers, half were 
slain.226In the long term, because many of the South Vietnamese VC cadres were in effect 
wiped out, Tet ultimately proved detrimental to their cause. Their losses were to have 
long term negative affects on the overall war strategy for the VC and the North 
Vietnamese, because the lost cadres had better familiarity with the countryside and its 
inhabitants than their North Vietnamese replacements. Any potential for winning the war 
in the south with only the VC was not to be. 
223 Starry, 125. 
224 This action by the 11th ACR inspired a book with the title Ringed in Steel: Armored Cavalry, Vietnam 
1967-68. 
225 Alan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States. 
(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 560. 
226 Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S. - Vietnam In Perspective. (Novato, CA: Presidio, 
1978), 202. 
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In contrast, however, the Tet Offensive was a victory for the Communists in the 
psychological sense, because their short-lived possession of many of the cities in 
Vietnam gave the impression that they were winning. Additionally, ARVN troops 
suffered heavy losses, and desertions escalated sharply after Tet.227 As expressed in For 
the Common Defense, all of these caused President Johnson to "snatch victory from the 
jaws of defeat." Within a month, he denied Westmoreland's request for more troops to 
continue to the pursuit, stated that he would not seek re-election, and unilaterally stopped 
Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam that in the 
past, if nothing else, had been used as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table. 228 
What Tet meant for the armored cavalry is that for they were able to demonstrate 
their effectiveness in racing to the rescue. Five cavalry squadrons proved themselves 
critical to the success in beating off the attacks of Tet by forming a ring around the 
Saigon area of more than 500 vehicles, securing critical U.S. installations in the 
process.229 Furthermore, they used tactics very similar to conventional tactics -
conducting attacks in order to secure specific, terrain based objectives. They were very 
successful in this series of actions, and perhaps in Tet enjoyed a crowning moment, a 
high contrast from three years earlier when a role for them in Vietnam was not 
envisioned. 
1968 to 1973: A Change in Strategy 
227 Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. 
(Novato, CA : Presidio, 1985), 245. 
228 Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 560. 
229 Michael Mahler, Ringed in Steel: Armored Cavalry, 1967-68. (Novato, CA : Presidio, 1986), WI. 
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Later that same year, not long after Tet, General Abrams took command of 
MACV from General Westmoreland in July, 1968. By early 1969, he declared a "One 
War" policy in Vietnam, a policy that newly arrived President Nixon adopted.230prom 
this point until the drawdown of U.S. troops was complete in 1973, the U.S. forces in 
Vietnam experienced change because of this changed strategy - a change from the top 
down. The priorities shifted away mainly seeking out and combating the enemy units, 
the essence of "search and destroy," and changed to the dual emphasis of fighting "one 
war." Whereas previously, U.S. forces primarily carried the fighting load and were 
proportionally less involved in the civilian side of the war, now the two sides of the war 
were to receive equal emphasis. Part of this plan rested on adopting the policy of 
Vietnamization - the policy of improving the South Vietnamese forces with the goal of 
giving them more responsibility and ownership of the war, while at the same time 
shifting more U.S. focus on providing security for the people near where the people 
lived.23I 
While not meaning a cessation of combat against the enemy, the new strategy 
shift framed a new way of attacking the problem of the war. It represented a shift from 
large-scale conventional style operations with a goal of "body count," as part of General 
Westmoreland's strategy of attrition, to an emphasis on fighting the whole war. As such, 
it required that the fighting effort be fused with pacification and territorial security; that 
the various aspects be better integrated and synchronized into the "one-war" concept. In 
the mind of Abrams, the real war lay in securing the people, helping them, and at the 
same time getting more participation from them. 
230 MilIett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 562. 
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The change in strategy was not an arbitrary decision. The increased emphasis on 
Vietnamization and pacification was able to happen largely because the timing was right. 
The enemy's bid to topple the South Vietnamese government in 1965, with largely 
conventional means, had been thwarted. Ever since, with the intervention of U.S. forces 
and the subsequent large-scale operations directed against them, they had not been able to 
move past Phase II of an insurgency. Another reason the timing was right was that the 
vast destruction of the Viet Cong leadership and cadre during Tet set the enemy back in 
his progress. In general, the level of enemy activity was down, which was a good time to 
try a change in strategy. Not to mention General Abrams seemed to have a clear 
understanding and vision of how the war should be fought. Another reason was that the 
U.S. forces and the South Vietnamese had little choice. In June1969, it was announced 
that U.S. troops would begin to withdraw from Vietnam, so both the U.S. and the South 
Vietnamese knew that the South Vietnamese had to be prepared to increasingly stand on 
th . 232 elr own. 
The change in strategy affected the conduct of military operations. It was said 
that within 15 minutes of Abrams taking over, tactics changed. The new focus was not 
totally on destruction, but also on control of the people. General Abrams knew that the 
war was not just one of the "big battalions"; rather, it was a war that was taking place on 
several levels - destruction of the enemy, territorial security, and pacification - all 
simultaneously. 233Now, the strategy would be to set up forces in such a way as to protect 
the populations, rather than spend too much time thrashing and flailing through the 
232 Stanton, p. 285. After June, 1969, the ante was upped when it was pronounced that the drawdown of 
U.S. forces would continue, regardless. In retrospect, this was probably not the wisest decision. 
233 SOfley. Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in 
Vietnam. (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1999), 17-18. 
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jungles. Inherent in this strategy was the recognition that the enemy's real objective was 
the people?34As one journalist was quoted in the book by historian Lewis Sorley, "where 
Westmoreland was a search and destroy and count the bodies man, Abrams proved to an 
interdict and weigh the rice man.,,235 As part of all this, there was a shift from larger units' 
conducting less operations, to smaller, more agile units covering more area, and then 
converging numbers to bear in the event of contact. What this meant was more frequent 
small unit actions, patrolling and ambushes, in order to cut off the "logistics nose" of the 
enemy and interdict his movement toward the populace.236"Logistics nose" was a term 
coined by General Abrams, and described what he came to realize was critical to the 
enemy war effort: the preposition of caches of ammunition, weapons, and food out in 
front of a planned advance. To find these caches was to cut of this "nose." 
The strategic change implemented by Abrams and the American ambassador, 
Ellsworth Bunker, characterized the actions of the U.S. army for the remainder of the 
war. Immediately after Tet, U.S. units continued to pursue the enemy vigorously, and 
continued to do fight well, even though the drawdown began in June 1969.237 One of the 
big, early changes with potential to have a direct effect on cavalry operations was a 
change in terminology. "Search and destroy" became the term "clear and hold." "Clear 
and hold" meant clearing the enemy out of an area, but then keeping him out.238There 
was also an interesting shift in reconnaissance in general, especially as it pertained to the 
division cavalry squadrons. Whereas before, "search and destroy" sought the enemy, 
234 Sorley, 20. 
235 SorJey, 21. 
236 Sorley, 20-21. The logistics nose was a concept articulated by Abrams, and was based on the fact that 
the enemy stored his supplies in caches, laid in place ahead of his advance, until the time of need arose. 
The U.S.'s job was to find these caches and destroy them. In any event, Abrams made it more of a priority, 
because enemy caches were certainly captured and destroyed prior. 
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238 Sorley, 30. 
114 
under the new strategy reconnaissance was officially stated as a technique used to 
accomplish security objectives.239In this case, the population was secured more 
effectively by having cavalry units break down into areas of operation that one unit 
would work habitually for a period of time, using a number of different methods, but 
essentially patrolling, looking for the enemy, but also gaining familiarity with the terrain 
and thus harassing and denying the enemy access to the people. The squadrons of the 
11 th ACR still continued to conduct reconnaissance in force operations the majority of the 
time?40 
Execution began to show the effects of the change in strategy, at least on paper. 
The widespread references to "search and destroy" missions were down, though old 
habits died hard. In their place were more references to reconnaissance in force, and the 
"pile on." Further, there were more references to the success of joint air cavalry, ground 
cavalry, and infantry missions. Generally, references were to the air cavalry locating the 
enemy, fixing him, and then "piling on" with additional ground elements. The 
commander of the 11 th ACR in early 1969, Colonel Leach, commented about these joint 
operations that "the technique of air cavalry with armor-infantry teams has proved to be 
very effective both in medium jungle as well as open terrain. Reinforcing air cavalry 
contacts with armor heavy elements to block escape routes as well as to destroy the 
enemy has produced significant results.,,241 
Part of the proof of this switch in emphasis to more small-unit actions was in the 
actions of 1-1 Cavalry, the division cavalry squadron for the 23rd Americal Division, 
239 ACTIV Study, "Optimum Mix of Armored Vehicles for Use in Stability Operations" , 1971, Volume II, 
Annex G, Armored Cavalry Regiment, Armor School Library, Ft. Knox, KY, H-6. 
240 ACTIV Study, G-S. 
241 Quarterly Evaluation Report, (QER) 1st QTR CY 1969, 11th ACR, S3DIBI, S April 1969, 12. 
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which operated up north in I CTZ. During the period from June of 1968 to May of 1969, 
their strategy was to increase the tempo of operations to "actively seek him out and 
destroy him," whenever the enemy broke down into small units to avoid engagements. 
They also increased their night small-unit operations. In the opinion of their division 
commander, by using more small-unit operations, they were very successfu1.242 
Cavalry Doctrine of the Later Years 
Continuing the trend, the 1968 and 1973 Divisional Cavalry manuals followed the 
evolution of cavalry execution during the Vietnam War. By the November,1968 version 
the mission statement read virtually the same; the trinity was intact. The 1968 manual 
stated again that the cavalry "provides the higher commander the capability to 
concentrate the efforts of other elements of the command on other important objectives or 
aspects of the mission." This statement was still an accurate statement about how cavalry 
operated in Vietnam, as will be discussed later, but only in a very different sense from the 
doctrinal intent. 
A huge change from the 1965 manual was a change to the mission paragraph, 
however. The difference was a sentence stating that "they (armored cavalry) may 
function as maneuver units in stability operations. As these missions pertain to armored 
cavalry units, they are appropriately discussed in this manual as reconnaissance, security, 
and economy of force operations.,,243With this one statement doctrine granted carte 
blanche on the use of the cavalry - cavalry could be used as a maneuver force, or 
virtually anything else for that matter. Despite this seeming major shift, this new 
statement avoided implying any need for new doctrine by essentially saying that the 
242 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Charles M. Gettys, CG, Americal Division, June 1968 - May 
1969. S7D2, #11, Armor in Vietnam Collection, Patton Museum, Ft. Knox, KY, 9. 
243 FM 17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units 1968, 1-4. 
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cavalry could conduct regular maneuver force missions by virtue of being able to conduct 
the more specialized trinity missions. 
Further adjustments in the 1968 manual appeared in the discussion of security. 
The manual added a category called "Degrees of Security," listing and defining its 
components of "Cover," "Protect," "Screen," and "Security forces." In virtually every 
description of these was a requirement to engage the enemy, even in screening, where it 
was spelled out that within their capability, screening forces were authorized to "destroy 
or repel enemy patrols.,,244Traditionally, screening was a mission in which the enemy was 
detected, and visual contact maintained until the enemy could be destroyed either by 
artillery fire or maneuver units, so this represented a huge change. 
There is also a reliance on economy of force implicit in the requirement to engage 
the enemy in each of these degrees of security. Their doctrinal terms request of the 
cavalry the ability to delay, engage, defeat, destroy, harass, impede, repel, or generally 
engage in "offensive, defensive, or delaying actions as required in order to accomplish 
the mission.,,245 The specific laundry list expected of the cavalry was growing. 
A further difference of the 1968 manual was an added section on surveillance at 
all of the levels of cavalry: the platoon, troop, air cavalry troop, and squadron levels. The 
manual states that surveillance was conducted as an "inherent part" of reconnaissance and 
security. In essence, by conducting reconnaissance and security missions, surveillance 
was conducted as well. In the mission portion, there was an entirely new surveillance 
section, with surveillance fundamentals, just like for reconnaissance and security. An 
entirely new, albeit short (three-page) chapter was devoted to surveillance at the squadron 
244FM 17-36,1968, 1-5. 
245 FM 17-36, 1968, 1-5. 
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level. It referred to that fact that surveillance tasks and procedures were similar to 
screening missions.246As it related to the trinity, the increased emphasis on surveillance 
was tied to both reconnaissance and security.247 
This increased emphasis on surveillance in 1968 may have arisen from 
experiences with cavalry operations in Vietnam. It may have grown out of need. With 
the reconnaissance and security abilities of the cavalry watered-down by the challenges 
of Vietnam, and the melding of trinity reconnaissance missions with offensive, trampling 
herd operations such as "search and destroy," the need for as much intelligence only 
grew. To help fill the void, surveillance was added to the cavalry manuals. To help 
make this possible were technological advances such as air and ground mounted 
surveillance radar, seismic devices, photography, and night optics. The cavalry 
increasingly used night vision devices in particular, as they increased their night 
operations over the course of the war. 248 
Another big reason for the growing emphasis on surveillance Was to emphasize to 
the planners and executors the importance of continually being on the watch for the 
enemy. Surveillance needed to be conducted virtually non-stop, and a way to make this a 
reality was to make it an inherent part of reconnaissance and security. The new emphasis 
was a reflection of continuing to adapt reconnaissance and surveillance to the conflict in 
246 FM 17-36, 1968, 11-2. 
247 One take on increased emphasis on surveillance is certainly that it reflects growth of surveillance 
technology, new equipment. Further than that, however, is an implication that the trinity in Vietnam, 
because of the lack of front lines, required more of an emphasis on the "continuousness" nature of 
operations in Vietnam, more than the usual trinity. There were no front lines, so their were no highs and 
lows of either being on the front line or not; rather, it was a continuous level of effort, somewhere in 
between, though obviously punctuated with sharp, sudden actions. Emphasis on surveillance was a way of 
emphasizing the continuous nature of the trinity, especially reconnaissance and security. 
248 ACTIV Study, p. H-7. This states that cavalry squadrons conducted some type of mounted night 
movement on an average of 30% of nights, albeit mostly with whatever lights they felt like using. They did 
conduct more night ambush patrols, and strongpoint ambushes. For division cavalry, it was about 9% of 
nights on average (H-3) and for the ACR squadrons, it was 15% of nights (G-3). 
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Vietnam, which required more of an emphasis on interdiction, increased night 
surveillance posts, and a growing sensitivity to all activities, military and civilian, in a 
given area of operations. Further, in Vietnam in general, most intelligence came from 
human sources because of the intermingled nature of the war; thus a reminder of the 
importance of keeping ones eyes open was paramount. Surveillance was just one more 
ingredient that could serve to make the intelligence picture more accurate, and the more 
accurate the intelligence, the higher the likelihood that the enemy would be where 
intelligence said he was, and thus could be destroyed when forces found him. 
Regarding counterinsurgency, the 1968 manual had a new chapter entitled 
"Stability Operations." It greatly expands the scope of cavalry operations in support of 
stability operations. Whereas the counterinsurgency portion of the 1965 manual 
elaborated only under a sub-heading entitled "Tactical Operations," emphasizing 
encirclement, raid, pursuit, ambush, and counterattack as the five offensive operations, 
the 1968 manual had an expanded mission paragraph, and better organized the tactical 
operations categories into reconnaissance, security, surveillance, offensive actions, and 
defensive. Plus, it adds two new categories of offensive actions, the search and clear, and 
economy of force, for a total of seven. Defensive actions included roadblocks, blocking 
positions, defense of units, installations and communities, and reinforcement of friendly 
units in contact. 249While in this instance doctrine still followed execution, the 1968 
manual did a better job of codifying, and thus recognizing and legitimizing the actions on 
the ground, such as "search and clear." However, interestingly enough, "search and 
249 FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units, 1968, 16-2. This particular defensive action, 
reinforcement of units in contact, is illustrative of the topsy-turvy nature of doctrine and execution during 
Vietnam for ground forces. It states that "reinforcement of units in contact is defensive mission employing 
offensive action." 
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clear" was listed under offensive actions, not reconnaissance. 25o This was another clue of 
the fusion of reconnaissance with the offense, borne out through doctrine following 
execution. 
When adding economy of force as one of the seven offensive actions, the manual 
stated that cavalry units could support infantry operations in this role, and that cavalry 
could be used as a "maneuvering element, a direct and indirect fire support unit, or in any 
other role that helps infantry complete its mission." Again, this is basically an open-
ended invitation for cavalry to be ordered to do whatever needs to be done in order to 
defeat the enemy, while "categorizing" the action as an economy-of-force role.251 Here 
was a drift toward economy of force actually meaning a force that is versatile enough to 
be used for virtually anything. 
Going further, it is fair to believe that cavalry was given carte blanche to conduct 
all manner of missions partly because of a "can do" attitude, and the fact that the cavalry 
was repeatedly referred to as having an optimal task organization for missions in 
Vietnam. Consequently, it was to a large degree the victim of its own success. There 
were able to perform a wide array of missions in Vietnam because of their organic, innate 
capabilities, and because of this, because they could, they were used for just about 
everything. The manual conveys this by stating that "the support provided by armored 
cavalry can be decisive in accomplishing the supported forces mission," and that "an 
aggressive commander will make every effort to find ways to negotiate such (difficult) 
terrain. ,,252 
250 PM 17-36, 1968, 16-2. 
251 It might also be noted that in at least one other place in the 1968 manual, p. 13-6, there are other 
reference to the cavalry performing in a maneuver role - as a Division reserve, 13-6. 
252 PM 17-36, 1968, 16-9. 
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Economy of force was specified further in tongue-twisting fashion. In order to 
deny areas to the enemy, the manual stated that cavalry could conduct "area oriented 
reconnaissance in force as an economy of force." The manual then clarified the concept 
somewhat by stating that when conducted in relatively open terrain, cavalry could playa 
decisive role in denying large areas to the enemy by constant movement and other 
offensive actions, freeing up infantry to concentrate on more restrictive terrain. The 
manual described this operation as one similar to a zone reconnaissance, covering a 
different portion of the area of operations each day, never using predictable patterns, and 
constantly interfering with the enemy. The confusing sounding line had much 
significance, however. The line was a doctrinal link to area-type operations, and like 
many other areas of this manual, it codified actions that were already going on in 
Vietnam. The line was another instance of doctrine following the execution curve. The 
manual finished its description of area-oriented reconnaissance by saying that it was "one 
of the best methods of employing the cavalry squadron in stability operations." 253This 
emphasis on area operations may be a quick doctrinal reflection of the impact of Abrams' 
change in strategy, which by its nature emphasized increasing small-unit, area operations 
closer to the population. 
Economy of force goes even further, squeezing yet more functionality out of 
cavalry units. It stated that cavalry had the "capability of fighting in fortified and built-up 
areas, usually as an economy of force mission," and further stated that "while (the cavalry 
is) not designed primarily for this type of employment, it can fight in built-up areas with 
infantry, in the same way as in conventional operations.,,254This tendency to keep piling 
253 FM 17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units 1968, 16-9. 
254 FM 17-36,1968, 16-9 to 16-10. 
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on the tasks onto" the cavalry was a sign that their contributions in Vietnam were 
significant; that things had come a long way since the days when people could not 
envision their role in the conflict. Scant years previously this statement might have been 
declared heresy. Now, economy-of-force had become the doctrinal "catch-all bag" 
category of the trinity, into which new missions that did not fit in reconnaissance or 
security could be put. These multiple interpretations of missions under the banner of 
economy of force were indicative of the elasticity of the cavalry doctrine, for better or 
worse. 
Meanwhile, the term "search and clear" was finally listed in a cavalry doctrinal 
manual, outside of its mention in the 1966 fM 17-1 Armor Operations manual. In this 
version of 17-36, "search and clear" was the other new offensive action (the other being 
economy of force), and was described as a combination mission, combining "movement 
to contact, reconnaissance in force, and search (area reconnaissance) in order to destroy 
or capture all enemy in an assigned area or zone.,,255 Here was the progeny of the 
politically sensitive "search and destroy" term, and another example of doctrinal 
codification following the execution "curve." The term was also another example of a 
doctrinal link to area operations. 
As the manual admitted, "search and clear," as a type of an offensive action, was 
a hybrid of other cavalry missions, and defined using other doctrinal sub-tasks. This 
supported the theory that "search and destroy" and "search and clear" were overarching 
terms, used to convey intent, which conceivably made it less urgent that they be codified 
in doctrine. The fact that these two missions were composed of combinations of 
doctrinal missions and sub-tasks, therefore gave them, probably in the minds of many, 
255 FM 17-36, 1968, 16-5 to 16-6. 
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enough doctrinal legitimacy to stand alone. Further, regarding these terms, perhaps it 
was felt that codifying them thoroughly, if at all, was not that urgent, since U.S. troops 
knew that they would not be in Vietnam for too long; that "this too shall pass." Lastly, 
the terms defied true codification because of their overarching, broad nature, and the fact 
that variations of enemy and terrain were so great that any number of doctrinal templates 
could not work. Less specific, broader terms, subject to and conveying intent, may have 
been the answer. 
The chapter on stability operations for division cavalry was first seen in the 1968 
manual, no doubt taking the cue from the 1967 Stability Operations manual. The term 
"stability operations" was not present in the 1965 Division Cavalry manual. At that time, 
it was a "counterinsurgency operations" section as part of a "special operations" chapter. 
The 1968 chapter on stability operations moved toward specificity by using diagrams. 
The chapter had two diagrams, one for encirclement and one for a raid. There were also 
diagrams in an annex in the back in the battle drill section that depicted platoon drills in 
the event of an ambush. The diagrams showed the herringbone formation, and the 
compression tactic for fighting ambushes.256 This is a big change from 1965, which had 
no diagrams and much less in general on the topic of counterinsurgency. The level of 
emphasis and detail in "stability operations" would shift again, however. 
The next Divisional Cavalry manual came out in 1973. The overall trend seemed 
to be that it was edging back to a trinity focus, inasmuch as it had ever left the trinity 
during the Vietnam era. There was little change to the overall mission statement at the 
front of the manual except that the carte blanche statement about use of the cavalry as a 
maneuver force in stability operations was gone. Reconnaissance in force and area 
256 FM 17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units 1968, D-9. 
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reconnaissance disappeared as types of reconnaissance, replaced by the term "specific" 
reconnaissance.257 One possible reason the reconnaissance in force disappeared was that 
in the 1968, it was listed as one of the "subcomponent" missions that fell under the 
category of "search and clear." Since "search and destroy" / "search and clear" 
terminology was used less, perhaps other missions that had previously made them up 
were taken out, such as reconnaissance in force. Further, with the U.S. forces withdrawal 
from Vietnam complete that year, it is possible that the drop-off in their conduct 
influenced the removal. Further, reconnaissance in force, as the definition in 1968 stated, 
was a "limited objective offensive mission." This idea is contrary to the fundamentals of 
the reconnaissance, which requires that one "avoid decisive engagements." The technical 
violation of this fundamental had been present since the earliest missions in Vietnam, and 
now perhaps doctrine was trying to creep back to the pre-war trinity emphasis, back in 
line with its own fundamentals. Indeed, by the 1977 manual, PM 17-95 Cavalry, this 
fundamental was gone, and in its place was "retain freedom to maneuver. ,,258 
In further changes to the mission statement the manual removed the "types" of 
security - cover, protect, and screen - that had been added into the 1968 manual. The 
most important significance of this deletion is that whereas in 1968 there was a 
requirement of screening to engage the enemy, now screening returned to its definition in 
the traditional sense - no engaging the enemy directly. Again, cavalry doctrine appeared 
to be edging back to the trinity. 
In the stability operations chapter, however, there are more substantial 
differences. The biggest initial difference is that the mission statement for stability 
257 FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron 1973, 1-3 to I-
S. 
258 FM 17-95, Cavalry, 1977, 5-3. 
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operations became even more generic. The 1965 manual listed a whble host of non-
doctrinal missions; by 1968, they were grouped according to reconnaissance, security, 
surveillance, and offensive and defensive operations. By 1973 the chapter stated that 
"specific missions should be those which directly counter the greatest enemy tactical 
threat.,,259B y being generic, it seemed to also be returning to the trinity by leaving the 
tactical specifics to the conventional, tactical chapters. Further, the chapter put an 
emphasis on reconnaissance and offensive missions, stressing the ground and air cavalry 
work best together on this. It mentioned performing security, defensive, and support 
missions, but stated that these types of missions "do not take maximum advantage of the 
unit's inherent capability." This was an affirmation of the conduct of the cavalry in 
Vietnam - that while they conducted all types of missions in Vietnam, including many 
and varied security missions, they were at their best and best maximized when on the 
offense, when taking the fight to the enemy and thus taking advantage of their mobility, 
among other characteristics. 
Overall, another big difference in the 1973 manual chapter on stability operations 
was that it provided the reader much more background and context. This was seemingly 
a positive development, although it had the effect of making the chapter seem almost as 
much a classroom reading assignment as a doctrinal manual. The chapter stated that the 
role of the military goals must be viewed in context of the larger goal - that of internal 
development and securing the support of the people. It further educated the cavalry 
leader about the "one war" concept, the idea that winning a war against an insurgency 
required much more work with the citizens and their needs, rather than relying totally on 
firepower and counting enemy bodies. It stated that the "objective of friendly tactical 
259 FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1973, 15-2. 
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operations is to destroy insurgent forces and bases and establish a secure environment 
within which internal development is possible.,,26oThe 1968 version stated only that the 
"ultimate objective in operations against an insurgent force is to eliminate the insurgency 
and prevent its resurgence," and says little else about the civilian considerations.261 This 
"classroom" approach probably exists to help explain General Abrams' emphasis on "one 
war," which because of its greater emphasis on civil activities was probably best 
expressed this way. In addition, it was keeping with the trend of shrugging the specifics 
back to the tactical chapters, back to the trinity. 
General Abrams' emphasis on the "one war" was brought to the fore in the 1973 
manual. The manual emphasized that civil-military operations are as important to the 
overall campaign goals as purely tactical operations. It defined civil-military operations 
as "stability operations, advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological operations, 
intelligence operations, and population and resources control." It stated that the cavalry 
must be prepared to conduct civil-military type missions when it "contributes to the 
accomplishment of assigned or deduced missions," help keep civilians from interfering 
with military operations when necessary, and, more generically, "assist the commander in 
the discharge of his legal obligations with regard to the population of the area.,,262These 
statements, while accurate, also reflect a broadness of scope in missions, and state the 
necessity of, at times, deduction, or drawing from the intent of the higher commander. 
With further regard to the civilian aspect of the war, the 1973 version stated that 
tactical operations must be careful about causing collateral damage, and made clear the 
challenges of destroying an enemy without destroying everything else around it. It 
260 FM 17-36 Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron 1973, 15-1. 
261 FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units, 1968, 16-1. 
262 FM 17-36, 1973, 15-2. 
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advised discretion in the use of firepower, and delved deeper into the nature of fighting 
an insurgency as part of stability operations by spelling out the link between the guerilla 
and the population, noting insightfully that if this link was broken, then the guerilla 
became ineffective. 
There was another interesting development that related to the conduct of area 
operations - a growing emphasis on the importance of familiarity and ownership. The 
1968 manual stated that armored cavalry "dismounted elements" do not ordinarily 
conduct a zone reconnaissance in the pure sense during stability operations; rather, they 
"patrol selected areas" which permits the cavalry units to do three things: become 
familiar with the terrain, keep the enemy on the move, and disrupt his logistics.263This 
reflected the 1968 change in strategy, which put more emphasis on smaller units, 
constantly patrolling, protecting the people and interdicting the enemy. 
In the 1973 version, area operations doctrine gains more specificity. What drove 
most of the chapter on stability operations was a section that stated three basic principles 
of offensive operations, rather than the previous five and seven offensive actions in the 
1965 and 1968 manuals, respectively. They were 1) develop reliable sources of 
intelligence; 2) take the initiative and keep it, and 3), develop the ability to rapidly 
concentrate forces on proven contact to destroy the guerilla forces before they escape. 
Regarding the first, in order to develop the reliable sources of information, it stated that 
armored cavalry squadron elements "do not ordinarily conduct zone recon or specific 
reconnaissance in stability operations, but are assigned an area of operation and patrol 
selected areas. ,,264This was the closest to a definition and codification of area operations 
263 PM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units, 1968, 16-3. 
264 PM 17-36, Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1973, 15-2. 
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yet. As if to reinforce this concept, the manual went on to specify that air cavalry was the 
"most effective organic information-gathering source," and that it should be "assigned an 
area of operation and remain in that area as long as possible.,,265It further clarified 
cavalry's role in area-type operations, a role that gradually proved essential and necessary 
in a war against insurgents. 
Regarding the second principal, maintaining the initiative, it was usually gained 
by conducting "sustained troop or platoon clearing or patrol-type operations," within the 
area of operations, to keep the guerillas off-balance.266 In order to do this, the manual 
authorized making patrol units as small as possible so as to be as widely dispersed as 
possible, without risking defeat in detail. The manual listed techniques such as using 
daylight reconnaissance patrols, coupled with night ambush patrols. The techniques were 
further examples of how doctrine followed the execution curve, and by default reinforced 
the area operations concept. 
Interestingly enough, even when describing small unit actions in area operations, 
particularly reconnaissance, there was still no one trinity mission term used. Rather, area 
operations were still based on blends of other mission terms, such as "platoon clearing," 
and "patrol type" operations. These descriptions were reminiscent of larger scale "search 
and destroy" missions, which were based on blends of other smaller, missions, and were 
never really defined in doctrinal manuals, certainly not in proportion to their use in 
official reports. Indeed, "search and destroy" / "search and clear" missions seemed to 
defy definition by anyone conventional doctrinal mission sub-component - they seemed 
to always be blends. As presented in this manual, cavalry reconnaissance-type missions 
265 FM 17-36,1973, 15-3. 
266 FM 17-36, 1973, 15-3. 
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in an area operations environment had license to do just about anything, even when 
operating on a much smaller scale and in a more decentralized manner. It appeared that 
commander's intent filled in the rest. 
For the last principle, rapidly concentrating on the enemy once he was found, the 
manual describes the following scenario: once the enemy was detected by the air cavalry, 
the aero-rifle platoon was dropped in order to fix the enemy until ground cavalry or 
infantry was brought in to finish the destruction with fire and movement. The manual 
recognized that this is a form of piecemeal commitment, something that usual 
interpretations of the principles of war would not support, but in this instance, the manual 
essentially said that it was a good procedure based on the fact that letting the enemy get 
away was the worst case scenario. The manual also recognized the importance of unit 
standard operating procedures in this instance.267The description accurately described a 
technique already used in Vietnam and known as "piling-on." The name was given to it 
by Colonel George S. Patton Jr., commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in 
Vietnam, who became an advocate of the tactic. "Piling on" was a technique that was a 
function of area operations, which by their nature require dispersal of forces. Once the 
enemy was located, friendly forces rapidly converged to fix, encircle, and destroy the 
168 enemy before he could escape.-
Regarding the offensive actions, in the 1965 version there were five, and in the 
1968 version, there were seven. In this manual, only ambush, raid, and reserve / 
population or resources control were mentioned. Gone was the mention of "search and 
clear," and gone was any attempt to try and lump operations under economy of force. Of 
267 PM 17-36, Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1973, 15-4, 
15-5. 
268 Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., "Pile On," Armor (March-April 1970) : 27-28. 
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the remaining three actions in the 1973 manual, the most significant change was the 
description of the ambush. Whereas this was traditionally an infantry task, and the 1968 
version essentially said this, the 1973 version gave the armored cavalry vehicle ambush 
tacit approval. This was possible because the manual, no doubt reflective of experience, 
stated that "armored cavalry can be used [in an ambush situation] if imaginatively 
employed." The secrecy in setting up an ambush site was achieved more by deception 
than stealth, mainly by random vehicle movement. Further, ambushes were possible at 
greater ranges because of the heavier weaponry, and it was possible to "obliterate" the 
enemy with greater firepower. 269 
With regard to security, the stability operations chapter of the 1973 manual 
mentioned that stability operations do not call for security operations in the traditional 
(conventional) sense, such as guard, screen, and cover, but there was a "heavy and 
constant security requirement" because there was no forward edge of battle or secure 
echelon. Because there were no front lines, the chapter referred to basic security 
requirements such as cavalry providing its own close-in security, but also included 
probable missions to provide security for lines of communications and installations. The 
chapter discussed escort missions and the establishment of mutually supporting 
strongpoints for more permanent route security. The chapter also cautioned that security 
missions should only be assigned when "more profitable offensive missions cannot be 
assigned.'moThe overall statement about security is a huge milestone, because it 
acknowledged that security operations were different in a stability operations 
environment, something that had been reality since 1965. 
269 PM 17-36, 1973, 15-5. 
270 FM 17-36, 1973, 15-6. 
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The chapter also confirmed a change in doctrine that further legitimized mission 
homogenization between trinity and maneuver missions. The chapter stated that "lightly 
armored vehicles of the armored cavalry squadron" can be used in "tank-like roles," and 
that as a result of the relatively lightly armed enemy, the squadron could be "effectively 
employed on missions normally assigned to other combat maneuver elements." 271 Before 
u.s. ground troops arrived in Vietnam in 1965, ARVN troops learned to use the MI13 
armored personnel carriers in a tank-like role combat role. Rather than being used in its 
doctrinal role of transporting infantry and stopping short of the enemy to dismount the 
infantry, APC's led the way and the infantry followed. This was a doctrinal switch. 
When the U.S. forces arrived, they continued and expanded the practice. The ACAVs 
that the cavalry used in the cavalry troops were customized with specially augmented 
with metal plates to protect the crew in order to help maximize these tactics. MI13 
ACA V s could attack on line with tanks in an assault, or carry dismounts into battle rather 
than doctrinally dismounting them prior to contact with the enemy. This modification of 
the ACAV, along with the superior firepower, mobility, and protection of the cavalry in 
proportion to a much more lightly armed enemy enabled cavalry to perform as maneuver 
units. Doctrine finally caught up to this reality and sanctioned it. These statements 
represented another carte blanche for the use of cavalry, and stated in even clearer 
language than the preceding division cavalry manuals that cavalry units could be used in 
non-trinity missions. The maneuver onus was not placed under the safe, all-
encompassing banner of economy of force; rather, it stood brazenly all by itself.272 
271 FM 17-36, 1973, 15-1. 
272 The only issue here is the default acknowledgement that what enabled cavalry units to operate as 
maneuver units (and not necessarily in their doctrinal conventional trinity roles) is the fact that they were 
facing a relatively lightly armed enemy. This may be not telling the whole story. The fact was that there 
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Another important aspect of the 1968 and 1973 Division Cavalry manuals was 
that they stated up front that their doctrine was not "inflexible." Rather, it was subject to 
intelligent interpretation based on the situation on the ground, and thus the judgment of 
the person in charge. The situation was judged based on factors of METT - Mission, 
Enemy, Terrain, and Troops. While this flexibility was certainly necessary and useful to 
make doctrine work in Vietnam even this flexibility was stretched to its limit. The 
statement was, however, an acknowledgment of the importance, and indeed necessity, of 
operating largely from intent. For the cavalry in Vietnam, doctrine followed execution 
and these manuals seemed to acknowledge that in the interim, the missions in Vietnam 
relied on new terminology that reflected and relied on intent, and rested on combinations 
and variations of doctrinal missions for legitimacy, to "get them through." 
The 1973 division cavalry manual reflected a proportionally big leap forward in 
trying to communicate the doctrine of fighting an insurgency as part of stability 
operations. This was accomplished with a holistic discussion of the topic of stability 
operations and the nature of fighting an insurgency, something that had heretofore been 
lacking. It also emphasized area operations, though still not specifically labeling them as 
such. Concomitant with this emphasis on area operations was the belief that units could 
"own" specific pieces of ground - the advantages of which were learning about the 
terrain, the inhabitants, being able to protect better close-in protection and being able to 
spot when something was amiss. The only drawbacks of the 1973 stability operations 
were a number of other reasons why the cavalry was employed in maneuver role. One of the biggest was 
the nature of area warfare - the terrain and enemy in Vietnam - that caused adaptations beyond any that 
bothered to make predictions. The cavalry adapted to the terrain and enemy, along with all the other 
maneuver units, out of necessity, not out of choice. This also raises another interesting possibility: whether 
or not adding more U.S. ground forces units (not considering at this point whether that would have helped 
the overall war or not) would have freed up the cavalry to perform their trinity missions, if not exclusively, 
then at least more often. 
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chapter is that it became more generic with regard to tactics - there were no diagrams, 
and it was half the length of the 1968 manual. What it gained in presenting the holistic 
picture it lost in tactical specificity, of which there was not much to begin with. 
There were other armor and cavalry doctrinal changes that came out after the 
overall change in strategy in 1969. One was Change 1 to the 1966 Armor Operations 
Manual, PM 17-1, which came out in August, 1969, and the other was the Change 1 to 
the 1966 ACR Manual, FM 17-95, which came out in March, 1970. The update to the 
armor manual added a chapter on Stability Operations, a change from the section the 
1966 manual that had called it "Internal Defense Operations." The update stated that 
"tactical operations are conducted in support of strike and consolidation campaigns. 
Offensive operations are conducted in an assigned area of operation to find, fix, and 
destroy or capture insurgents. Defensive operations, which are characterized by long 
duration, are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility to provide a secure 
environment in which positive effort can be devoted to internal development.,,273What 
these statements reflected was an emphasis on the area, reflecting the 1969 shift in 
strategy under Abrams. In spite of the change, there was the familiar "find, fix, and 
destroy," the basic task of "search and destroy," only now there was no mention of the 
terms "search and destroy" or "search and clear" as in the previous manual. 
There were also two statements that continued to reflect mission homogenization 
between maneuver and trinity missions in a stability operations environment. One 
statement was that "reconnaissance, security, and surveillance tasks are inherent in all 
tactical operations in stability operations.,,274The other was that "armored cavalry may be 
273 FM 17-1 Armor Operations Change 1, 1969, 34. 
274 FM 17-1, 1969, 35. 
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used as separate maneuver units.,,275 At this point in U.S. involvement in Vietnam, this 
was not the first time that the de facto homogenization of missions was recognized in 
doctrine, but the trend continued. Regarding the air cavalry, the manual stated regarding 
aerial search operations that "the air cavalry will reconnoiter from the air an assigned 
area, utilizing area and/or zone reconnaissance; or route, utilizing route reconnaissance, 
in search of the insurgent.,,276This statement was explicitly rooted in trinity tasks, 
something not seen in ground cavalry descriptions under stability operations. It was a 
clue that the air cavalry may have been a key factor in picking up the trinity missions of 
the cavalry. 
The Change 1 to FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment mainly addressed 
changes in task organization based on new equipment, but there were some updates to the 
section on stability operations, no longer entitled "counterinsurgency operations." The 
stability operations section simply stated that "the primary mission of the regiment in 
stability operations is to conduct tactical operations against insurgent armed forces and 
their support facilities.,,277This was an open-ended statement, meaning that subject to 
interpretation, the whole spectrum of operations was open; that the armored cavalry 
regiment could conduct whatever operations were necessary, with the focus on the end 
result. The chapter then made a capstone statement that when cavalry accepted 
attachments such as infantry and then became a squadron task force, it may "then be 
employed extensively in roles normally assigned to tank and infantry battalions (rather 
than being restricted to the traditional roles of reconnaissance, security, or economy of 
force), in accordance with the tactical concepts of stability operations discussed in FM 
275 FM 17-1, 1969, 38. 
276 FM 17-1, 1969, 45. 
277 FM 17-95 Armored Cavalry Regiment Change 1, 1970, 44. 
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17 -1, FM 31-16, and FM 31-23. ,.278This was a final, naked admission that in stability 
operations, cavalry units were authorized, doctrinally, to function as maneuver units. The 
doctrine had finally caught up with execution. The statement further implied that the 
mantle of the trinity mission of reconnaissance, in stability operations, had evolved to the 
air cavalry by stating that it (the air cavalry) is "ideally suited for reconnaissance 
missions and the rapid offensive operations conducted in stability operations.,,279 
The update then made the controversial statement that "the doctrine for 
employment of the regiment in conventional operations applies equally to stability 
operations. Specific tactics and techniques are derived to fit the operational environment 
and nature of the insurgent threat.,,28oFirst, the doctrine for the trinity tasks did not apply 
equally in stability operations. Portions of the trinity doctrine did and various 
overarching principles may have, but by and large the stability operations and area war 
environment of Vietnam set the conventional trinity doctrine on its ear. The manual 
seemingly contradicted itself when it said that cavalry units, with attachments, "may then 
be employed extensively in roles normally assigned to tank and infantry battalions." This 
last statement is clearly in contrast to the previous assertion that doctrine applied 
"equally." As experience had shown, the cavalry clearly were mostly involved in 
multiple, non-trinity missions and tasks, as well as adaptations of trinity tasks, with a few 
exceptions. 
The ACTIV Study 
278 FM 17-95, 1970, 45. 
279FM 17-95,1970,45. 
280FM 17-95, 1970,45. 
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During the later years of the war after General Abrams' change in strategy, the 
Army still grappled with the puzzle of Vietnam. A reflection of this was the Army 
Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) Study was conducted during the period of October, 
1969, through April 1970, and was approved for release in March of 1971. The ACTIV 
study was a follow-on to the MACOV study, and was entitled "Optimum Mix of 
Armored Vehicles for Use in Stability Operations." The study examined doctrine and 
execution in order to arrive at the other conclusions involving organization and 
equipment. 
The results were illuminating but not surprising. Regarding the 11 th ACR, the 
study found that in stability operations the unit was used as an offensive fighting unit to 
find and destroy the enemy, and that the "missions assigned to the regiment and to the 
regimental squadrons were typical of missions assigned to mechanized and armored units 
in RVN.,,281This finding spelled out the earlier definition of "search and destroy," and it 
also supported the idea that the regiment was used primarily as another maneuver unit. 
The finding also lent credibility to the idea that the innate organization and capabilities of 
the cavalry unit made it susceptible for use to accomplish any task or mission. By that 
standard, the regiment had become, in effect, a jack of all trades. 
When listing the types of missions that the regiment conducted, the study 
acknowledged that "types of missions have been grouped into broad categories for 
simplicity and to avoid confusion in terms (for example, the doctrinally accepted term 
"reconnaissance in force" was called by several different names in Vietnam, ranging 
from "search and destroy" to "protective reaction")." This meant that the reconnaissance 
category included all any missions where the regiment was out looking for the enemy. 
281 ACTIV Study, G-1. 
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Each squadron conducted reconnaissance operations 55%, 51 %, and 50% (1 st, 2nd , and 
3rd squadrons respectively) of the time, while they conducted security missions 16%, 
22%, and 23% of the time respectively. Thus, the "reconnaissance" category composed 
the majority of the missions conducted during the time frame of the study, while security 
missions were the next largest grouping.282 However, the study stated that though the 
majority of missions were reconnaissance in force missions, "several other terms were 
used on occasion.,,283For the regiment, the next largest category in terms of aggregate 
time spent was security, road clearing, followed by ready reaction force, maintenance, 
other, and civic action. 
The study also found that the regiment usually conducted operations the majority 
of the time at troop level, within the regimental area of operations. They did not usually 
go below troop level, as was the case in other areas of Vietnam with other units, because 
of the thick jungle and the proximity to the Cambodian border brought with them the 
increased likelihood of sizeable enemy contact. Regarding security operations, the 11 th 
ACR conducted them on an almost daily basis, and most of these consisted of security of 
convoys, engineer work parties, fire support bases, and populated areas.284 
The study also pointed out that the squadrons conducted night ambushes / strong 
points on average 12% of the time; the other nights the troops usually established night 
defensive positions.285These night defensive positions (NDPs) were established by 
mounted units from the earliest days in Vietnam when out in the field at night. Because 
282 ACTIV Study, G-2, G-3. The rest of the mission categories were "Ready Reaction Force," 
"Maintenance Stand Down," "Civil Action," "Road Clearing," and "Other." Civil Action had the lowest 
frequency, followed by Other, Maintenance Stand Down, Ready Reaction Force, with Road Clearing being 
the third most conducted category across the board. 
283 ACTIV Study, G-S. 
284 ACTIV Study, G-S. 
285 ACTIV Study, G-4. 
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of the nature of the terrain and the enemy, these positions emphasized tight perimeters for 
security purposes to keep the enemy out and to keep the unit together. This was an 
accepted and acknowledged change from doctrine which usually called for dispersion in 
the defense in order to not present a harder target for the enemy. 
The study showed that division cavalry squadrons' traditional roles and missions, 
as defined by doctrine, were also modified in Vietnam, but not as much as the 11 th 
ACR's. Although used in a variety of missions, their three basic methods of employment 
were as combat maneuver battalions operating in an assigned area of operations; as 
economy of force elements screening or securing a large area; and as a "fire brigade," 
moving as needed to the greatest point of need in the division area of operations. They 
typically operated under the operational control of a maneuver brigade, and typically 
operated without their air cavalry squadrons, which were detached to higher.286 
The study looked at the percentages of the types of missions they conducted as 
well?87 The study found that 1-1 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance missions 56% of the 
time; 2-1 Cavalry 53%; 3-4 Cavalry 75%; and 3-5 Cavalry 64%. In aggregate, their next 
largest chunk of time was on maintenance, followed by security operations, road clearing, 
ready reaction force, and civic action.288Similar to the regiment, the squadrons conducted 
missions in troop size almost exclusively, though one frequently conducted platoon size 
operations. They divided into troop areas of operation, and then subdivided them down 
into platoon areas of operation. Regarding security operations, the percentage of time 
devoted to them varied from CTZ to CTZ, based on the terrain. The heavier the 
286 ACTIV Study, H-1. 
287 1-4 Cavalry was not available for data, the study notes, because they were redeploying. As the first 
division cavalry squadron to Vietnam, it was their time to finally leave. Also, 1-10 cavalry was not visited 
for the study. 
288 ACTIV Study, H-3. 
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vegetation, the more security was pulled, but overall they worked the same security 
missions as the ACR, and conducted some type of security mission daily. The most 
common security missions were road clearing, route security, security of populated areas, 
and security of fixed and semi-fixed installations.289 
The ACTIV report was partly a final check on the status of MACOV 
recommendations, and partly a study by itself. The recommendations of both studies 
mostly centered on finding the best task organization and equipment for the cavalry and 
other mounted units. The doctrine and missions being conducted were part of the study 
in order to set the framework for any organizational and equipment changes - not 
necessarily to study doctrine versus execution and then make recommendations along 
those lines. However, the findings of the missions and doctrine were significant. 
The ACTIV study findings reiterated that cavalry units were conducting missions 
outside their trinity parameters. The majority of missions being conducted by the cavalry 
were labeled reconnaissance, but the study acknowledged that the term "reconnaissance" 
was not in its traditional sense, but was used to represent a much broader range of 
missions. It even stated that a doctrinally accepted term such as "reconnaissance in 
force" was called several things, from "search and destroy" to "protective reaction.,,29o 
What happened in Vietnam was that almost any mission that sought out the enemy 
actively was labeled under the "reconnaissance" category, whatever the actual mission 
was; missions that provided unit or base security were put under the category of 
"security." There was no category of economy of force, though there was reference to it 
as one of the three "basic methods of employment" of division cavalry squadrons, used to 
289 ACTIY Study, H-6. 
290 ACTIY Study, G-l. 
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screen or secure a large area.29lThis tied in with a country-wide economy of force 
concept, whereby the mobility of the cavalry were able to patrol a large area, freeing up 
other forces such as infantry to accomplish their mission elsewhere. 
The findings also helped confirm the concept of mission homogenization, and 
expansion of the term "reconnaissance." In addition to the cavalry, the study, like the 
MACOV, examined other mounted units such as armor and mechanized infantry. What 
the study found was that in the case of 2 of the 3 armor battalions studied, the majority of 
their missions were considered reconnaissance missions, just like the cavalry, and with 
the same understanding of the broad meaning of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance 
actually meant "to find and destroy the enemy, and to deny him fixed operating bases or 
access to populated areas." Thus, missions were of similar intent, if not identical, to 
"search and destroy" missions of earlier years. The additional difference was in the 
"denial" aspect, which put missions more in line with the Abrams shift in strategy, 
whereby security of the people and denial of them to the enemy was as important as 
finding and destroying the enemy. There was also a sense that under the umbrella of 
reconnaissance was also show of force and denying the enemy freedom of movement.292 
Thus, presence alone, in the right areas, was now a factor. This was also another addition 
to the meaning of reconnaissance. 
The Cambodian Invasion 
Just as cavalry trinity missions were modified for the war in Vietnam, the usual 
missions were occasionally punctuated by significant, large-scale operations that utilized 
mounted forces like CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY in 1967, and Tet in 1968. 
291 ACTIV Study, H-l. 
292 ACTIV Study, K-7. 
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Under General Abrams, one operation that was a long time in coming was a proposal to 
raid into Cambodian border sanctuaries with U.S. and ARVN troops in order to destroy 
enemy and supply stockpiles. President Nixon approved it, and on 1 May, 1970,20,000 
U.S. and allied troops attacked into Cambodia.293While the invasion itself was successful 
in terms of enemy logistical stockpiles wiped out and the estimated damage it did to the 
enemy's long term ability to infiltrate South Vietnam, the resulting political damage to 
the Nixon Administration was worse. As part of this, the invasion was curtailed soon 
after it began, with deadlines given to the troops to be out of Cambodia by 30 June, and 
troops limited to 30 kilometers inside the border, by presidential decree.294 
The cavalry played a significant role in the invasion. For them, the invasion was 
largely an example of operating under the old conventional, ttinity tactics, and it was a 
chance for them to "stretch their legs." The 11th ACR participated in the invasion, and it 
was one of the few times during their time in Vietnam that they fought together. In fact, 
the 3rd Squadron traveled over 300 kilometers to link up with the other two squadrons 
prior to the invasion. For most of the invasion, two of the squadrons performed a mission 
similar to a doctrinal, advance guard security mission, leading the invasion in some areas, 
racing in the lead to reconnoiter and secure key routes, crossroads, and villages. In the 
case of one particular city, Snuol, which was discovered to be a significant logistics hub 
location, the regiment was able to surround it and rout the enemy by using two squadrons 
in a joint attack, in conjunction with the air cavalry. The remaining squadron's primary 
mission was to secure lines of communication back to War Zone C, and later they 
conducted search missions. Another cavalry unit, 3-4 Cavalry, acted in its doctrinal role 
293 Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 562. 
294 Starry, Mounted Combat, 169. 
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as the divisional cavalry squadron for 25 ID. It led the 25 th ID into Cambodia in 
conjunction with mechanized infantry units, and helped them set up blocking positions 
for the benefit of ARVN forces. 295 
The end state of the invasion was that it bought time for the forces back in South 
Vietnam by interfering with the enemy's usual preparations in the border sanctuaries. It 
helped buy time for the U.S. withdrawals, and the building up of the South Vietnamese 
forces. The invasion resulted in the capture of almost 10,000 tons of food and materiel, 
and ,killed over 11,000 enemy soldiers, while capturing 2,000.296The invasion was also a 
reminder of the abilities of cavalry to perform in roles closer to their more traditional, 
trinity roles, and necessity to be able to do so. They truly had become a "jack of all 
trades." 
295 Starry, Mounted Combat. 174-175. 
2% Starry, Mounted Combat. 180. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE METAMORPHOSIS EXAMINED 
In the end, there was a metamorphosis of armored cavalry's mission execution in 
Vietnam in relation to their traditional, conventional doctrine. The largest part of it was 
due to necessity. The cavalry had to adapt their tactics and doctrine because of the 
demands of area warfare, which in tum resulted from a largely insurgent enemy and less-
than-optimal terrain for armor. Area warfare required adaptation from conventional 
doctrine, because it resulted in area operations, which unlike conventional doctrine, had 
no front lines, and rarely any massed enemy formations to strike. Area operations in tum, 
by their very nature, tended to result in "homogenized" missions, and any combat units, 
no matter what their specialty, had to adapt. The problem of adapting to area operations 
from a conventional mindset was exacerbated by strategy and policy considerations, 
which kept U.S. forces in South Vietnam in a type of "fishbowl" type of environment, 
continually circling and looking for the enemy. They did this instead of penetrating in 
into the heart of the enemy's vitals where crucial logistical support for the war was 
allowed to flourish, in areas such as border sanctuaries in Cambodia and even North 
Vietnam.297The Cambodian invasion was a brief glimpse of how the cavalry would 
operate in such a situation - more according to conventional doctrine. 
297 Fears of widening the war and political expediency held this option hostage, though at one point in the 
war, when the U.S. bombed North Vietnam as part of Operation LINEBACKER, there was, as one 
historian noted, a notable lack of interest displayed on the parts of China and the Soviet Union. 
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Part of the metamorphosis from trinity doctrine to very different execution was 
due to timing - a surprise and an accidental introduction of armored ground forces to 
Vietnam. The deployment of mounted forces to Vietnam took the Army by surprise, 
despite some warnings to the contrary, such as the 1962 counterinsurgency study. The 
"unanticipation" of armored, mounted forces' potential role in Southeast Asia or in a 
counterinsurgent environment was exacerbated by mythologies that were not dispelled 
until they were proven wrong. This may have led to lack of planning for cavalry as part 
of a coherent, strategic plan - a problem that arguably plagued the entire war effort. To 
further inhibit anticipating armored cavalry's role in a counterinsurgent environment was 
the environment in Vietnam - the nature of the enemy, the terrain, and the civil aspect of 
the war were all hard to define separately, let alone all together. The terrain was thought 
to be inhospitable to mounted forces, and defining an insurgency was an open-ended 
challenge. Once they could be figured out, it was a challenge to figure out how to best 
fight, as evidenced by changes in strategy and tactics. In the final analysis, the definition 
of an insurgency was portrayed doctrinally in the stability operations manual as a 
revolutionary war, inspired by Mao and Lenin, and conducted in phases, but this was just 
one definition of an insurgency among many.298 
Part of the reason for the metamorphosis may have been due to the fact that the 
whole nation was not mobilized for war - a political decision that had military and 
tactical ramifications. What this meant in the short term was that if there had been more 
units to conduct maneuver missions, then that might have better freed up cavalry to 
298 There are still disagreements as to what type of insurgency it was to this day, and probably always will 
be. There are also major disagreements as to whether the war was really a conventional war in insurgency 
clothing (the wolf in sheepskin), if it truly was a revolutionary war, or if was a non-revolutionary 
insurgency. 
144 
conduct missions akin to the trinity missions, such as trinity screening missions along the 
borders for example (though the terrain there was much more rugged and less optimal for 
mounted operations). Because there never seemed to be enough troops there, more was 
asked of and indeed forced out of the units that were there. Along these lines, part of it 
may have been that the cavalry was a victim of its own success - that its own innate 
attributes and characteristics allowed it to be used for just about everything. The cavalry 
was used for almost everything because it could. This aspect also may have been enabled 
by a series of other organizations and innovations such as the air cavalry that helped 
supplant, and indeed mask the lack of cavalry performing their traditional tasks. 
Perhaps part of the reason for the metamorphosis between doctrine and execution 
may have been that discretion may have truly been seen as the better part of valor. To 
stick with the conventional doctrinal terminology and not overly seek the true doctrinal 
roots of cavalry's operations was the safest path, and easier. Not making an issue of 
execution differing from doctrine would not "rock the boat," and it was easier to claim to 
operate within established doctrine than to put effort into new doctrine and then get 
burned. This may be why there are numerous references by commanders in reports from 
the war to the effect that although operations were changing and adapted, "current 
doctrine remains valid." Even some doctrinal manuals went so far as to say the same 
thing! In any event, it was true that the situation in Vietnam would certainly not totally 
nullify or replace the trinity doctrine, since the war in Vietnam was arguably not truly a 
war with immediate life or death consequences for the U.S., and to add to that, the 
majority of the Army was still preparing to defend Europe as part of the Cold War. As if 
to give credence to the claim that the trinity doctrine was still valid, one of the damning 
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aspects of Vietnam was that there was always the threat of conventional, NV A forces, 
and cavalry did engage the enemy on a large scale, similar to conventional operations, on 
several occasions. 
Part of the metamorphosis between doctrine and execution may have been an 
over reliance on technology and firepower, creating in the words of David R. Palmer a 
"phalanx of fire." A reliance on technology and firepower was an outgrowth of the 
attrition strategy that characterized the first few years of the war under General 
Westmoreland - one that emphasized enemy body count in relation to U.S. body count. 
Thus, the trend began, counter to doctrine, that, rather than closing with and destroying 
the enemy, contact was made and then as much firepower as possible was dumped on the 
enemy; generally, maneuver units found the enemy, and firepower destroyed him. Fire 
and maneuver had become maneuver and fire. 299This aspect had two other effects. First, 
a faith and reliance on technology may have masked or delayed true efforts to evaluate 
doctrine in light of Vietnam, once it was discovered that conventional, ground forces 
would head to Vietnam en masse. Under those circumstances, the thought may have 
been, conduct the "search and destroy" and once you find the enemy, dump all hell on 
him. Thus, the art and science of maneuver, hampered already by elusive, small groups 
of enemy and thick jungle terrain in many areas, was allowed to languish at the expense 
of firepower and technology. Under those circumstances, in a war that may have been 
seen as temporary anyway, doctrinal maneuver was not given the thought and attention it 
deserved. Secondly, the switching of emphasis to a reliance on technology and firepower 
created part of the mess at the end of the war, which General DePuy sought to remedy 
299 David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.- Vietnam in Perspective. (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1978), 144-147. 
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with his 1976 version of 1976 ofFM 100-5 Operations - a move back to the basics, and a 
move to forget what had been learned in Vietnam because in reality, he was right. A lot 
of what had become expedient in Vietnam was not doctrinal, and would get soldiers 
killed in a conventional battle in Europe. From this one might draw the conclusion, and 
understandably so, that once ground troops got to Vietnam and were in the thick of a 
peculiar and unfamiliar fighting environment for which training and doctrine had 
minimally prepared them for, concern with doctrine largely ceased, and the military did 
what was necessary to fight and win in a strange war in a strange land. They resorted to 
firepower, and modified conventional doctrine. Expediency thus superseded doctrine. 
There may have been little choice. 
From one perspective, the Army did seem to make an effort to find itself 
doctrinally during the Vietnam War. The studies were one example, but further evidence 
of this was seen in proliferation of other manuals in the late 1960's, such as the 
counterinsurgent manuals, counterguerilla manuals,and others: Civil Affairs Operations, 
Psychological Operations, Jungle Operations, Night Operations, and Border 
Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations. However, these manuals were probably not widely 
circulated, nor did they probably have much effect on the operations in the field since 
most came out during the war. In some senses, the Army may have been suffering from 
too much doctrine in its efforts to come to grips with the complexity of the war in 
Vietnam, while in the midst of growing technological improvements, dissent at home, 
and poorly articulated policy and strategy objectives at the highest levels. 
The doctrine that came closest to possibly nailing down what the Army needed to 
do comprehensively with regard to Vietnam was the stability operations manual. 
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However, the manual was largely contextual and was not very helpful for combat units in 
depicting to the level of detail necessary regarding any doctrinal tactical operations 
against insurgencies, let alone adaptations of conventional doctrine. This was 
particularly true with regard to the Vietnam equivalent of reconnaissance: "search and 
destroy" missions. There were almost no diagrams devoted to hypothetical or real 
doctrinal situations of it, or any others, in either the stability operations manual or the 
cavalry doctrine. More detailed doctrinal depiction was an overall shortfall, not only for 
training and execution during the Vietnam era, but also for codifying doctrinal tactics and 
techniques for future reference. 
The lack of detail in the new stability operations manuals and the newer versions 
of the cavalry and armor manuals could be explained by several possibilities. One was 
that each assumed that the other would carry the detail necessary, and neither truly did. 
Another possibility was that many of the missions in Vietnam rested on adaptations of 
trinity missions; therefore, knowing the basics of the trinity missions was "good enough." 
The rest could be covered on the ground in Vietnam. Another possibility is that the 
overarching, broad mission terminology, such as "search and destroy," was legitimate 
enough in that it allowed each mission to rely on intent of the commander, and was 
further legitimized by the fact that sub-tasks of "search and destroy" were doctrinal, such 
as reconnaissance in force, or movement to contact. Another possibility as to why there 
was an overall lack of detail in defining and depicting such Vietnam-specific operations 
as the "search and destroy" is that terms such as the "search and destroy" were simply not 
definable or able to be depicted in the doctrinal sense because they relied on intent and 
could consist of so many variations. The many variations were based on the differing 
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terrain of the CTZs, the different levels of enemy, civil considerations, and the fact that 
the whole range of maneuver and cavalry forces conducted them, so no one proponent 
had the "rose" pinned on them to develop the doctrine. To define terms such as "search 
and destroy" doctrinally was a challenge, because it was an amalgamation of 
reconnaissance with offensive operations. Lastly, "search and destroy" missions were 
called by many different names, by different units, at different times. What stayed the 
same, however, was relatively simple: find the enemy and his installations, fix him, and 
destroy him. Lastly, doctrine, to the extent that it did change, may not have put in more 
detail on purpose, in order not to prescribe the solutions, because the situation in Vietnam 
seemed to defy anyone solution. Using broad, overarching terms such as "search and 
destroy" may have helped foster use of intent. 
Despite an overall lack of doctrinal depiction of new operations and missions in 
Vietnam such as "search and destroy," the cavalry used what they knew. They used basic 
doctrinal principles and tasks of traditional trinity missions, as well as basic warfighting 
skills, and then operated within and according to the commander's intent. The best 
example was the "search and destroy" mission. According to studies, these 
"reconnaissance" missions were alternately called many things, but no single doctrinal, 
conventional trinity term could accurately describe the search and destroy mission, yet 
the term was widely listed in reports. At the same time, the terms "search and clear" and 
"search and destroy" barely appear in the doctrine of the time. They first appear in the 
1966 17-1 Armor Operations manual, but by 1973 Stability Operations, they were 
gone.300The term then became "strike operations." However, "strike operations" did not 
300 FM 17-1, Armor Operations, 1966, 221. Here it says under the Internal Defense Section that there are 
two general categories of operations which will be conducted in an insurgency operational environment -
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appear doctrinally in documents describing ground cavalry action in Vietnam, so 
theoretically it never made it to the field, into the lexicons of the officers on the ground 
writing the reports. What was happening was that terms used by cavalry units in the 
field, particularly "search and destroy" and "search and clear," were barely reflected 
doctrinally, while terms that were coined doctrinally, such as "strike operations," were 
barely seen in after-action documents or used by units in the field. This suggests that 
lack of detailed doctrinal depiction may not have mattered that much. Units in the field 
used what they knew and used the terminology that most accurately reflected their 
mission on the ground, regardless of what doctrine said. The two, doctrine and 
execution, seemed to be missing each other. 
In the end, terms such as "search and destroy" were used because they most 
accurately described the intent of the operation - find the enemy, fix him (and his 
installations), and destroy them. In the chaotic war environment, intent was probably 
enough provided there were some basic warfighting skills that lay beneath it. The 
cavalry, among others, possessed these additional skills, as well as fantastic capabilities, 
and they went to work. Intent was enough to take immediate action, which is what the 
situation demanded. The cavalry could not sit and wait, arms crossed, on updated 
doctrinal manuals to make their way down to them, and lament that their role in a 
counterinsurgent environment was not planned for. 
As it was, the "search and destroy" and the "search and clear" appeared only 
briefly, and not widely, in doctrine, in contrast to their publicity and use in after action 
strike operations and clear, hold, and consolidation operations. Regarding strike operations is says 
"variously called search and clear, search and destroy. and others ... are primarily tactical operations." 
"Strike ops are conducted primarily to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces, and they may also be 
used to harass insurgent forces." "Strike operations are comprised of raids, RIF, coordinated attacks, relief 
operations, or combinations of these." 
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reports. They were doctrinally ephemera1.30l lt was almost as if the operations in Vietnam 
defied codification; that the commander's intent was good enough, and the doctrine 
writers recognized this. It may also be that "search and destroy" was not codified 
because there were so many versions of it, by units at different levels, on differing terrain, 
and facing different enemy formations. According to Major Robert Doughty, indeed, 
regarding "search and destroy," "no fixed model existed for such operations.,,3021t may 
have been that few were pressing for doctrinal codification. This may have been largely 
based on the fact that tactics and techniques used by the units, to the extent that they were 
new, were lucky to get codified in units SOPs such as 1-4 Cavalry's. Any ambivalence 
that may have existed among doctrine writers may have been aided by the fact that the 
war in Vietnam was seen as a passing war; it would not last. Certainly the mindset before 
the war among many senior armor professionals did not help. Their line of thinking was 
to stay away from the Vietnam topic - it was an infantryman's war, and was in a far 
away, jungle country. Consequently it was best to stay out of there and not spend much 
time worrying over it. Along these lines perhaps doctrine writers and those in charge of 
them took comfort in knowing that the conflict in Vietnam was not the true, conventional 
threat - that the potential, conventional conflict in Europe was the greatest threat, and that 
therefore as long as doctrine addressed worst case scenario then all was okay. 
In the end, armored cavalry saw a metamorphosis from the doctrinal trinity of 
traditional cavalry missions based on conventional warfare - reconnaissance, security, 
301 The term "search and destroy" is only in the 1966, 17-1 Armor Operations Manual, in the Internal 
Defense Operations section. Of note, the term "strike operations" is also found here, one of a few places. 
302 Major Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976." 
CFt. Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 48. He also mentioned 
that in 1968, the "search and destroy" was, as General Westmoreland noted, "equated in the American 
public mid with aimless searches in the jungle and destruction of property." Doughty went on to say that 
"the original term was sometimes carelessly used in a blanket faction to describe almost any kind of 
offensive operation." 
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and economy of force - to various other missions. Many of these other missions could be 
linked in some form or fashion to the closest version of the trinity missions, and collected 
under that respective category. This was particularly true with regard to reconnaissance. 
As the ACTIV study showed, the "reconnaissance" category included a wide range of 
missions ranging from the "search and destroy" to the doctrinal "reconnaissance in force" 
to "combat reconnaissance" to "protective reaction." At the heart of all of these, perhaps 
the term "search and destroy" best captures the commander's intent for these missions, 
and that was eloquently summed in the "four f's" phrase of "find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em 
and finish 'em.,,303The main difference between the metamorphosis of cavalry in Vietnam 
from that of World War II was that in the latter, cavalry went in with one set of 
expectations, and came out with very different ones, with different doctrine to legitimize 
the changes, and largely tied to organizational reorganizations during the war. In 
Vietnam, execution was different from the doctrine going in, but this metamorphosis did 
not greatly affect doctrine during the war, nor did doctrinal changes as a result of the war 
stay. In fact, cavalry doctrine became even more strongly rooted in the trinity, with little 
to no mention of the experiences gained in Vietnam.304The experiences of stability 
operations stayed were relegated to peripheral manuals. 
While the studies were informative and useful, there was institutional resistance to 
doctrinal changes to reflect current "best practice" methods. The Continental Army 
Command (CONARC) refused to let some doctrinal updates occur that Fort Knox and the 
303 Major (P) Craig S. Harju, Sf. White Paper, "A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or 
Scout Platoon. (Ft. Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor School), 47. 
304 The only manuals where the experiences of Vietnam seemed to truly linger were in the ancestors of the 
stability operations manual, seemingly relegated to peripheral status, and which by 1981 was labeled "Iow-
intensity conflict." The manual itself is FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, January 1981. 
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MACOV study group wanted to see implemented.305CONARC's reasoning was that by 
the time that some of the doctrinal "best practices" were codified, such as leading 
infantry with the M113's, or riding them into contact as opposed to dismounting short of 
the enemy or objective, the practice would be overcome by events. The enemy in the 
meantime surely would have acquired better weaponry to render the temporary doctrinal 
aberration obsolete. This was shortsighted, almost in line with a civilian book publisher's 
concern. It also may be a sign of general reluctance to alter doctrine because Vietnam 
was still perceived as a short term aberration. Part of the reluctance to accept 
recommendations for doctrinal change may have been the perception that doctrine was 
"still valid," from reading reports from Vietnam. In any event, CONARC's perspective 
may have been due partly to the fact that sometimes "best practices" were enshrined in 
memorandums disseminated for learning purposes, in SOPs, or other mediums in lieu of 
doctrine. 
To elaborate further on the concept of whether doctrine was valid, it was 
acknowledged that missions were conducted, by and large, differently in Vietnam due to 
the area war, and a litany of other reasons previously listed. However, to say that 
"doctrine is still valid" is both a truism, but also incomplete and somewhat misleading. It 
was a truism in that certainly all doctrine was not invalidated by the experiences in 
305 Maj. 1. Bryan Mullins. "Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry," (M.M.S. Monograph, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 45. 
According to Major Paul Herbert, in his Leavenworth Paper entitled "Deciding what has to be done: 
General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM-l 00-5, Operations," CONARC was created in 1962 
to oversee all Army activities in the continental United States, and as part of its responsibilities oversaw 
the operation of the Army's training bases and schools. (p. 35). Under General DePuy, CONARC was 
eventually broken into two parts, which became TRADOC - the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command which is still around in 2005, and FORSCOM - Forces Command, also still around. TRADOC 
also assumed the functions of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, "a separate command from 
CONARC whose field agencies had always been collocated with, but bureaucratically separated from, the 
Army schools. (p. 35) CDC's focus was on researching new techniques of land warfare, based on 
equipment capabilities. 
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Vietnam. To think that or to make that so would have been folly. Certainly the military 
would not "throw out" conventional doctrine it its entirety, the trinity missions of the 
cavalry. Indeed, one of the challenges of Vietnam for the military was that they had to be 
prepared, in most cases, to handle any conventional formations that the enemy decided to 
use. However, even in light of this fact, most conventional doctrine did not apply in 
Vietnam either in name, or in intent, without major modifications. This was true with the 
trinity missions of the cavalry. 
The statement that "doctrine is still valid" was also incomplete. It does not tell 
the whole story, in that a lot of the new, overarching missions conducted, such as "search 
and destroy" and "search and clear" were predicated and based on numerous other 
doctrinal tasks that made them up, such as movement to contact, reconnaissance in force, 
and other economy of force missions such as attack. The statement is also incomplete in 
that "search and destroy" missions were conducted at the platoon level, but even here 
their actions were still based on doctrinal subtasks, such as reaction to contact and 
conduct fire and maneuver. The statement is misleading because it can create the belief 
that if doctrine is valid, then what are the issues or problems? The speed reader might 
read "doctrine is valid" and tum the page. The statement that doctrine "is still valid" can 
cause a failure to examine thoroughly for lessons learned or find a need to change 
doctrine by instilling complacency in readers. A statement such as that could mislead 
readers, causing them less pain and effort then they might otherwise experience than if 
they read statements such as "doctrine does not adequately address .... ," or "doctrine is 
lacking," or "we were operating outside of doctrine." The accompanying affects of 
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reading statements such as these open a "pandora's box" of trouble, the implications 
being that officers and soldiers are not trained for their missions. 
Reasons why doctrine did not change more than it did may be partly due to 
largely decentralized, smaller-unit operations, especially after General Abrams took 
command of MACV. This resulted in tactics, techniques and procedures being developed 
at mainly small unit level, since this was the level that most contacts took place. By this 
definition, small units were brigade/regiment and below, and they conducted the bulk of 
the effort of the war. 306Changes that small units made and discoveries as to what worked 
made it into local SOPs, but many did not make it into doctrine, as evidenced by the 
cursory attention given "search and destroy" and "search and clear" in doctrinal manuals, 
and the lack of specificity and illustrations, for example, in chapters dealing with stability 
operations or counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, the small unit actions did not 
receive the big unit attention they may have gotten otherwise. Furthermore, the 
decentralized nature of operations resulted in far-flung small unit actions, spread among 
the varying terrain and enemy situations in Vietnam, with different small units 
conducting different types or variations of tactics that worked according to that particular 
terrain, enemy, and commander's personality. While there were calls to "expand" 
doctrine and incorporate "lessons learned," that was mainly it, and in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, the collective weight of other factors distracted the Army from a 
good, thorough doctrinal evaluation. 
Another reason for lack of overall doctrinal change was the idea of doctrinal "no-
mans land." The environment leading up to the Vietnam War in the early 1960s was 
already in doctrinal flux; thus U.S. entry into the war was already on a shifting doctrinal 
306 Major Robert A. Doughty, 'The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine," 47. 
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foundation. Once U.S. ground forces entered the war, they found that Vietnam was a 
situation unlike the any other the U.S. Army had ever faced, at one time. In the words of 
Generals Ira Hunt and Julian Ewell, "the war and its total environment were so foreign to 
classical western experience, military and civilian, that one could not grasp it well at the 
time, much less understand it.,,307The cavalry and the larger Army were caught up in an 
unusual situation of fighting a spectrum of enemy, from guerrillas to conventional units, 
while simultaneously trying to secure and develop the civilian population and train the 
Vietnamese Army. These multiple challenges, coming at times from all points of the 
spectrum, may have, in effect, "frozen" doctrine in a no-man's land, where the safest 
course of action was to maintain what you had, not to move too much in anyone 
direction. To the extent that people realized this, doctrine failing to predict and prepare 
cavalry prior to the war or perfectly adapt during the war, may have been seen as 
acceptable in light of the multitude of challenges the army was facing. From this 
perspective, it is little wonder that execution led doctrine. 
Arguably, doctrine did not get it right for cavalry prior to the war because overall 
doctrinal change was collapsing under its own weight. The Army was experiencing 
turbulence already in the early 1960's with the change to the ROAD divisions, and when 
counterinsurgency was added to mix, it was a great deal of change in a short period of 
time. What all the change meant was that the Army was not prepared in doctrine or 
equipment for a counterinsurgent environment such as Vietnam, largely because there 
was so much other change happening around the same time, doctrinally and 
organizationally. A study around that time said that "the tactical doctrine for the 
307 Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell and Major General Ira A. Hunt, Vietnam Studies, Sharpening the 
Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment. (Washington, D.C. : Department of 
the Army, 1974), p. 7. 
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employment of regular forces against insurgent guerrilla forces has not been adequately 
developed, and the Army does not have a clear concept of the proper scale and equipment 
necessary for these operations.,,308 
To compound the problem, there was institutional resistance on the part of the 
Army to changing doctrine and taking other measures. In the opinion of one officer, one 
of the biggest obstacles to sitting down at the table and really figuring out how to tackle 
counterinsurgent warfare was the foot dragging of many of the army officers in 
leadership positions, most of whom knew only nuclear or conventional tactical doctrine. 
Michael Lind, in his book Vietnam: The Necessary War, pointed out the military's 
response to President Kennedy's pressure to understand and prepare for 
counterinsurgency warfare was to "dismiss it as a fad.,,309Three successive high ranking 
Army generals in the early 1960s said that Kennedy was "oversold" on the concept; that 
"any good soldier can handle guerrillas"; and that "any well-trained organization can shift 
the tempo to that which might be required in this [counterinsurgency] situation." Another 
army officer and instructor at West Point stated "the U.S. Army blocked organizational 
learning during-and after-the Vietnam War.,,310 Years after the war, retired General 
Starry, author of Mounted Combat in Vietnam and former commander of the 11 th ACR in 
Vietnam, proposed that part of the problem with managing change in the Army was that 
the Army had not equipped itself with rigorous staff officers of the caliber of the German 
308 Maj. Robert Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine," 40. 
309 Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War. (N.Y: Touchstone, 1999), 103. 
310 Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War, 103-104. 
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general staff officer corps of World War II. 31 I Perhaps this might have helped rescue an 
Army that seemed recalcitrant, yet deluged in doctrinal change in the early 1960s. 
With regard to security, the second leg of the trinity, the end state in Vietnam was 
still the same as conventional doctrine: orienting on the friendly unit, and preventing 
observation or harm to friendly units or installations. However, in doctrine, the means to 
the end are as important as the end. In Vietnam, the end was the same the means were 
different. In a trinity security mission, security is usually provided by the cavalry as a 
unit, usually to its host unit. By that example, part of the cavalry's (both division and 
armored cavalry regiment) mission is to conduct security missions to protect the division 
or unit assigned. The conventional security missions for this are primarily in the forms of 
screen, guard, and cover missions. Each provides a different level of protection, or 
security, for the rest of the friendly unit. They can be stationary, or moving, and can be 
to the front, flanks, or rear. By adding these qualifiers, one can see the problems posed 
by area warfare: there are not front lines per se, no true orientation. In the area warfare, 
the dense terrain and "everywhere" nature of the enemy caused security to be 
everywhere: in convoys, along convoy routes, around installations. When units 
conducted missions, they were their own security in many cases, both in stationary night 
defensive positions in the field, and on the move, largely because they oriented on 
themselves rather than another friendly body. The one exception to this was the air 
cavalry, which provided a level of observation and early warning that a ground cavalry 
unit could conduct in a conventional, European environment, where fields of observation 
and fires were better, and the enemy came from a known direction. In Vietnam, security 
311 General Don A. Starry. "To Change An Army," Military Review, (March 1983), Vo. LXIII, Number 3, 
26. Article adapted from an address made by General Starry in 1982 to the U.S. Army War College. 
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became less of a doctrinal concept or mission, and became, for the most part, literal 
security. 
One of the other aspects about security repeatedly found in the doctrinal manuals 
of the era was that security and reconnaissance were interrelated and augmented each 
other. This was equally true in Vietnam. A "search and destroy" mission kept the enemy 
off guard and harassed him, increasing the likelihood that planning an attack on U.S. 
forces was harder and more complicated. Finding enemy supply caches or installations 
also harassed the enemy. By destroying the enemies support structure and "logistics 
nose," it made harder for him and less likely that he'd attack. Indeed, largely as a result 
of General Abrams' change in strategy, it was stated that in area operations, 
reconnaissance took on a security function. Additionally, when conducing security 
missions such as convoy escort, armored cavalry was always on the lookout for the 
enemy; thus it was always a form of reconnaissance. Further, it is arguable that in a 
country such as Vietnam, with the blurring of roles between maneuver and cavalry units, 
the homogenization, with each unit providing largely serving as its own maneuver unit 
and cavalry unit, the trinity missions were themselves more blurred and homogenized. 
Economy of force was perhaps least discussed. In a straight conventional sense, 
the principle of economy of force rests on the idea as previously discussed: that cavalry, 
with the smallest force possible, engages the enemy in offensive or defensive actions that 
enable the decisive maneuver of the main body of friendly forces. Vietnam required 
major adjustments to this trinity, doctrinal definition. The first is that seldom did a 
decisive point materialize. The decisive point became where the enemy was found, and 
at the point, the mission was his destruction. Second, seldom did the cavalry have the 
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luxury of acting as, well, the cavalry. There was seldom a main body of forces behind 
the cavalry, whose decisive maneuver was enabled by the cavalry. The closest thing to 
this was those instances of working in conjunction with airmobile infantry. In those 
cases, the cavalry would usually find and fix the enemy, and the airmobile infantry would 
maneuver to seal or block in the enemy, and prevent their escape, and complete the 
destruction of the enemy. In this situation, as was pointed out earlier, there was a role 
reversal in doctrine, with armor cavalry becoming the fixing force, and infantry becoming 
the maneuver force. In still other instances, the main body of forces was technology - the 
artillery and air strikes that were called in on the enemy to complete their destruction, 
after the enemy was found and fixed by either the cavalry or maneuver forces. Both 
served as a fixing force. Everything was predicated on finding the enemy.312 
Lastly, regarding economy of force, it can be argued that a twist on this concept 
was that, with not many cavalry and mechanized units in Vietnam let alone total forces in 
proportion to the job at hand, units were deployed across the country with economy of 
force in mind. As reflected in the 1967 stability operations manual, economy of force in 
Vietnam came to mean, in one sense, that units that had an area of responsibility, 
enabling other forces to conduct strike operations as opportunities arose. In area 
operations, units were spread over as much terrain as possible, and when the enemy was 
found, appropriate friendly forces were massed on him. The decisive point became a 
decisive point, or decisive points. 
Other methods of achieving the Vietnam version of economy of force - that is, 
getting the most area coverage possible, came from new techniques such as saturation 
patrolling. Saturation patrolling was one of the techniques mentioned more often later in 
312 Which is probably why "search and destroy" seemed to take on such mythic proportions. 
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the war, and was likely another reflection of General Abrams's emphasis on smaller-unit 
operations. According to the 1967 stability operations manual, saturation patrolling 
entailed "deployment of patrols over a selected area of operations so that insurgents 
cannot move without detection. 313Patrolling was conducted by squad and platoon-sized 
forces which maintained contact with insurgent forces until larger units could be 
deployed to destroy them.,,314Under offensive operations, the manual says that 
"harassment tactics also may be conducted as an economy of force measure," and under 
defensive operations, the manual said to "economize forces in one area in order to apply 
decisive force elsewhere.,,315 This was the new, Vietnam-version of economy of force. 
At the same time, in area operations, finding and destroying was not the only 
goal. General Abrams realized that the war of the people was as important as destruction 
of the enemy. Therefore, this part of the war took on added emphasis. It meant that the 
civil side of the war could be seen almost as a new form of decisive maneuver. Under 
this increased emphasis on the civil side of an area war, economy of force meant that 
forces were spread around as much as was feasible, providing maximum coverage that 
allowed massing elsewhere. This improved the security of the people by increased 
presence and familiarity with terrain in a particular area. Presence also was deterrence, 
show of force, and harassment. The very presence of units protected the citizens and 
impeded guerilla activity. Further, continued presence meant not leaving after a big 
operation, allowing guerrillas to return or rebuild. This aspect of the war in Vietnam, 
313 Saturation patrolling is another example of using intent, like "search and destroy." There is no one 
diagram that shows how to best conduct it (there are written descriptions in reports), but it is understood 
that saturation patrolling is saturating an area with small patrols that at some point, are everywhere. Even 
with saturation patrolling, the end state was still the same, however. 
314 FM 31-23 Stability Operations 1967, 89. 
315 FM 31-23,1967, 90. 
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given increased focus under General Abrams, when added to the success of tactical 
operations, led author and historian Lewis Sorley to make the assertion that the war was 
actually won in late 1970.316 
Part of the reason the metamorphosis between the trinity missions of the cavalry 
and their execution in Vietnam happened was because it could. In that sense, the cavalry 
were victims of their own success, akin to the super achiever who finds only more tasks 
piled on the plate. There were several major reasons why it was convenient for the 
cavalry to become a "jack of all trades." One was that the cavalry possessed many 
positive characteristics that quickly enabled them to accomplish a myriad of tasks, such 
as firepower, mobility, protection, flexibility, and inherent task organization. They 
quickly shifted from a force whose role was not envisioned in an insurgent environment 
(unlike the helicopter) to one that was used almost everywhere, for almost everything. 
Another reason that the cavalry could adapt from their trinity missions was that very 
rarely did enemy forces represent a lethal threat to U.S. and allied forces, and seldom 
were they massed. Therefore, U.S. forces did not, and could not keep out or away enemy 
forces, or find them in the sense of large, lethal formations, because there were virtually 
none (until after U.S. forces left). On the other hand, the dispersed, covert nature of the 
guerillas and the terrain that hid them precluded trinity missions in the traditional sense. 
Therefore, it was almost as if the enemy was too small to be relevant to conventional, 
trinity mission doctrinal template, while at the other end of the spectrum, the relative lack 
of massed formations further rendered the doctrinal template largely impractical. 
Therefore, it was both okay and necessary to adjust, and the cavalry could. 
316 Sorley, A Better War, 217. 
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The ground cavalry's trinity roles were still important; indeed, intelligence in 
Vietnam was crucial. With cavalry becoming largely maneuver units, and vice versa, 
both blending their responsibilities (doctrinal homogenization), the "old" responsibilities 
of the trinity did not go away per se; rather, they were largely picked up by other assets, 
other new concepts and formations that could, especially the air cavalry. The fact that the 
trinity missions were taken up by other newer organizations and certain technologies 
largely covered for the ground cavalry while they were out performing their adapted 
missions. The newer organizations and technologies were enablers that eased the loss of 
the ground cavalry performing in their trinity roles, and aided and abetted the de facto 
transition of doctrinal responsibility, and masked the change. An example of this was 
Task Force Spur, with air cavalry providing far reconnaissance of the objective and land 
navigation, or in statements in after action reports to the effect that "the aero scout section 
has proven to be the most effective means of locating the Viet Cong.,,317 Additionally, 
infantry and other maneuver units picked up trinity roles, such as flank and rear security, 
just as the cavalry picked up maneuver roles - all part of the mission homogenization.318 
Beyond the air cavalry and other conventional maneuver units, there were other 
means of filling the trinity gap. During the later years of the war, cavalry units, among 
others, used techniques such as automatic ambushes, which were ambushes that were 
powered by batteries tied to claymore mines. rigged to go off with no friendly forces 
present. 319There was a new doctrinal emphasis on surveillance, the passive dimension of 
reconnaissance. Intelligence and reconnaissance gathering assets were created during 
317 "Annual Historical Summary, E Troop, 17th Cavalry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), 
September 1966. S7D3, #17, II B 1-6. 
318 1-4 Cavalry SOP, 1966, S2D3B I, #69, II. The examples here are of infantry battalions providing flank 
and rear security for brigade sized operations. 
319 Automatic Ambush Memo, 3/11 ACR, S2D3B I, #65, 7 November 1970. 
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the Vietnam with positive results, such as the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 
(LRRPs), Long Range Reconnaissance Companies (as a Corps level asset), and a number 
of programs run through the Special Forces such as Mobile Guerilla Forces and Mobile 
Strike Forces, Project Omega, and other operations with their Civilian Irregular Defense 
Group (CIDG) counterparts. The Special Forces operations in particular were primarily 
dismounted reconnaissance, but they conducted screening and surveillance missions, and 
as necessary conducted limited attack and defense missions. At first, their missions were 
primarily to "provide a reconnaissance and intelligence screen" along the Cambodian 
border, as well as area development, but after 1965, their missions shifted to finding the 
enemy for the conventional forces. 32o 
Other additional reconnaissance assets included the use of reconnaissance 
airplane companies, and even scout tracking dogs. 321Another aspect ofthe war was the 
increased emphasis on and critical importance of human intelligence on enemy activities 
and whereabouts, and penetration of his political activities. The Phoenix Program was an 
example of this. Lastly, increasing reliance on technology, such as seismic sensors, 
infrared and image intensification night vision devices, radar, photography, and even 
devices known as "people sniffers" were used to shore up trinity missions. 
320 Outline History of the 5th SF Gp (Abn), "Participation in the CIDG Program, 1961-1970," U.S. Army 
Military History Institute, 2-3. The history also refers to the period of 1965 to 1969 as "Support of 
American Conventional Unit Deployment." It states that SF and CIDG forces were used in a "variety of 
services, including local reconnaissance, flank security, intelligence reports, bomb damage assessments, 
guides, and interpreters." Further, it was estimated that by 1967 U.S. Army Special Forces (units) were 
producing over 40% of all MACV ground combat intelligence. (p. 15-17.) Apparently, the border 
surveillance role was filled by the SF and the CIDG, until 1970, when the CIDG were discontinued, partly 
because it was determined that at that point in the war, the job of border surveillance could be turned over 
to the ARVN because of their increased level of competence. It may have had to do too with the levels of 
success elsewhere in the country, i.e. post-Tet and under new strategy under General Abrams. 




THE POST-VIETNAM LEGACY 
Historian and Professor George Herring stated that "in the immediate aftermath of 
the war, the nation experienced a self-conscious, collective amnesia. ,,322The military was 
a large part of this experience. In a sense, the amnesia was a result of self-administered 
anesthesia, an effort to numb the pain of shock, disappointment, betrayal, and confusion, 
as a result of the Vietnam War. These emotions created a vulnerable environment for an 
institution such as the Army that did not have the luxury of asking too many questions 
when so many were asking for answers from them. As in other times history, change 
often takes place during times upheaval and great turmoil. The U.S. Army in post-war 
Vietam was in such a state, and was no exception. 
By the end of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in 1973, the U.S. Army 
was in need of repair and change. Its reputation seemingly needed refurbishing in the 
wake of the perception that the military lost the war. It was in need of repair in terms of a 
loss of identity; the sense of having lost America's first war was no doubt a mind-
numbing sensation, and the scorn which much of America heaped on it upon its return no 
doubt affected its sense of identity. The army questioned itself and a country that saw it 
fight a war in a far away land that few seemed to cared about. 
322 Herring, America's Longest War, 273. 
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To add a sense of urgency, everything from Vietnam seemed wrong. The U.S. 
theoretically lost the war. Morale was down. Discipline was down. Recruiting for the 
new volunteer Army was down. One school of thought found fault with success; the air 
cavalry and airmobile infantry that had done so well there did so because of the enemy's 
lack of air defense options. The same was undoubtedly true with opinions about armor 
and cavalry; that they did well largely because the enemy did not have the volume of 
anti-tank weaponry to stop them, and so on. In that climate, it was not hard to heap other 
factors on top to continue to push the Army toward forgetfulness of the lessons of 
Vietnam. The outcome of the war seemed to confirm pre-Vietnam war biases about the 
use of armor and cavalry in an unconventional war; those who saw the war as an 
aberration or a temporary blip on the radar, or those that thought a war such as Vietnam 
belonged to the netherworld of infantry and Special Forces. Now, it appeared that the 
Army needed to unlearn the way of fighting in Vietnam and quit cold turkey, because 
what was learned there was now hazardous to national security health. In the opinion of 
one historian, "in short, a decade of war in Vietnam had rendered the U.S. Army an 
unlikely instrument with which to protect America's European interests.,,323 
One the areas that needed repair was doctrine. The need to overhaul doctrine 
stemmed from the usage of an army that had been structured for a conventional fight 
before the Vietnam, but whose conventional abilities, habits, and understanding of war 
experienced a metamorphosis in Vietnam. While the metamorphosis was good in the 
sense that Army units, cavalry included, showed amazing verve, versatility, and 
flexibility in their ability to adapt conventional missions in Vietnam, and other units 
323 Major Paul Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and 
the 1976 Edition ofFM 100-5, Operations." (Ft. Leavenworth, KS : Leavenworth Papers, #16, 1988), 13. 
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proved their concepts worthy such as the airmobile infantry and air cavalry, it was bad in 
that the Army was seen as no longer prepared to fight the truly critical wars. Now there 
was a sense of urgency to revamp, because, as seen from the eyes of the generals, the 
U.S. had lost time during the Vietnam War doctrinally, and now had to catch Up.324 
The idea to overhaul doctrine also came from a revamp in strategy. As part of a 
major reassessment of U.S. strategic policy in the wake of the war, the U.S. decided that 
it needed to reduce its potential commitment to third world nations and the amount of 
wars it could realistically fight simultaneously. Consequently, the Army adopted a "1 Y2 
war" (at any given time) as opposed to the "2 112 war" po~icy of the 1960's.325The plans 
called for a shift back from Asia to a cold war stance in Europe with NATO, as part of a 
strategy entitled "strategy of realistic deterrence." The model scenario said that the Army 
needed to be prepared to fight in Europe (the "I"), at the same time theoretically as a 
conflict in the Middle East (the "112"). With a resurgent Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, 
many felt that the tattered Army that emerged from the jungles of Vietnam was in no 
condition to confront this threat. This was the major factor in reforming and repairing the 
Army after Vietnam. 
If the major impetus for doctrinal overhaul did not come from one man, it was 
certainly led by one man. The need for revamping doctrine was led by General William 
DePuy, formerly the commander of the 1st ID in Vietnam, 1-4 Cavalry's division. His 
perspective as commander of newly formed Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) was that the Army had learned bad habits in Vietnam, and that now they 
needed to unlearn them, shake off the dust of Vietnam, and get collective heads back in 
324 Doughty, "The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine," 63. 
325 Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done," 13. 
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the game. One of his major contributions in the post-Vietnam era was the creation of the 
new 1976 version of FM 100-5 Operations, the first since 1968. The new manual set the 
tone and direction for the rest of the Army. 
Most importantly, with the new FM 100-5 he wanted to make a deliberate break 
from the past in order to set doctrine up to prepare for the next war, not fight the last one. 
He felt that soldiers and officers had learned bad habits in Vietnam that would get them 
killed in the conventional fight. 326 Therefore, his was a conscious effort to break from the 
past in order to "wipe the slate clean." Doing so brought no cries of protest, as methods 
and doctrinal execution in Vietnam were atypical in most respects, certainly with respect 
to the cavalry. Certainly, he can't be faulted for wanting to prepare for the strategic worst 
case scenario, which took the Army back to a familiar place: Europe. 
Some of the overarching characteristics of the new manual were that it 
emphasized the importance of winning the first battle in a potential clash in Europe. 
Some of this was a result of watching the results ofthe Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Further, 
the tank returned to prominence, becoming the "decisive weapon" of ground combat, but 
the manual also emphasized the importance of the combined arms team. Overall, the 
manual's tone was that of armored, mobile warfare, with a threat model based on Warsaw 
Pact forces. The manual was clearly geared toward a conventional war in Europe. It 
introduced the idea of the "active defense," and introduced the term "Air-Land Battle.,,327 
There were other factors that helped foster a sense of urgency toward creating this 
manual. According to Major Paul Herring in his work on General DePuy and his creation 
of the new FM 100-5, one of the additional and very important reasons for doctrine is that 
326 Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done," 28. 
327 Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done," 17. 
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it supports the credibility of the U.S. government, and by so doing helps achieve foreign 
policy objectives simply by its existence. It sends a clear position to potential enemies 
and thus it enhances credibility when it comes to containment, deterrence, and conflict 
contro1.328It was very likely that General DePuy saw this and believed this. The Army, 
stumbling out of Vietnam could ill afford to have doctrinal confusion or send messages of 
weakness to allies or potential adversaries. Further, one of doctrine's roles is to connect 
tactics all the way up to national strategy. In light of this, it was possible that because 
doctrine was so much based on conventional conflict, a seeming "misapplication" of it in 
Vietnam caused a chain reaction of "misfits" all the way up the doctrinal ladder, or vice 
versa. Perhaps the biggest gap in doctrine was in not addressing prior to the war the 
special aspects of counterinsurgency in doctrine as they pertained to the adaptation of 
conventional forces, and in not beefing up the tactical aspects and explanations of 
fighting the counterinsurgency - being more specific. 
There was also the civilian side of counterinsurgency / stability operations. 
General Abrams especially recognized and emphasized this part of the war. By 
combating the insurgency without addressing General Abrams' "one war" from the 
beginning, the U.S. arguably played into the hands of the North Vietnamese, who sought 
to tie down and wear out U.S. forces with guerillas acting in an economy-of-force role. 
The waiting game was lost, as the American people lost patience with the war and 
consequently the political will to continue was lost. Additionally, though the U.S. forces 
were winning tactically - the inability of the U.S. to articulate the appropriate strategic 
goals handicapped the tactical efforts from the outset. This lack of ability to articulate the 
appropriate strategy lies at the feet of the Commanders-in-Chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
328 Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done," 12. 
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and the highest leaders on the ground in Vietnam.329In the words of Col. Harry Summers 
in his work On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, "tactical success is not necessarily 
strategic success, and tactical failure is not necessarily strategic failure.,,33°In any event, 
perhaps part of the reasoning behind the new doctrine after the war was to better align 
tactics with national security policy and strategy objectives. 
While the new FM 100-5 set the tone for the Army and determined the direction it 
would take, the cavalry, in the post-Vietnam era did not experience much doctrinal 
change. The impact of the metamorphosis on armored cavalry while in Vietnam did not 
have much effect beyond Vietnam. During the war, they transitioned from their doctrinal 
role as a force specially trained and equipped to perform their trinity missions to a "jack 
of all trades" function. At the end of the Vietnam war, the doctrinal framework was set 
for their return to the trinity, a quick whisking back to the reality of their job as "masters 
of some." It probably took little incentive for armored cavalry to want to get back to their 
trinity missions. 
Before rushing back to the trinity, however, questions might have been asked. 
During Vietnam they adapted their trinity missions, and fought within self-imposed 
restraints, in unfriendly terrain, against a wily and tenacious enemy. They did what they 
had to do, and became a "jack of all trades" largely because they could. One might pose 
the questions about their ability to do so much, and do it well. Under more scrutiny, one 
might ask why there were not more units like the cavalry, units with so many positive 
qualities, such as organic task organization down to the platoon level, as well as 
firepower, mobility, protection, and top-notch communications. It may have been that 
329 Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1982), 57. 
330 Summer, On Strategy, 57. 
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these attributes were given a cold-water bath of reality by a trend that found fault with 
success. In the case of the cavalry, a critique of their relative success may have been the 
fact that they faced a relatively lightly armed adversary, faced no enemy armored 
vehicles or air power. In short, the cavalry did well because they overmatched the 
enemy. 331 As it was, one of the biggest "problems" with the cavalry was posed by General 
Starry at the end of his work Mounted Combat In Vietnam. In it, he ponders the question 
of piecemealing armor, whether it was done accidentally, ignoring the lessons of history, 
or by necessity. On the other side, the necessity of the cavalry might have been 
questioned. Did the Army even need units trained for trinity missions, such as the 
cavalry? After all, during Vietnam, cavalry performed maneuver unit missions, and by 
default maneuver units performed their own versions of trinity missions. In this context, 
what was the difference, or why have a difference? These were two questions to ponder: 
why not make more units more like cavalry, but at the same time, the question might be 
asked, do we really need cavalry? 
In spite of these possible questions, it seemed that the main impact for the cavalry 
that served in Vietnam was relearning the conventional tasks, and in a sense forgetting 
what they learned in Vietnam, not only because they had to, but because the culture of the 
time encouraged them to do so. Caught up in need to redirect doctrine from the top, 
lessons learned and doctrinal adaptations, with a few exceptions, were put on the shelves, 
perhaps one of the drawbacks of driving doctrine from the top without thorough 
canvassing from the bottom. Ironically, the two studies conducted during the war, the 
MACOV study and the ACTIV study involved fairly thorough bottom-up analysis. In 
331 This is similar to comments and observations about the air cavalry and the airmobile infantry: they did 
well because of the low to non-existent air defense threat of the enemy. 
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any event, the cavalry resumed planning for and training for newly energized cold war, 
conventional, European setting trinity missions. The transition may have been fairly 
easy. 
Cavalry doctrine in the post-war period did not change much, since now they 
were doing what they were supposed to be doing all along: pure and unadulterated trinity 
missions in a conventional war setting. The new cavalry manuals of 1977 and 1981 
reflected this. One change of note was the one of the previous fundamentals of 
reconnaissance had changed. "A void decisive engagements" was gone, and in its place 
was "retain freedom of maneuver.,,332Thus, it is arguable that the "fighting cavalry" 
legacy had an effect on the doctrine of cavalry at the end of the Vietnam era. However, 
the biggest overall change was that all references to counterinsurgency, stability 
operations, or any of the terms from Vietnam such as "search and destroy" were gone. 
Even reconnaissance in force was gone. Additionally, the threat model was exclusively 
based on the Cold War threat in Europe. 333Regarding this whitewashing of the doctrine, 
at least one perspective was that at least now doctrine was making a conscious effort to 
prepare cavalry for the next war, whereas in Vietnam execution led much of what 
occurred and doctrine followed. Perhaps a conclusion was reached that it was easier to 
train the cavalry and the army in general for conventional missions and then have them 
adapt to counterinsurgent-type warfare, rather than the other way around. 
Regarding the fate of stability operations, after the October, 1972 manual, the 
next came out in November,1974, right on the heels of the departure of u.s. troops from 
Vietnam. For the 1974 manual, the name had changed back to Internal Defense and 
332 FM 17-95, Cavalry, July 1977, 5-2; FM 17-36, 1968, 1-5. 
333 FM 17-95 Cavalry April 1981, 2-1. 
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Development, tenns that were used earlier during the war. The next version came out in 
1981, FM 100-20, entitled Low Intensity Conflict. It was almost as though the tenn 
"stability operations" brought back the specter of Vietnam, and was therefore banished. 
Surprisingly, however, the manual did not dump all the tenns. Missions were found in a 
chapter entitled "counterguerrilla operations.,,334The missions were broken into 
categories such as "operational techniques," some of which included search operations, 
patrols, ambush, counterambush, and encirclement. Another category, "offensive 
operations" includes movement to contact, and reconnaissance in force, among others. 
There were even the familiar tenns of "strike campaign" and "consolidation 
campaign.,,335Though none of the defined operational tenns or techniques were described 
in detail, they were there, and reflections of the Vietnam experience were there. 
Curiously enough, in the cyclical nature of warfare in history, the concept of 
stability operations appeared again in the mid-nineties with the deployments of u.S. 
soldiers to Bosnia, only then the tenns transferred from high-intensity / low-intensity 
conflict (HIC and LIC) to Operations Other Than War, and Military Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW and MOOTW). Not long after that, stability operations came back as 
a tenn, and in today's conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is referred to doctrinally as 
Stability Operations / Support Operations (SOSO). 
Conclusion 
In the end, cavalry doctrine based on the trinity missions changed, but changed 
after the fact. The trinity missions changed in name, and intent, and even meaning, but 
most the doctrine added was at best cursory. Ground cavalry execution changed in front 
334 FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict 1981, 6. 
335 FM 100-20, 1981, 7-9. 
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of the doctrilJal curve out of the necessity to adapt to area warfare and the area operations 
that had to be adapted to it. Evidence of this change was found particularly in new 
mission terms, such as "search and destroy." What made broader terms such as "search 
and destroy" work, and what perhaps may excuse the fact that it and others like it such as 
"search and clear" were barel y mentioned in doctrine is that the terms conveyed 
overarching intent. Given the lack of detail in newly released doctrine during this 
period, this reliance on intent may have been planned. Furthermore, new and broader 
terms such as "search and destroy" rested on other doctrinal missions, which gave the 
broader terms doctrinal credibility. For example, "search and destroy" rested on multiple 
doctrinal tasks, such as a movement to contact or reconnaissance in force. 
The pre-war cavalry doctrine's focus on the conventional trinity missions neatly 
fit into predictions of a minimal role for armor and cavalry in an environment such as 
Vietnam. As a result, cavalry troopers were largely unprepared for the environment in 
which they found themselves. Indicators show that mounted vehicles were not seriously 
considered for use in a counterinsurgent role, as evidenced by the accidental deployment 
of armor to Vietnam. They adapted, mostly because they had to, but also because they 
could. They adapted the doctrine and skills that they had. In the process, the trinity 
missions changed in execution, with cavalry's missions becoming more like maneuver 
units in a form of de facto mission homogenization. Consequently, ground cavalry 
became a "jack of all trades." All of this was aided by the introduction of other forms of 
intelligence gathering to help fill the trinity gaps. These forms utilized emerging 
technologies mounted on aircraft and on the ground, such as night vision devices, radar, 
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and seismic devices. These technological advances helped increase and emphasize 
surveillance, which helped particularly with reconnaissance, but also with security. 
These hard learned lessons were largely set aside at the end of the war as the 
Army set about expunging the habits of Vietnam from its collective memory, partly 
because the memories were painful, but also seen as harmful to survival on the future 
battlefield. Also expunged were the discussions of the metamorphosis that occurred 
between cavalry doctrine and cavalry execution in a counterinsurgent environment. The 
bottom line was that what was done "in the 'Nam'" would get you killed in another 
environment, the most important one, conventional war in Europe, where winning the 
first battle was critical. Most of what was done in Vietnam was relegated to lesser 
manuals. 
In the final analysis, doctrinal terms are important - the words have meaning. 
Doctrine is important, because it connects tactics all the way to national policy and 
strategy. While doctrine is subject to intelligent interpretation on the ground, it does have 
limits. Vietnam is a good example of stretching doctrine to its limits in terms of 
execution, but at the cost of under preparing soldiers for the environment they would be 
facing. In short, execution led doctrine. While this situation is certainly always possible 
because of the uncertain nature of war, it is not optimal. While doctrine will never 
foresee everything, it should do its best, and to do this, it should not let the lessons of 
Vietnam slip away. 
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